The Dissertation Committee for Rachel Reis Mourão Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

From Mass to Elite Protests: How Journalists Covered the 2013 and 2015 Demonstrations in Brazil

Committee:

Stephen Reese, Supervisor

Rosental Alves

Thomas Johnson

Joseph Straubhaar

Regina Lawrence

From Mass to Elite Protests: How Journalists Covered the 2013 and 2015 Demonstrations in Brazil

by

Rachel Reis Mourão, B.A.; M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

August 2016

Dedication

To Adrian

Acknowledgements

This study reflects my fascination with the relationship between journalism, technology, and politics in Latin America. First and foremost, I would like to thank the Brazilian journalists who took the time to answer my survey and talk to me about their work during a turbulent period in our country's history. It is not easy to be a reporter in Latin America, and I hope this work sheds light on some of the issues facing the press and Democracy in Brazil.

During this program, I have been so fortunate to learn from the greatest minds in the field of Communication. First, my advisor Dr. Steve Reese. About a decade ago, when I was learning about Framing in a city in the heart of the Amazon jungle, I never thought one day I would be privileged enough to meet Dr. Reese. It has been such an honor to have him push me forward theoretically and empirically during this process. With him, I learned how to "get things done," but not without taking the time to think about how my arguments matter. His excitement about the intellectual craft is an inspiration to all students at UT.

I am also indebted to my dissertation committee members for their guidance and excitement about this project. Professor Rosental Alves, who has been a friend and mentor, and whose doors are always open to talk about journalism. Rosental allowed me to use his network of journalists at the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas and without him this dissertation would not be possible. I am also grateful to Dr. Regina Lawrence, my former chair and my academic role model. Her guidance has undoubtedly made me a better political communication scholar. Many thanks also to Dr. Tom Johnson, who has been incredibly generous and kind with his time and feedback. I also

thank Dr. Joe Straubhaar for his passion for my country; I learned more about Brazil from Dr. Straubhaar than the other way around.

I would also like to recognize other people at UT Austin who have helped me during this program. Our director R.B. Brenner, whose passion for digital journalism has inspired my teaching in so many ways. R.B. has taught me that innovation is something to be greatly excited about, and I hope to keep this perspective alive in future endeavors. Dr. George Sylvie and Dani Kilgo, who worked with me on a project on the Ferguson protests that paved the way for this research. I'd also like to thank my three coders Giovana, Heloisa and Thays, who are amazing Brazilian graduate students and whose insights during training sessions have significantly improved my project.

Two brilliant women deserve especial mention for being more than friends during this journey: Magdalena Saldaña and Shannon McGregor. I simply could not have done this without them. My fondest memories from this program come from our statistics marathons and Beyoncé dance-offs. Their friendship, support and intellectual inspiration have shown me that, together, women can be strong in Academia. Our bond goes deeper than research, and I have no doubt that our families will always be connected. They have taught me the true meaning of sorority, and I'm looking forward to our first #PhDGirls retreat.

I also owe incredible thanks to my family and friends in Brazil. My father, who taught me journalism matters. His dedication to this profession goes beyond words, and the challenges we faced growing up have profoundly influenced this project. My mother, who always listens to me with an open heart. I know it was not easy to see me permanently move to America, but our love easily overcomes the distance. I thank my grandmother for her dedication in raising me and my sister, and for her countless prayers to all conceivable Catholic saints for my projects. My sister, Renata, who taught me how

to read and believed in me way before I believed in myself. Without her support, I would never have left Manaus to start my master's program. My friend Nathalia who is the best listener and my proudest cheerleader. And, of course, I thank my nephew Ian, who is a constant source of inspiration and joy in our lives.

Most importantly of all, I thank my husband Adrian for his love and support ever since we met in Florida. His generosity goes beyond anything I could possibly ask for, and his insights were critical to my work during this program. He is my best friend, my trusted editor, my connection to the "real world," and my source of inspiration. His love keeps me going and true happiness comes from making him proud of my work.

Muito obrigada!

From Mass to Elite Protests: How Journalists Covered the 2013 and 2015 Demonstrations in Brazil

Rachel Reis Mourão, PhD

The University of Texas at Austin, 2016

Supervisor: Stephen D. Reese

This dissertation uses a media sociology approach to untangle how multiple influences shaped journalistic coverage of two waves of protests in Brazil. In 2013, small demonstrations against bus fares evolved into a series of large protests expressing generalized dissatisfaction with conditions in the country. Following the reelection of center-leftist Dilma Rousseff, another wave of protests returned in 2015, this time with a clear agenda: the removal of the President.

Communication research has long examined the "protest paradigm," a pattern of news coverage that delegitimizes social movements. The Brazilian context provided a chance to assess the extent to which the paradigm holds when protests take on an elite-driven narrative contesting a government in crisis.

This project uses a quantitatively-driven mixed methods approach to provide a holistic understanding of how journalists went about covering the demonstrations. First, content analysis presents an overview of how coverage evolved over time. Then, a survey of journalists reveals their newsgathering routines and political attitudes. Finally, 23

journalists were selected for a matched data analysis linking survey data to the content they produced.

Results reveal that when grievances evolved into coherent anti-government demands, official sources from opposition parties served to legitimize the movement, even when journalists themselves viewed protestors with skepticism. In fact, findings suggest that the more journalists supported demonstrations, the less favorably they covered them. This holds true even when controlling for their outlet's editorial line, as measured by journalists' own perception of their employers. Through in-depth interviews, journalists described how they continually self-assessed and corrected for bias, citing professional norms as the basis for critical coverage of protests they personally supported.

This study departs from an understanding of protest coverage as paradigmatic towards a more complex view of the relationship between protestors and the press. The analysis helps elucidate the conditions under which the protest paradigm fails and how favorable coverage can occur. The experience of Brazil shows that when an elite opposition supports protests, journalistic norms and routines validate demonstrations, regardless of journalists' own attitudes.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: A country in crisis

In the decades since the military relinquished control of the government in 1985, Brazil has been a politically stable democracy, with seven successful transitions of presidential power. In 2009, the country was among the first ones to recover from the global economic shutdown. Growth has been matched by a decline in poverty indicators, with income redistribution being the trademark of the last decade of leftist governments in the country. In 2014, Brazil hosted the FIFA World Cup and in 2016 Rio de Janeiro is hosting South America's first-ever Olympic games. But on the eve of the Olympics, the country faces a deep economic recession, an unprecedented corruption scandal, declining GDP per capita, and a political crisis likely to culminate in the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff.

The history of this crisis started in the summer of 2013. A year before the FIFA World Cup, the world watched perplexed as thousands of Brazilians took to the streets in response to police repression of a small protest in São Paulo against a 20-cent increase in public transportation fares. While the unrest had its origins in demands of the lower class, it grew exponentially in scope. Protestors asked for political reform and anti-corruption measures, and criticized the exorbitant expenditures on infrastructure for the World Cup, as well as the lack of access to public spaces controlled by FIFA during the tournament (Romero & Neuman, 2013). Journalists also became targets of repression: according to the Brazilian Association for Investigative Journalism, more than 50 reporters were

assaulted and several were arrested by the police during the first month of protests. The second week of demonstrations was marked by large support from the population, less police repression, and more favorable media coverage (Moretzsohn, 2013). During this stage, conservative sectors started joining the movement and widening the scope of grievances against the government.

From an organizational perspective, the 2013 protests were largely coordinated online, with MPL initially directing collective action through social media. After the first week, MPL quit its protagonist role and the movement gained the characteristics of "crowd-enabled connective action." This form of protest does not depend on the role of any organizational actor; engaging in contentious politics becomes an act of personal expression, without the requirement of a shared common identity (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, 2013). Beyond communication, digital media played an organizing and mobilizing role in connective action. Social media, thus, work as place where crowds work together to shape mobilization, allocate resources, and adapt the movement to their own personal meaning.

After the reelection of President Rousseff in 2014, a second wave of anti-government protests erupted in the country. Organized by a right-leaning group called *Movimento Brasil Livre* (MBL), the 2015 protests were a response to several years of economic recession and the biggest corruption scandal in history unveiled by a federal police operation called "Operation Car Wash" (Watts, 2015). During the demonstrations, MBL emerged as a semi-formal organization moderating collective action mainly though Facebook. Those protests had a diverse set of demands, from moderate ones such as

tougher anti-corruption investigations, to radical solutions like a military coup d'état following the impeachment of the elected President. By March, 2015, MBL and its allies brought more than 1 million people to the streets asking for the removal of the President. A year later, Rousseff's impeachment proceedings were approved by the Senate and she was removed from power.

STUDY PURPOSES

This dissertation examined how journalists navigated this political turmoil to cover the demonstrations in Brazil. The goal was to analyze the various influences shaping journalistic work and how patterns of protest coverage manifested in the country's press during the two demonstrations. Little is known about the way the Brazilian press portrayed the movements and how journalists perceived the demonstrations as they unfolded. Furthermore, very few studies, if any, have addressed the role of social media as a tool for reporting protests, which are now largely organized online. This project aimed to fill this gap, focusing on frame building, that is, the process of creation of frames by journalists (D'Angelo, 2011; Scheufele, 1999). Thus, this research project had three main purposes: (a) to analyze the way journalists framed the 2013 and 2015 protests in Brazil; (b) to investigate the different levels of influences on journalists' work; and (c) to assess the impact of social media for the work of journalists covering the protests.

The first goal of this dissertation refers to content produced by journalists covering the protests in 2013 and 2015. Several studies have investigated media portrayal of protestors and found that news has traditionally presented mobilizations in a very

negative way. Stories emphasize violence and deviant behavior, and ignore the demands and grievances of protestors. Scholars call this pattern of coverage the "protest paradigm" (Boyle, McLeod, & Armstrong, 2012; Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). In this research, I was interested in the way Brazilian journalists adhered to the protest paradigm as protests grew in scope and demands shifted. Through a sociological approach rooted in the work of Benford and Snow (2000) on movement-specific and generic frames, this project linked media content to the evolution on protest frames behind the movements. Movement-specific frames are particular to an issue and only pertinent to particular protests, while generic frames go beyond specific events and themes and can be used by different social movement organizations over time and in different contexts (Benford & Snow, 2000; De Vreese, 2012). In this project, I analyzed how the evolution from movement-specific demands (bus fare rates) to generic frames (e.g. rights, political reform) affected journalistic coverage.

The second purpose of this project was to assess the influences on journalists' work following the hierarchy of influences model (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). The hierarchical model uses concentric circles as a visual depiction of multiple influences on media content, taking into account micro, meso and macro influences. Through the results of a survey and in-depth interviews with Brazilian journalists, this research uncovered the different inputs and constraints on the way reporters perceive and go about covering contentious politics in the country.

Finally, the relationship between reporting and social media was at the center of the third purpose of this project. Guided by the theory of normalization, the goal was to

investigate how social media served as an input for journalists covering protests, and how online discourse influenced the process of news production during demonstrations. Results from survey and in-depth interviews provided information on the way social media conversations were incorporated into reporting routines.

This project addressed its three purposes though a quantitatively-driven multi-method approach. First, a content analysis of news stories published by the four main newspapers in the country assessed how coverage evolved as the protests unfolded. Then, a survey of Brazilian journalists tapped into reporting routines and attitudes towards the movement. Finally, survey data from 23 selected journalists was matched with the content they produced in a model that simultaneously tests how variables from all levels of the hierarchical model predict actual content.

Findings are particularly relevant given the recent increase of similar types of protests in developing countries including Venezuela, Egypt and Mexico. As US politics and media become more polarized, the insights from this research may also shed light on the way certain media organizations (e.g. Fox News, MSNBC) cover anti-government protests that are supported by elite groups (e.g. Tea Party).

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

This project used the hierarchical model of influences to analyze how multiple inputs affected news coverage of the 2013 and 2015 protests in Brazil. The literature on the protest paradigm stems from studies in the United States and Europe, which found that negative patterns of protest news coverage arise from news routines favoring official viewpoints, conflict and spectacle. Brazil offers a unique opportunity in that North

American media norms and technological advancements are combined with a more dynamic political system, currently headed by a center-leftist political party. The Brazilian case is also different than the United States because coalitions and political parties are less stable; alliances shift between election cycles and new smaller parties emerge and disappear every few years. Political elites' support of a social movements has less to do with ideological affinities with demands, and more to do with how they align with the government under attack. This context provided a chance to examine the extent to which media routines supporting the protest paradigm respond to political uncertainty, including elite-supported protests.

My argument is that protests are covered more favorably if their frames are aligned with the preferences of anti-government elites, who subsidize information to journalists. Rather than understanding protest coverage as paradigmatic, this project assessed under which conditions negative coverage appears, and under which conditions demonstrations were covered more favorably.

The 2013 and the 2015 protests are ripe for this analysis, as frames evolved from grievances of the lower class to those of the upper-middle class. Findings help elucidate not only how journalists cover street demonstrations, but how coverage responds in the face of a changing narrative negotiated by its supporters on social media. Through a media sociology approach, this analysis helps explain when more favorable media coverage happened, how media professionals perceived different types of protests and how those perceptions were reflected in the news.

This research was contextually rooted in the evolution of master frames guiding

the protests in 2013 and 2015, accounting for weekly changes in the coverage. The quantitative approach treated variables from the levels of influence as stable and independent, but it is important to recognize that the relationship between media and protestor discourses is dynamic and complex. For this project, I treated news coverage as the outcome of the analysis, but with an understanding that this method was limited as media frames were not simply influenced by protest frames without in turn affecting the movement's discourse.

FROM 20 CENTS TO IMPEACHMENT

The protests in 2013 and 2015 provided an ideal opportunity to compare how the same media organizations covered street demonstrations related to different sets of grievances and demands, and how coverage changed as the frames guiding the protests evolved. Here, it is important to make a distinction between *media frames*, the dependent variable of this dissertation, and *collective action frames* as the "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimize the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.164).When a collective action frame is abstract and flexible enough to be shared among many different social movement organizations, it starts operating as a master frame (Benford & Snow, 2000; Mooney & Hunt, 1996; Swart, 1995; Tarrow, 1994). The master frames guiding the protests in 2013 and 2015 protests serve as the context in which media frames were negotiated.

The label "master frame," coined by Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986), refers to the function performed by collective action frames that orient the activities of multiple social movement organizations (Snow et al., 1986). According to

the authors, a master frame occurs when numerous movements share aspects of their collective action frames. In that sense, a master frame is not a concept in itself, but a stage that can be achieved by certain collective action frames when they are flexible, transferable and resonant. Only a few collective action frames are broad enough to be considered master frames (Benford & Snow, 2000), including "rights frames" that were used by civil rights (Valocchi, 1996), women's rights (Freeman, 1975), and gay rights movements (Valocchi, 2005), and emerged as the guiding frame after the second week of the 2013 protests in Brazil.

In Brazil, the "rights" master frame elevated demonstrations from a small group of radical protestors asking for affordable bus fare rates to a massive wave of demonstrations that represented society's general dissatisfaction with the government on the eve of the World Cup. Initial protests were not completely spontaneous, but a result of years of mobilization from *Movimento Passe Livre* (MPL). The violent police response to MPL's small demonstrations was the catalyst that ignited mass popular revolt (Moraes & Santos, 2013; Moreira & Lima Santiago, 2013). Over the course of two weeks, the "rights" master frame was adopted and grievances expanded to encompass, among others, World Cup expenditures, human rights abuse, and rampant corruption. Steering away from the bus fare issue, protestors chanted "it's not about 20 cents, it's about rights." Gradually, sectors of the middle-class joined the movement and by the end of June more than 1.4 million people had marched the streets of 120 cities in the country. This process is known as a "cycle of contention" (Tarrow, 1994). Cycles of contention are characterized by a phase of intense conflict, followed by rapid diffusion of collective

action frames from more mobilized (MPL and its original supporters) to less mobilized sectors (middle class), which in turn leads to the creation of new and transformed frames ("not about 20 cents, about rights"). For Tarrow (1994), protest increases when institutional access opens, rifts between elites appear, allies become available and state repression generates outrage, which is often followed by a decline in state's capacity to repress the movement. Cycles of contention subside when there is exhaustion in the collective action frames and institutionalization of demands, which become coopted by elites (Coy, 2013).

At the end of 2014, President Dilma Rousseff was reelected with 51 percent of the votes, and a new cycle of protests erupted in the following year. This time, protests were led by four organized conservative groups: *Movimento Brasil Livre* (MBL), *Revoltados Online, Movimento Vem pra Rua* e *Movimento Endireita Brasil*. Protestors had a clear antigovernment agenda against President Rousseff's Workers' Party. As opposed to *Movimento Passe Livre* in 2013, this movement was elite-driven and did not clash with the police. Demands ranged from tougher anti-corruption laws to the impeachment of the newly-elected President. Radical dissidents also asked for a military intervention to put an end to the Party's government (Gonzatto, 2015). Four months later, *MBL*, *Revoltados Online* and *Vem Pra Rua* organized a march that brought about 800,000 people to the streets. This time, politicians from the opposition party (*Partido Social Democrata Brasileiro* - PSDB), including the runner-up from the 2014 race, were acclaimed by the crowd (UOL, 2015). Pro-impeachment protests gained strength after the federal police investigation from "Operation Car Wash" unveiled a $5.3 billion corruption scheme

involving the state-run oil firm Petrobras (Beauchamp, 2016). At the end of April, congress voted for the impeachment of the President. In the following month, President Rousseff was removed from power by the Senate, marking the beginning of the impeachment process.

ORGANIZATION

This dissertation uses a multi method approach to address its purposes: (a) to analyze the way journalists framed the 2013 and 2015 protests in Brazil; (b) to investigate the different levels of influences on journalists' work; and (c) to assess the impact of social media for the work of journalists covering the protests.

Chapter 2 provides the contextual background for this project, with an overview of the country's media system, its journalism tradition and how protests have been covered in the past. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical foundations of this study: media sociology's hierarchical model and the protest paradigm. Because social media was used as an organizing force during both demonstrations, this chapter also reviews the incipient literature on new media and protests, and how these platforms have been used by journalists in their reporting. In this project, I move from the analysis of social media as a organizing platform for protestors and towards its understanding as an input for journalistic coverage.

Chapter 4 provides the methodological overview of this project, detailing the quantitatively-driven multi-method approach that combines content analysis and survey data. Then, results chapters are organized following the three purposes of the project.

Chapter 5, titled "The Coverage," brings the results of a content analysis of stories

published by four mainstream newspapers in the country. On chapter 6, "The Journalist," results from a survey of Brazilian journalists analyze their attitudes towards the protests and how they went about reporting the demonstrations, including their use of social media for reporting. Then, Chapter 7 links these two elements via content analysis of stories produced by 23 journalists selected from the sample that answered the survey. This final step allows for the simultaneous testing of influences from all levels into *actual* content, the final dependent variable in this project.

Throughout chapters 5, 6 and 7, insights from journalists' responses to open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews provide context to the quantitative findings. Finally, chapter 8 brings the discussion and conclusion from this analysis.

BACKGROUND

Chapter 2: The protest and its context

Because this dissertation focuses on journalists embedded in a very particular context, this chapter provides an overview of the Brazilian media system and its development after the decline of the military regime following the typology developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) and the concept of hybridity applied to journalism (García Canclini, 1997; Kraidy, 2002; Straubhaar, 2007). This section also provides a brief historical overview of how the press covered the most recent waves of massive urban protests in the country: the 1984 political opening demonstrations ("Diretas Já!") and the impeachment of President Collor in 1992 ("Fora Collor!"). This overview is particularly relevant because these two cases were the only example of news coverage of demonstrations after the end of official censorship, and because the 2013 and 2015 protestors often evoked historical narratives from 1984 and 1992.

THE BRAZILIAN MEDIA SYSTEM

According to Hallin and Mancini (2004) a country's media system and its related degree of independence emerges in ways determined by its political culture and political system. Through a comparative analysis of the media systems in European and North American countries, the authors have found four dimensions in which media systems differ: structure of markets, political parallelism, degree of professionalism and the role of the state. Three models of press systems emerge from the combination of these four dimensions: democrat corporatist, polarized pluralist, and liberal model. A high

circulation press, early press development, strong professional associations, and some degree of official regulation and state intervention to promote pluralism characterize the democrat corporatist model from North and central Europe. The liberal model, characteristic of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, has a high circulation press, information-oriented internal pluralism, high levels of professionalism and market-oriented outlets. On the polarized pluralist model, professional culture is weak, circulation press is low and aimed at elites, there is a high political parallelism and instrumentalization of the media by political actors. Journalists are expected to provide commentary and media owners are also political leaders, often starting outlets for political purposes. The polarized pluralist model is predominant in Southern Europe.

While the models proposed by Hallin and Mancini are undoubtedly a useful analytical toolkit for comparative analyses of media systems, Alburquerque (2012) and Voltmer (2012) point out that broad attempts to apply them beyond the homogeneous set of Western countries analyzed risks converting the polarized pluralist model into a "catch all" concept ignoring important aspects that do not fit into the categories. Rather than treating the models as "ideal types," Voltmer (2012) argues that most countries have a hybrid form of the categories proposed by Hallin and Mancini. Just as democratization did not lead to homogeneous forms of governments, the media systems that emerged after authoritarian rule do not fit easily into the models that were generated to explain media systems in developed democracies.

In an analysis applying the typology to Brazilian media, Albuquerque (2012) found that the political parallelism found in the polarized pluralist model does not

completely work in the country because of the reduced role of political parties, especially prior to 2010. With more than 35 parties currently existing in Brazil, their role is very limited if compared to the United States. However, during the 12 years of leftist government in the Presidency, political polarization has deepened, especially after the 2014 elections. Following a tight race, Workers' Party (PT) Dilma Rousseff was reelected with 51.6 percent of the votes, the slimmest in Brazilian electoral history. The runner-up, Aécio Neves, from Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), was the winner in most of the richer south and southeast regions, including São Paulo. The 2015 protests were marked by anti-PT sentiment and Aécio Neves and other PSDB politicians were championed by the protestors. Between these two parties, Brazilian Democratic Movement's Party (PMDB) recently left PT's coalition and is currently leading the impeachment process alongside PSDB. Scholars have yet to assess how emerging polarization influences the degree of political parallelism in the country.

In tandem with the polarized pluralist model, Albuquerque (2012) notes that none of the factors that originated the U.S. professional tradition of journalism existed in South America: newspapers were economically dependent on the state and military regimes suppressed freedom of speech (Azevedo, 2006; Mattos, 2002; Straubhaar, 1989). Most studies about the development of mass media in Brazil have identified the government as one of the main economic forces behind the growth of the media by giving economic and technical incentives (Mattos, 2002) and providing the necessary infrastructure for broadcast expansion (Straubhaar, 1989). After independence from Portugal in 1822, the burgeoning press in the region was characterized by opinion, following the French model

of political activist press. At the end of World War II, the press gradually started adopting the US model of professionalism, a process that was intensified with economic liberalization of the media in the late 1980s. But different from the polarized pluralist model, media organizations were private from their inception, and the leading corporations have adopted a "catch all" attitude regarding their markets, avoiding explicit partisan coverage. In sum, the press in the country was no longer partisan per se, but low circulation levels made it depended on government for economic viability. Unable to thrive based solely on private advertising, newspapers depend on government investments, state advertising and bribes. During privatization, certain groups associated with political elites gained advantage in the process, with many affiliates being owned by politicians themselves (Albuquerque, 2012; Waisbord, 2000).

The development of Brazilian journalism after the 1980s was shaped by two parallel forces: local politics and globalization (Fox & Waisbord, 2002). With liberalization and privatization of media markets, some old political alliances were weakened, while new ones were formed. Lima (2006) argues that economic uncertainty forced family-based companies to professionalize, moving further away from explicit partisan coverage. Others content that Brazilian media companies still reflect oligarchic configurations, with patronage practices still predominant in newsrooms (Kucinski, 1998). Similarly, Waisbord (2000) explains that national and local politics mediate globalization processes through accommodation and the politics of mutual benefits.

Currently, Brazil's media markets are dominated by a few conglomerates that have benefited from the politics of quid-pro-quo privatizations; that is, access to the

media apparatus via allocation of television affiliates and official advertising in exchange for political support. Allocation of official advertising also work as a system of punishing or rewarding media organizations (Waisbord, 2000).

Mainstream media are owned by a limited number of powerful families and oligopolies, most notably the *Marinhos*, the *Civitas*, the *Mesquitas*, and the *Frias*. The *Marinho* family owns *Grupo Globo*, a mega-conglomerate that includes *TV Globo*, the newspapers *O Globo, Extra*, and *Valor Econômico*, two radio stations, *Época* magazine, and one web portal. The *Civitas* own *Editora Abril*, which publishes several magazines, including *Veja*, the leading weekly publication in the country. *The Mesquitas* own *O Estado de São Paulo*. *Folha de São Paulo* is owned by the *Frias* family, which also control the web portal Uol, and other smaller newspapers (Matos, 2008).

The government controls the airwaves and the Brazilian Ministry of Communications awards broadcast licenses to companies or individuals. Radio and TV stations are frequently awarded to politicians or religious groups. Although the country's legislation forbids senators or congress members to own television or radio affiliates, a report from 2008 revealed that 20 senators, 103 congressmen, and 147 mayors were directors, owners or stakeholders of media companies. Several other politicians have relatives associated with radio and television affiliates (Matos, 2008).

While in the United States the development of broadcast communications led to the hegemony of the "big three" (NBC, ABC and CBS), in Brazil, the development of the medium led to the dominance of *TV Globo*. *TV Globo* is the only network in the world to maintain hegemonic media dominance in a large democratic society (Kucinski, 1998).

After 1985, other networks started trying to break into television markets. *Rede Record*, a network owned by the protestant church *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus*, is currently the biggest competitor to TV *Globo*'s leadership. Currently, *Globo* owns 128 radio stations, 122 TV affiliates, 17 cable news channels, several newspapers, magazines and the biggest online portal in the country (G1).

More recently, the country has gone through a rapid technological transformation, with widespread social media adoption. The digital turn has also been promising to Brazilian news organizations: in 2013, 22 percent of online users reported having paid for online news content (Newman & Levy, 2014). The first ones to experiment with online news were the mainstream Brazilian newspapers in the late 1990s. In 1995, *Jornal do Brasil* was the first newspaper in the country to publish a full online edition. The first real time news portal - called "*Brasil Online*" - debuted in 1996 by internet provider *Universo Online* (UOL). A few years later, *Brasil Online* changed its name to *Folha Online*, publishing content from the largest newspaper in the country*, Folha de São Paulo*. Meanwhile, regional newspapers like *Zero Hora* published online on a weekly basis (Barbosa, 2016). In the following years, magazines, radio and television organizations also launched their online ventures. By the early 2000s, the first digital native news organizations, *Terra* and *IG*, consolidated their "portal journalism" characterized by multimedia content, aggregation and minute-by-minute breaking news. The two main television conglomerates in the country, *Globo* and *Record* also released their own portals as a place of convergence for their news and entertainment content. In 2012, *Folha de São Paulo* launched a paywall for online content, followed by *Zero Hora*. Also

in 2012, 90 percent of Brazil's main newspapers abandoned Google News, arguing that the indexing platform works like a home page and competes directly with their own news sites (Barbosa, 2016).

To recap, using Hallin and Mancini (2004) typology, the Brazilian press is characterized by some elements of the polarized pluralist model, most notably low circulation press aimed at elites and economic dependency on the state. However, rather than high levels of political parallelism, in a country with a high number of political parties, media organizations adopted a "catch all" attitude. Instead of the opinion-based model found in the Mediterranean, the press in Brazil after the 1950s operates in a more business-oriented scheme (Waisbord, 2000; Albuquerque & Silva, 2009). Furthermore, rather than having a partisan professional culture that characterizes the press in the polarized professional model, Brazilian journalists have defined their identity with reference to the American model, although they have reinterpreted concepts like objectivity and neutrality, as described in the section below (Albuquerque, 2012, p.73).

THE BRAZILIAN JOURNALIST

This adoption of North-American professionalism was not a unidimensional imposition of foreign norms, but instead was characterized by hybridization, with journalists and corporations selectively adapting some routines, while ignoring others. Hybridization is the blending of the desired modernity with traditions that elites and masses maintain (García Canclini, 1997). In the context of modern globalization, Straubhaar (2007) argues that "as these [global] forces enter a new country or cultural space, they hybridize, interacting with previous forces and becoming localized, enacted,

and received by local people with their own identities, histories, and agendas" (p.3). For Kraidy (2002), hybridity is a space where communication practices are negotiated through interactions of differential power. Currently, Brazil's hybrid approach champions the adoption of fact-based reporting (objectivity) and balance of sources, but rejects the idea that journalism should be impartial. Instead, editors and reporters argue that journalistic coverage should take "sides with the facts" (Waisbord, 2000). For news organizations, modernization meant to adapt to competitive markets, but maintaining political alliances (Albuquerque & Silva, 2009).

The adoption of US norms of professionalism also solved a practical problem: most of older literary journalists lacked the skills of producing news as a technical product, and publishers in the 1960s resorted to communist journalists who provided professional and disciplined labor. According to Albuquerque and Silva (2009), "the rhetoric and practices of the American model of independent journalism provided the basis for conservative publishers and communist journalists to strike a bargain" (p. 377). In 1969, the military regime passed the Decree Law 972 establishing that journalists in the country must have an undergraduate degree to be allowed to work. Some scholars contend that the Decree aimed to undermine the role of leftist political organizations in newsrooms by replacing them with journalists from an upper socioeconomic status who had access to college education (Albuquerque & Silva, 2009). With the increase in journalism schools across the nation, emphasis was placed in technical training. This did not, however, lead to the desired result: at universities, students were exposed not only to Marxist ideas, but also to the American principles of Journalism that were rooted in the

notion of freedom of expression, which was severely limited by the military government. In 2009, the Supreme Court ruled for the end of the diploma requirement for journalists. Throughout this process, ideals like objectivity and fact-based reporting norms helped professional journalists navigate the dichotomy between their own political leaning and that of their employers.

The Brazilian journalist's relationship with objectivity and impartiality has traditionally been conflicting and cynical. Some scholars argue that Brazilian professional reporters view objectivity as an in an ideal that is more about free markets than ideas ("*liberdade de imprensa é, na verdade, liberdade de empresa*" [freedom of the press is, in fact, freedom for business]), but also used the concept to gain autonomy in the newsrooms (Albuquerque & Silva, 2009; Waisbord, 2000). For Waisbord (2000), reporters in Latin America do not follow the orthodoxy of U.S. journalism, preferring to focus on consequences rather than methods of reporting in a utilitarian perspective that emphasizes anonymity and overlooks the motives behind sources. This hybrid approach champions the adoption of balance of sources, but rejects impartiality with stories often openly supporting one side (Waisbord, 2000).

For the Brazilian journalist, Albuquerque and Silva (2009) explain that North-American journalistic norms and routines, especially objectivity, are often invoked to reaffirm journalism's ability to prevent bias. This is not unique to Brazil: In the United States, Reese (1990) found that reassertion of journalistic norms has been used to repair occupational paradigms in the case of Kent McDougall's revelation that he was a socialist while working for The Wall Street Journal. Findings from this study suggest that

values and news making routines were mentioned in seeking to reinforce that the news is unbiased, even when a journalist openly says he is not (Reese, 1990). In Brazil, Kucinsky (1998) argues that it is self-censorship that prevents leftist journalists to produce material that is contrary to their outlet's conservative positions. According to the author, journalists actively hide information from their audiences in an effort to survive in media markets dominated by conservative families.

In addition, authoritarian legislation, economic pressures, violence against journalists, and absence of legal mechanisms to access official records limit journalism practice in the region. As a result, stories are dependent on elites' willingness to wage battles in the media ring, with the bulk of reporting being based on accounts from official powerful sources, with limited space for fact-checking and data reporting (Fox & Waisbord, 2002; Sinclair & Straubhaar, 2013; Waisbord, 2000). Reliance on official sources is not exclusive to the Latin American case, but in the United States, the dominance of institutionally positioned sources comes from news routines aiming to reduce reporting costs by constantly seeking officials who subsidize information. This beat system of newsgathering fosters a symbiotic relationship between reporters and their institutional sources (Bennett, 1990; Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2007; Lawrence, 1996, 2012). In Brazil, the symbiotic relationship between press and government is not so symmetrical: economically, journalists face governments pulling official advertising; from a legal standpoint, libel laws severely limit freedom of speech; and from a personal standpoint, physical violence against journalists is an ever-present threat.

Because various forms of libel and defamation remain criminalized, the threat of lawsuits leads to self-censorship for journalists who lack the resources to face legal processes. Politicians and business people have also used the law to preemptively block the publication of certain information. According to Freedom House, this constitutes as a form of "judicial censorship," with courts barring media outlets from publishing information or demanding removal of material from news articles. Journalists are often subject to threat and physical violence, especially those covering the link between political corruption and organized crime. In 2014, three journalists were killed because of their work covering corruption and protests (Freedom House, 2015).

The last times Brazilian reporters covered massive urban protests was in 1992, during the "*Fora, Collor!*" movement asking for the impeachment of President Collor and in 1984, during "*Diretas Já*!," asking for end of the military regime. The following section reviews the literature on the way the press portrayed these two demonstrations.

COVERING PROTESTS IN BRAZIL

This dissertation focuses on the way Brazilian journalists covered protests, but in order to proceed with this analysis, it is important to overview the literature on "*Diretas Já!*" and "*Fora Collor*!." Because they are so rooted in popular imaginary, the 2013 and 2015 protests often evoked their symbols and discourses, from the yellow and green "painted faces" to the 2015 logo "*Fora Dilma!."*

1984 - Diretas Já!

The 1984 popular movement *Diretas Já!* (Direct Elections Now!) marked a decisive moment in Brazilian democratic history and its relationship with the media.

Although the coverage of the protests is often remembered as a prime example of media manipulation against protestors, studies reveal a much more heterogeneous coverage throughout outlets in the country (Matos, 2008; Straubhaar, 1989). After two decades of military control, "*Diretas Já*!" was a civil movement that demanded direct elections for President in 1984. Although the protests were unsuccessful – the law for direct elections was rejected due to a lack of quorum – they served as a catalyst to the end of the authoritarian regime (Matos, 2008).

The first mainstream newspaper to support the movement and openly criticize the military regime was *Folha de São Paulo*. The newspapers *Estado de São Paulo* and *O Globo*, as well as magazines *Veja* and *IstoÉ* more discretely supported the protests, mainly in order to cut ties with the vanishing military regime (Matos, 2008). According to Matos (2008), *Folha de São Paulo* saw the civil unrest as an opportunity to capitalize journalistically by reinforcing its role as the leading news organization behind the protests, marking the peak of the paper's militant journalism. Through a textual analysis of 871 stories about the campaign printed by *Folha, O Globo, O Estado de São Paulo, Veja, Isto É* and *Jornal do Brasil*, the author found that, overall, print media coverage endorsed democratic reform. In particular, the coverage of the protests helped *Folha* establish its news identity and boost circulation numbers. Discourses that supported a gradual and moderate democratic transition, as proposed by the military government, were predominant in the press (Matos, 2008).

Accused by journalists and academics of downplaying the political importance of the protests (Abreu, 2002; Bucci, 2000; Conti, 1999), *TV Globo*'s coverage remains an

important moment for political communication scholars interested in Brazilian television. Local affiliates covered the protests in the capitals, but stories were ignored during the network's main nightly newscast and absolute audience leader at its time slot. *Globo*'s infamous coverage of the protests often serves as the exemplar of the media's efforts to omit or downplay social movements in the country (Bucci, 1996; Conti, 1999; Lima, 2005; Mattos, 2005; Miguel, 2002; Straubhaar, 1989). The network's decision to broadcast a 2-minute story on Praça da Sé's protests while emphasizing the festivities for the city of São Paulo's anniversary led to accusations that the network was not only ignoring the national rallies, but also distorting the motives behind the protests (Conti, 1999; Straubhaar, 1989).

Two months later, the network abruptly shifted its editorial line and offered in-depth national coverage for the protests in Rio de Janeiro (Lima, 2005). Straubhaar (1989) explains that when the elites fragmented and major events pointed to the advent of a civilian rule, *Rede Globo* followed its own economic interests and changed the coverage from omission or negative portrayal to support of a moderate military-civilian elite. All media outlets connected to *Organizações Globo* started covering the movement after the television network changed its position (Miguel, 2001).

Though the "*Diretas Já*!" movement did not achieve its goal of direct elections, it did mark the beginning of the end for the military regime. Moderate leader Tancredo Neves was elected by the Electoral College and guaranteed that the military would not only maintain its elite status, but also not be investigated for its crimes (Miguel, 2001). Neves died before his inauguration and left the presidency to vice-president José Sarney.

Direct elections came four years later in 1989, when Brazil elected Fernando Collor. In 1992, the masses went to the streets once again, this time to ask for Collor's impeachment.

1992 - Fora Collor!

The coverage of President Collor's crisis marked a watershed for Brazilian media. Following a series of stories on corruption and electoral fraud, student unions went to the streets to demand for Collor's resignation. According to Azevedo (2006), the media not only covered the collective actions, but also mobilized public opinion and essentially served as a watchdog of the political system. Matos (2008) considers the coverage of the impeachment as the national media's attempt to affirm their political independence and establish their watchdog function.

By 1990, *Folha de São Paulo* and *O Estado de São Paulo* began printing a series of stories on corruption and electoral fraud during Collor's first months in the government. Six months later, *Isto É* magazine published an investigative piece on Collor's treasury secretary. Kucinski (1998) compares the coverage of the corruption scandals during *Collor's* government to Watergate in the United States. For the author, it was the media, more precisely the magazines *Veja* and *Isto É*, that led the public campaign culminating in the impeachment of the President. As the anti-Collor movement grew, student protests contributed to pressure more reluctant elites, thus becoming a turning point in Collor's fate (Conti, 1999). By the end of the impeachment process, the main newspapers in the country enthusiastically celebrated the movement (Conti, 1999; Matos, 2008). It is important to note that, with the exception of *Folha de São Paulo* and

the weekly magazines, most print and television outlets started only started covering the protests when certain that the Congress would vote for impeachment (Kucinski, 1998).

Despite the differences in the nature, the media portrayal of the 1984 and the 1992 protests share some commonalities. In both instances, even outlets associated with conservative sectors eventually shifted their coverage when they realized political changes were inevitable. Led by the newspaper *Folha de São Paulo*, outlets gradually transitioned to support the end of the military regime and the impeachment of Collor. For these movements, media coverage of protests progressed from omission to partial coverage, and to militant journalism at the end of the cycle of contention.

Overall, these findings suggest that the media provided a heterogeneous coverage of mass urban protests, with newspapers gradually changing the coverage as movements gained force. These studies did not, however, empirically address those changes as the result of how the movements transformed and how elites relate to protestors, as indexing would predict. Instead, they are mainly descriptive and often treat Brazilian media as a homogeneous group working in favor of conservative sectors.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Chapter 3: Media sociology, the protest paradigm and new media

The purpose of this project is to analyze the way journalists framed the 2013-2015 protests in Brazil; to investigate the different levels of influences on journalists' work; and to assess the impact of social media for the work of journalists covering the protests. The previous chapters described the 2013 and 2015 cases, the country's media system and a recent historical overview of protest coverage. In this chapter, I explore the theoretical foundations of this study: media sociology's hierarchical model and the protest paradigm. Then, the following section provides a literature review of the way new media has been incorporated into social movements and how it serves as an input to journalists. The final section of this chapter brings these literatures together into the list of research questions and hypotheses driving this dissertation.

WHAT INFLUENCES CONTENT?

Media sociology's investigation of "what influences content" dates back to the 1920s, with the Chicago School of Sociology and Robert Park's investigations on journalism as a locus for urban sociology inquiry (Zelizer, 2004). Yet, with the dominance of Columbia's paradigm of media effects research in the United States, communication has traditionally placed the message itself as the independent variable, with its effects on individuals as the dependent variable (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). In media sociology, scholars consider how the message is influenced by a wide variety of factors, becoming the *dependent* variable of inquiry (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).

Earlier sociological inquiry is marked by studies that focused on gatekeeping (Shoemaker, 1991; Snider, 1967; White, 1950), social control (Breed, 1955) and news selection (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Simultaneously, occupational studies have evaluated the values, ethics, roles and demographics of journalists (Tunstall, 1970, 1971; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986, 1996; Weaver & Wu, 1998; Weaver, 2015). The second stage of inquiry focused on organizational settings and patterns of interactions among journalists. Newsroom ethnographies offered a view of what it is like to be a journalist, focusing on conditions and news making decisions (Fishman 1977; Tuchman, 1978). The third stage of sociological research investigated institutional and ideological questions, with loci shifting from newsrooms to broader sociocultural aspects (Zelizer, 2004). Studies on ideology, hegemony, consensus and political economy of the media emerged in this period (Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1982; Herman & Chomsky, 2002).

This project uses the "hierarchical model" of news making, proposed by Shoemaker and Reese (1996; 2014) as a framework for media sociology research. Overall, the hierarchical model addresses the core concern of media sociology: how "the message, or media content, is influenced by a wide variety of factors both inside and outside of media organizations" (Reese & Shoemaker, 1996, p. 9). The model comprises five levels of influence on content production, arranged from macro to micro: social systems, social institutions, organizations, routines, and individuals. Visually, the model uses concentric circles for describing different levels of influence (see Figure 3.1).



Figure 3.1 – The hierarchical model (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014)

The first level, "social systems," refers to influences at the level of subsystems of society, such as ideology, economics, politics and cultural aspects. The study of communication at this level is often done comparatively or through critical and interpretive approaches (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). In this dissertation, the work of Brazilian journalists covering the protests is to be understood as part of the unique context of a media system dominated by a few powerful conglomerates and a hybrid professional journalism that blends forces of globalization with volatile national politics, as described on Chapter 2.

The second level, "social institutions," refers to forces outside the media structure

itself, such as the economic environment in which the media operate (circulation, market size, profitability, competition with other media), the influences by government, social movement organizations, advertisers, interest groups, market characteristics and media policies. This level focuses on understanding the relationship between journalism and other social institutions. In this project, I focus on the influence of social movement organizations on news content. More specifically, how coverage evolved as demands and grievances changed, and the "rights" master frame started guiding the movement.

The "organizations" level focuses on influences stemming from media organizational roles, structures, and policies. Influences at the organizational level refer to how institutional ownership, goals, actions, rules, and membership influences content. The way organizations are structured and the policies that sustain this structure are at the center of the "organizational" level (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). The primary goal of media organizations is profit; therefore, economic pressures play a great role in determining content (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). In the United States, economic pressures place an *indirect* influence on content, as organizations typically have a separation between editorial and commercial arms (Gans, 1979). Studies in Latin America reveal this separation to be more blurred, and journalists constantly report economic and political ownership pressures as one of the main constraints on their work (Saldaña & Mourao, 2015; Waisbord, 2000). In addition, a small number of families closely associated with political groups owns most of the media organizations in the country and often politicians themselves own affiliates. News outlets remain dependent on government advertising, which adds to the pressure to align their coverage to official

viewpoints. In this study, organizational level influences on journalists' work covering protests will be assessed in two ways: First, news coverage between four different newspapers will be compared. Then, the characteristics of journalists' organizations will be entered in the final regression models.

The fourth level, "routines," comprises influences that result from newsgathering and transmission routines. News values, the beat system, pack journalism, and reliance on official sources are some of the elements that affect news content at this level. Overall, scholars recognize journalistic norms and routines as the main force behind the protest paradigm, as news values favor conflict, spectacle and quotes from official sources (Mcleod, 2007; Tuchman, 1978). Shoemaker and Reese (2014) argue that norms and routines do not happen in a vacuum; they are structured themselves in social systems. The persistence of this coverage pattern across time and different social movements with different degrees of public support (Boyle et al., 2005) has led scholars to consider norms to be rooted in deeper ideological resistance to groups that challenge the status quo (Gitlin, 1980; Entman & Rojecki, 1993). In general, journalists in Brazil follow routines based on U.S. notions of professionalism. For this project, I am particularly interested in the ways social media has been incorporated into news-gathering routines, and what does that represent for the protest paradigm. More specifically, I assess how journalists used social media to keep up with information about the protests, find sources and disseminate their own work.

Finally, at the "individual level," the analysis is centered on individual journalists' characteristics. Only a handful of studies have attempted to match individual

characteristics of journalists with the news content they produce, mostly finding this to be a weak relationship (Craft & Wanta, 2004; Rodgers & Thorson, 2003). According to Weaver and Wilhoit (1991), the effect of personal characteristics on content is minor because of routines that constraint individual's inputs on news stories. For Shoemaker and Reese (2014), demographic factors may influence content indirectly through shaping personal attitudes and values. At this level, this study links results from a survey of journalists with their actual coverage of protests, which allows for statistical analyses to isolate demographics and personal attitudes from variables from the other levels of influence.

THE PROTEST PARADIGM

Communication and sociology scholars have long examined news treatment of protests and social movements, with several studies showing that media routinely marginalize social movement organizations. Scholars refer to this pattern as the "protest paradigm," characterized by episodic narratives favoring spectacle, featuring official sources, marginalization, delegitimization, and demonization (Boyle, McLeod, & Armstrong, 2012; Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Episodic coverage focuses on separate, individual actions of social movements and not their policy-driven grievances and demands. News highlights protestors' deviance by emphasizing looting, private property invasion and obstruction of other citizens' daily routines, even when such actions do not characterize the bulk of the social movement's activities (McLeod & Hertog, 1992; Mcleod, 2007).

In his pivotal book "The Whole World is Watching," Gitlin (1980) analyzed the

nature of the media coverage of the Students for a Democratic Society (New Left) movement, emphasizing the relationship between protestors and media, and the consequences of the coverage to the internal cohesion of the SDS. According to the author, the media fomented suspicion of the New Left through a series of devices, including trivialization, highlighting counterdemonstrations, emphasizing internal dissension, marginalization, disparagement by numbers (undercounting), and disparagement by effectiveness (characterizing the movement as useless).

After the movement gained some power, marginalization and demonization were intensified, and stories started to focus on statements from official sources, emphasizing the "communist threat," accentuating violence and giving considerable attention to right-wing opposition. The New York Times, for example, initially treated the SDS as a serious political movement and then switched the coverage to focus on its marginality, ineffectiveness and oddity. As a response to President Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War, coverage portrayed the movement as an undoubted menace, often linked to "the communist threat" (Gitlin, 1980).

Similarly, Entman and Rojecki (1993) found that the media follow the protest paradigm more closely when protestors begin mobilizing larger groups and exercising effective political power (Entman & Rojecki, 1993). In an analysis of the U.S. anti-nuclear movement, the authors found that news judgment is greatly influenced by official sources and an underlying professional ideology that is suspicious of public participation in social movements, findings that are consistent with Bennett's (1990) analysis of The New York Times's coverage of the contras in Nicaragua.

Overall, scholars explain that journalistic norms and routines are the driving force behind the protest paradigm and news values favor conflict, spectacle and official discourse (Tuchman, 1978; McLeod, 2007). The paradigm is naturalized by journalistic socialization and has its origin from the routines that shape news production, leading to homogeneous news coverage across independent media (Sparrow, 2006; Cook, 2006). According to Gitlin, negative frames spread from medium to medium in a pack-like behavior that is consistent with the hegemonic view subsidized by public officials.

For the protestors, media coverage operates like a double bind: movements need media coverage to matter and reach prospective supporters, but what they receive usually harms the protestors' legitimacy, affects the movement's internal cohesion, and repels public opinion (Gamson, 2008; Gitlin, 1980). According to Gitlin (1980), when the media cover a movement, the movement is both actor and acted upon: coverage exaggerates the sense that there is an extremist character to the movement, parts of the movement pursue confrontation for strategic reasons, new members are recruited, and the state escalates repression. More importantly, media coverage can be devastating to the movement's internal cohesion, both by converting leadership into celebrities and by inflating the movement's rhetoric and tactics in an attempt to get news attention (Gitlin, 1980). For the anti-war movement, the media helped SDS grow in numbers and public support, but leadership disintegrated.

The protest paradigm is set on four pillars: marginalization devices, predominance of official sources, protest frames and negative evaluations. Marginalization devices are recurring elements used by journalists when covering protests (Dardis, 2006; McFarlane

& Hay, 2003; Weaver & Scacco, 2013). According to the literature, protest marginalization devices can refer to tactics, depictions of protestors, and depictions of public opinion (Dardis, 2006). The first type of marginalization device emphasizes protest violent tactics, including mentions of vandalism, looting, trespassing, blocking streets and general lawlessness. Violence can also be accentuated by coverage highlighting the confrontation between protestors and police (Dardis, 2006; Hertog & McLeod, 2003; McFarlane & Hay, 2003). Another type of marginalization device comes from depictions of protestors' appearance and mental capacity. Coverage of the anti-war movements, for example, emphasizes physical oddities (piercings, tattoos, etc.) or childlike behaviors (dancing, playing Frisbee, etc.). Similarly, coverage may portray protestors as "idiots," unintelligent, immature and incapable of providing substantive opinion about serious issues facing society (Dardis, 2006; Hertog & McLeod, 2003; McFarlane & Hay, 2003).

Depiction of public opinion is another device used to marginalize protestors, implying that they do not speak for the general public's perceptions of the issue at hand. Public opinion can be depicted through actual polls or statistics on the issue, or appear as "common sense" generalizations about the way the population perceives the contested issue. Eyewitness or bystanders' quotes can be used to illustrate public opinion that is seemingly unfavorable towards the social movement. Quotes are often limited to questions about the legality of actions, such as blocking the streets, than the morality of the issues (McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Informal negative representations of public opinion happen even when polls reveal that the majority of the public shares the same views as

the protestors (Entman & Rojecki, 1993).

The adoption of official sources is also at the core of the protest paradigm. Several scholars have shown the way reliance on official viewpoints relates to critical coverage of social movements. Critical theorists, for example, explain that the media marginalize dissent and suppress oppositional voices in their stories (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1978). Media sociology's newsroom ethnographies have also documented journalists' reliance on official sources (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978).

Reliance on official sources is a point of convergence between protest paradigm literature and the theory of "indexing," which predicts that the range of debate about political issues in the news depends on the range of elite debate about the issue. In other words, the degree of agreement among elite sources (such as elected and government officials) determines critical coverage of the issue. When elites reach consensus, the coverage will reflect this agreement. When elites disagree and their views range, coverage expands to accommodate dissent (Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2007; Bennett, 1990; Lawrence, 1996; Lawrence, 2012). There is a mutual dependency between newsmakers and official sources in the negotiation of newsworthiness. On one side, the media depend on the government for information subsidies. On the other, the government needs the media for publicity (Tuchman, 1978; Cook, 1998).

Indexing studies have applied the theory in various settings. A study by Entman and Page (1994), for example, found that coverage of the Persian Gulf conflict focused on conflict between elites rather than evaluating actual policies. In the book *When the*

Press Fails, Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston provide an in-depth examination of news coverage during the George W. Bush administration and found that news leading to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was largely driven by key sources from the administration.

Conversely, social movements and media have an asymmetrical relationship. As opposed to the media-government nexus, movements are more dependent on the media than the reverse (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980).

Together, sources and devices organize into frames that have been largely documented in the protest paradigm literature (Boyle et al., 2012; Dardis, 2006; Hertog & McLeod, 2003). Frames are "organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social work" (Reese, 2003, p.11). This project focused specifically on *journalistic frames*, which emerge from the processes behind news production: selection, exclusion, editing, and organization. As opposed to *advocacy* frames, *journalistic* frames focus on procedures rather than on the topics social movements are trying to promote (De Vreese, 2012). In this case, the frames analyzed do not assess the actual demands pursued by movements (e.g. bus fare prices or corruption measures), but instead focus on the way their political strategies are presented in the news (e.g. conflict or peace, riot, confrontation).

Common protest paradigm journalistic frames include:

1. Circus or freak show: portrayal of protestors as spectacle; emphasis on oddity, funny appearance, celebrity participation, and childlike behavior.
2. Riot: emphasis on the conflict between protestors and society; lawlessness, looting, violence by protestors, disruption of daily life, destruction of property,

etc.

3. Confrontation: portrayal of protestors as combatants versus the police; emphasis on the clashes between the two groups.

Hertog and Mcleod (2003) also identify two frames that legitimize social movements, deviating coverage from the protest paradigm:

1. Protest: centers on the conflict between protestors and powerful political institutions; protestors treated as a legitimate group with valid grievances and demands.

2. Debate: this frame puts the social critique brought by the social movement at the center of the coverage.

Finally, evaluations refer to how stories generally appraise protestors, their cause and the group they are challenging. Evaluations can be negative, neutral or positive (Shahin et al, 2016). Rather than about specific devices, evaluations refer to the *valence* given to a story when talking about the actors and the motives involved in the protest.

Empirical evidence has revealed that the more radical a group and its tactics, the more the news coverage will follow the characteristics of the "protest paradigm" (Boyle, Armstrong & McLeod, 2012; McLeod & Hertog, 1999). Peaceful marches with goals that do not challenge the status quo are prone to receive less negative coverage, although the level of confrontation is also determined by the police response to the protests (Laschever & Boykoff, 2011). Yet, a theoretical article analyzing the evolution of the protest paradigm between 1960 and 1999 found that, even though protests became less deviant and radical, the coverage of social movements did not change over time, suggesting that

newspapers actually became more critical of less deviant actions (Boyle, Mccluskey, Mcleod, & Stein, 2005). Boyle et al. (2005) also found that war and labor protests were covered more negatively than social protests (e.g. abortion), despite the level of radicalism.

The vast majority of the existent literature on the protest paradigm focuses on newspaper and broadcast television coverage of protests and social movements in the United States. As such, findings are limited to the way a specific set of journalists cover social movements, largely ignoring the role of alternative press, partisan media and social media. When it comes to international research, in a recent study, Shahin and colleagues (2016) found that the protest paradigm does not as closely apply to other nations. Through a comparative analysis of China, India and Brazil, the authors found variance in marginalization devices, although reliance on official sources and focus on violence remained constant across nations. Marginalization devices like circus, focus on appearances and bystanders' accounts were rarely used outside of the United States, but protestors were blamed for excessive violence in all countries analyzed.

More recently, studies have started taking a less deterministic view of the paradigm, suggesting that media outlets' ideological affinity with the government of the day is also determinant of negative coverage (Shahin et al, 2015; Weaver & Scacco, 2013). For the Tea Party movement, for example, MSNBC was the most likely to portray protestors as "idiots," and CNN was more likely than Fox News to use marginalization devices (Weaver & Scacco, 2013). In a cross-country comparative study on the protest paradigm, Shahin et al. (2016) concluded that "the historical legitimacy of informal

political negotiations in a nation reduces the likelihood of its news media following the protest paradigm" (p.158). This line of research challenges the idea that the paradigm comes from news values and routines (McLeod, 2007) or from a general suspicion of movements that challenge the status quo (Gitlin, 1980). For these scholars, patterns of protest coverage are more dependent on which group is being challenged and the alignment between news organizations and the government. Interestingly enough, the original study using the term "protest paradigm" found that the outlet's political ideology mattered for the 1970s protests in Hong Kong: right-leaning newspapers had a negative portrayal focused on tactics, and left-leaning outlets portrayed protestors more positively (Chan & Lee, 1984). This view, nevertheless, assumes all protests are left-leaning, and conservative newspapers will always be critical of social movements (Shahin et al., 2016).

This dissertation aims to further the theoretical understanding of the protest paradigm in the context of the Brazilian media ecosystem, marked by a hybrid combination of North American journalistic values and fluid political alliances. Results help elucidate which elements of the paradigm stem from media routines and how negative patterns hold in response to elite-supported demonstrations. But before delving into specific research questions, the following section addresses the final element of the 2013 and 2015 protests that could affect coverage patterns: the use of new media for mobilization.

NEW MEDIA AND PROTESTS

It is impossible to understand the scope of the demonstrations that took over

Brazil after 2013 without assessing the mobilizing role of social media for social movements. Facebook, the absolute preferred network in the country, was used to organize protest events and debate ideas in both 2013 and 2015. On Twitter, users followed the stream of information in real time. Videos of the police brutality against protestors went viral in these platforms, contributing to the national outrage that led millions to the streets in both years (Costa, 2013; Stauffer, 2013).

The use of social media as an organizing force is by no means unique to the Brazilian case. A recent body of communication research has focused on the relationship between online networking and social movements, particularly after the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movements. At the individual level, several studies have found that social media use has a positive relationship with numerous forms of individual protest participation, including public demonstrations, petitions and boycotts (e.g. Valenzuela, Arriagada, & Scherman, 2012). These studies are based on cross sectional survey data about self-reported online networking and political participation (see Boulianne, 2015 for an overview). However, when analyzing the relationship between social media and protests from a macro-level perspective, Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer (2013) found that social media use actually increased only *after* main street mobilizations took place during the Arab Spring, debunking the idea that social media led to the protests. This study assumes a linear relationship and concludes that increase in the use of new media is more likely to follow protest activity rather than precede it.

Rather than thinking of a causal relationship between social media use and protest participation, another body of literature focuses on an organizational perspective; that is,

how technology have transformed the way social movements operate. These changes could signify an expansion of the collective action repertoire of contention, understood as the various tools and actions available to a movement at a given time frame (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Harlow & Harp, 2012; Snow, Soule & Kriesi, 2004). The Internet also allows for the emergence of online-only protest tactics, like petitions, hacking of official websites, culture jamming and trending of hashtags (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010), just to cite a few. Tufecki (2014) argues that social media sites have empowered movements by facilitating access to public attention, evading censorship and allowing for coordination of logistics.

In a radical reassessment of collective action theories, Bennett and Segerberg (2012) argue that the role of social media goes beyond facilitating the organization of traditional protest tactics. The authors identify a new model of organization that is directly enabled by digital media, which they named *connective action*. Through an analysis of Occupy, Arab Spring and Indignados movements, the authors proposed a typology for large-scale protests based on the role of communication for the way protestors organize. The first type, "organizationally-brokered networks," are characterized by strong organizations coordinating the actions and using communication technologies to spread their collective action frames. The second type is a hybrid form "organizationally-enabled networks," in which action is moderated by loose formal organizations that sponsor causes and actions around a general issue, but invite participants to personalize them individually. The third type, "crowd-enabled connective action," is characterized by social movements that do not depend on the role of any

organizational actor; digital media platforms are the organizational mechanism behind action. In the past, movements needed to engage in frame alignment by strategically linking efforts to the interests of prospective constituents (Snow et al., 1986). In technology-enabled connective action, networks are individualized and do not require the symbolic construction of a single collective identity. Engaging in contentious politics (protesting, boycotting, etc.) becomes an act of personal expression, with people connecting in elastic ways, taking what they want of existing movements and re-shaping issues to their own meaning (Papacharissi, 2010, 2014; Valenzuela et al., 2012).

The challenge becomes to understand the actual political impact of these digitally-networked actions, as they often lead to sporadic protests and chaotic demands. For Tufecki (2014), technological affordances have weaknesses for social movements: new media allow movements to put together sizeable protests without the levels of organizational capacity that marked old successful social movements. But these protests result in very few fundamental policy changes, as protestors are unable to organize around a set group of demands and exert political pressure.

Some social movement scholars have met the "logic of connective action" with resistance. Tarrow (2014) argues that the impact of new forms of communication for social movements is not different than the impact of the pamphlet, hand-held radio and television. As for the "crowd-enabled actions," scholars are reluctant to even label them "social movements." Tarrow (1994), for example, defines social movements as "sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained

challenges against powerful opponents" (p.2). If social movements are marked by continuity and organization (Tilly, 2008; Snow, Soule & Kriesi, 2004), protests represent only one element of social movements' inventory of actions. Digitally-networked protests, based on individualized politics and temporary solidarity, do not provide sustained unified challenges against opponents and cannot, therefore, become an effective social movement.

Solving the definitional problem of what constitutes a social movement is not within the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I am interested in the coverage of a specific act of contentious politics – the street demonstration – that characterized social unrest in Brazil in 2013 and 2015. In this project, I argue that the logic guiding the protests followed a *connective action* approach, both organizationally-enabled (during the first days with *Movimento Passe Livre*) and crowd-enabled (during the massive demonstrations) in 2013. In 2015, crowd-enabled connective action gave space to the return of formal organizations, most notably *Movimento Brasil Livre*, which used social media to invite engagement, but without losing control of its organizational role.

Despite disagreements over the scope of the impact of new technologies for contentious politics, evidence has shown that the use of social media signifies a change in the asymmetrical relationship between movements and mainstream media, as protestors are able to bypass news gatekeepers (see Garrett, 2006 for an overview). Tufecki (2014), for example, found that new media ecologies allow for autonomous content production by social movement organizations to be delivered directly to prospective supporters, circumventing mainstream media. In addition, social media can work as an awareness

system for journalists alerting media professionals about trends and stories under the news radar (Hermida, 2010). Online networks provide a way for social movements to signal to reporters ”Hey, we matter!” through the trending of hashtags and cyberactivism. According to Chadwick (2013), social movements use new media to make interventions in news making processes, rather than completely replacing journalists' role in producing the news. In this project, I am shifting the locus of analysis from social movements' use of social media to journalists. Instead of analyzing the role of online networks for protestors, this analysis focuses on how they were used by journalists in their process of news production. The final section of this chapter focuses on what we know about the use of social media for reporting.

NEW MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Scholarly work on how journalists adopt digital technologies and social media has been guided by the theory of "normalization," which predicts the adoption of old norms and routines in new platforms (Singer, 2005; Lasorsa, Lewis & Holton, 2012; Hermida, 2010). This body of research suggests that, rather than a space for disruption, social media sites are adapted by journalists to fit traditional norms and routines, often reinforcing gatekeeping practices (Lawrence et al., 2014; Lasorsa, Lewis & Holton, 2012; Artwick, 2013; Hermida, 2010). Expanding on this line of research, studies have found that journalists may strategically deviate from traditional norms in an effort to gain attention for themselves online, but not to the point of allowing *participatory* transparency. In other words, the disruptions by journalists on social media are performative — usually in the form of job talk, self-branding and humor — but do not

significantly involve the audience in the news production itself (Molyneux, Mourao & Coddington, 2016; Molyneux & Holton, 2015; Lawrence et al., 2012; Mourao, Diehl & Vasudevan, 2014; Rogstad, 2014).

The literature on journalists' uses of social media identifies two main applications: social media as gatekeeping and social media as an awareness system. When used as an "awareness system," journalists passively maintain social media conversations in their peripheral view, constantly checking what others are saying and monitoring shifts in the conversation (Hermida, 2010; Lawrence, 2012). Borrowing from the literature on computer science systems, Hermida (2010) calls this use "ambient journalism," which is always turned on in the background and can alert journalists of a breaking news story through disturbances in the tone of the system.

For gatekeeping, journalists actively use social media platforms to "claim jurisdiction over the ability to objectively parse reality" (Hermida, 2013, p.303). While these platforms could provide a participatory space for audiences, there is limited evidence that social media challenged journalists' role as gatekeepers. Instead, reporters use social media sites to exert their power on deciding what to pass to others via retweets and replies, who is a credible source of information, and what qualifies as news, effectively acting as curators of digital information (Lawrence et al., 2012; Molyneux, Mourao & Coddington, 2016; Zeller & Hermida, 2015). While social media have undoubtedly augmented the pool of sources available to journalists, traditional voices remain dominant and journalists often still prefer to interact with each other and other political elites, largely excluding the general public from conversations (Lawrence et al.,

2014).

The exception seems to be during breaking news events, like protests and natural disasters, when journalists can be more open to crowdsourcing practices. Acting like "gate watchers," they ask for, evaluate, curate, and immediately pass along information from the general public, performing the role of "informational hubs" (Bruns, 2005; Vis, 2012; Hermida, Lewis & Zamith, 2014). However, only a few journalists consistently engage in this type of collaborative crowdsourcing, with the vast majority limiting their use of social media to more traditional forms of gatekeeping: information gathering and filtering, finding elite sources, sending users back to organization's main website, and getting audience feedback on traditional content (Hermida, 2013; Hedman & Djerf-Pierre, 2013).

It is important to note that the evidence presented in this literature is limited in two ways. First, because of accessibility, the bulk of this research is based on content analyses of Twitter. The platform allows access to one percent of its content via an application programming interface (API), and scholars often use lists of "most influential" journalists to collect the data. As such, this work focuses on the practices of journalists who are already successfully using the technology and may not be representative of the profession as a whole (Hermida, 2013). The focus on Twitter can also be problematic: with 23 percent of internet adults in the platform, Twitter is only the fifth most used network in the United States and Brazil, behind Facebook, Pinterest, Instagram and LinkedIn (Duggan, 2015). Second, the vast majority of research has been conducted in the United States and Europe, despite social networking being more

prevalent per capita among online populations in many developing countries, including Jordan (90%), Indonesia (89%), Philippines (88%) and Brazil (79%) (Pew, 2016).

In Latin America, scholars have used surveys to tap into social media adoption by journalists. Herscowitz (2012) found that Brazilian journalists mostly use social media for basic news tasks: reading other outlets, getting press releases, accessing databases, finding traditional sources and disseminating their work. At that time, about 67 percent of journalists had a Facebook account, 47 percent had a Twitter account and 53 percent had a blog. Another study found that journalists in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina used social media for news gathering, research and fact-checking (Schmitz-Weiss, 2015). In a study analyzing how Latin American journalists use social media for investigative reporting, Saldanã and colleagues (2016) found that reporters are using these platforms to keep up with the news, find ideas for stories and publicize their own work, with Twitter being the most used platform for reporting in 2012. Overall, evidence from surveys is starting to suggests that, similar to North-American journalists, Latin American reporters have been using social media as an awareness system, with Brazilian journalists more likely to use Facebook, YouTube and LinkedIn for reporting.

In this project, I assess the role of social media as an input for journalists covering the protests. Because protests are a breaking news event, it is possible that journalists engaged in "gate watching," using online networking platforms at a higher rate than usual to find sources, ask for information, and publicize their work. As an awareness system, social media can provide protestors with some direct access to journalists.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This dissertation uses a multi-method approach to address which factors influenced the way Brazilian journalists covered the 2013 and 2015 protests. The first set of research questions aims to describe the outcome of media work, identifying patterns of the protest coverage. First, two questions refer to the presence of marginalization devices, frames, sources and evaluations in 2013 and 2015.

RQ1: What a) marginalization devices, b)frames, c) sources and d) evaluations were employed by media outlets when covering the 2013 Brazilian protests?

RQ2: What a) marginalization devices, b)frames, c) sources and d) evaluations were employed by media outlets when covering the 2015 Brazilian protests?

Second, two additional questions inquire about the evolution of those characteristics over time within each year:

RQ3: How did the use of a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources and d)evaluations evolve over time in 2013?

RQ4: How did the use of a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources and d)evaluations evolve over time in 2015?

Recent studies have found that negative media coverage can vary depending on political leanings of outlets: conservative networks like Fox News were less likely to portray the Tea Party movement negatively, for example. Based on previous findings in the literature suggesting that the protest paradigm may be contingent on the political alignment of the outlet with the government (Shahin et al, 2016; Weaver & Scacco, 2013), two hypotheses were tested using a previous content analysis measuring the level

of support for the government by four mainstream newspapers:

H1: The more adversarial to Rousseff's government the outlet, the more legitimizing to the protests the coverage will be in a) 2013, and b) 2015.

This research also examines the direct relationship between sources and the protest paradigm, and how official voices can lead to delegitimizing coverage. According to protest paradigm literature, negative portrayal of protestors is driven by official sources who marginalize the movement. As such, the following hypotheses are tested:

H2: The more stories use official sources, the more they will adhere to the protest paradigm in a) 2013, and b)2015.

H3: The more stories use non-official sources, the more legitimizing to the protestors they will be in a) 2013, and b)2015.

Finally, this project compares the coverage of 2013 and 2015. Because the 2015 protests were more elite-driven, the fourth hypothesis predicts:

H4: Newspapers will be more likely to adhere to the protest paradigm in 2013 than 2015.

Next, research questions and hypotheses turn to the journalist. First, I assess the use of social media for reporting during the demonstrations.

RQ5: How did journalists use social media for reporting?

Previous research has indicated that social movements are able to intervene on news making processes through social media, which serves as an awareness system for journalists (Tufecki, 2014; Hermida, 2010). Through online networks, journalists become aware of protestors' grievances and demands, which can influence their perceptions on

the movement. As such, this project hypothesizes:

H5: The more journalists incorporate social media into their reporting routines, the more supportive they will be to the protests.

Results of the survey of Brazilian journalists tap into journalists perceptions of the protests, their outlet's coverage and mainstream media coverage of the protests though an analysis of self-reported attitudes.

RQ6: What factors influence the way journalists perceived a) the 2013 protests, b) their outlet's coverage of the 2013 protests, c) mainstream media's coverage of the 2013 protests?

RQ7: What factors influence the way journalists perceived a) the 2015 protests, b) their outlet's coverage of the 2015 protests, c) mainstream media's coverage of the 2015 protests?

Then, this project tests hypotheses that journalists individual alignments can have an impact on their perceptions of the movements as protests shifted from left to right-leaning demands:

H6: Journalists who are more aligned with the left will be more supportive of the 2013 protests than those who are aligned with the right.

H7: Journalists who are more aligned with the right are more supportive of the 2015 protests than those who are aligned with the left.

Finally, the last set of research questions brings these two pieces together by linking content to its producers. First, RQ8 asks about journalists' characteristics and the average characteristics of the content they produce:

RQ8: How do journalists' characteristics relate to their coverage of protests regarding a)marginalization devices, b)frames, c) sources, and d) evaluations?

Then, Hypothesis 8 tests if social media for reporting leads to actual less adherence to the paradigm, effectively changing news content:

H8: The more journalists incorporate social media into their reporting routines, the less they will adhere to the protest paradigm.

Finally, the last research question refers to the multi-level analysis of what predicts content, linking results from the survey to results from the content analysis. The final regression model will have variables representing all levels of influence, and their standardized coefficients will be compared:

RQ9: How do influences at different levels influence coverage of protests regarding a)marginalization devices, b)frames, c) sources, and d) evaluations?

METHODS

Chapter 4: The Quantitatively Driven Mixed Approach

This dissertation poses several research questions related to a) how the coverage of the 2013 and 2015 protests compare, b) how coverage of protests evolved overtime, and c) how journalists' individual characteristics relate to this coverage. This chapter describes how each of these purposes were assessed via a quantitatively driven mixed methods design. The following sections briefly describe the steps of the design and how they were used to answer research questions and hypotheses. Because this dissertation has two loci of study - the news and the journalist - a detailed description of the methods and measures used is presented at the beginning of each of the results chapter.

Following a deductive approach rooted in the protest paradigm literature, this is a quantitative-dominant project. The core of the results comes from numerical data analyses, which are then triangulated with qualitative data to attempt to overcome bias and ensure validity (see figure 4.1). According to Johnson et al. (2007), quantitative-dominant mixed methods research "relies on a quantitative, postpositivist view of the research process, while concurrently recognizing that the addition of qualitative data and approaches are likely to benefit most research projects" (p.124). This approach allows this project to not only answer the general question of "what is going on here?," but also to slice a portion of that reality and explore its causal relationships (Tracy, 2013).



Figure 4.1 – Graphic of the Three Major Research Paradigms, Including Subtypes of Mixed Methods Research (Johnson et al., 2007)

The mixed methods design, also known as multi method, integrative, triangulated or blended, combines qualitative and quantitative approaches in the same project. Following the definition by Hunter (in Johnson et al., 2007), the term is used here not only to indicate the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, but also the different styles of research within the quantitative tradition. In this case, this study combines two quantitative methods - survey and content analysis - with a qualitative assessment of answers to open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews by the same subjects who answered the survey. The main rationale for combining methods here is the search for complementarity for quantitative findings, seeking "elaboration, enhancement, illustration, clarification of the results from one method with results from the other method" (Johnson et al., 2007, p.115).

OVERVIEW

This project follows three basic steps. First, a content analysis of stories produced by the four main newspapers in the country was conducted to analyze the way coverage of the 2013 and 2015 protests compared and evolved over time. Second, a survey of Brazilian journalists revealed their attitudes regarding the protests, their views on their outlet's coverage and how social media were used for reporting. Third, a content analysis of the stories produced by 23 selected journalists in the sample was conducted, which allowed me to link individual, organizational and routines levels of influence to actual content.

The final quantitative multiple regression model, with blocks representing the different levels of influences, provides the relative strength of each factor controlling for all other influences. Throughout the results, answers to open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews with journalists from the sample elucidated numeric findings, providing additional context and interpretation. This approach allowed me not only to provide an empirically-based assessment of the coverage and journalists' self-reported characteristics, but also a holistic view of the process for the selected journalists in the sample.

In the sections below, I provide a brief overview of the different components of the multi-method approach used here. For organizational purposes, the detailed methodology for each section – including measures, reliability tests and descriptive statistics – is described at the beginning of the results chapters.

QUANTITATIVE METHODS

Content Analysis

The outcome of the process of frame building is located in the media content, which is the final dependent variable of this study. This dissertation uses a content analysis of news articles posted by the four most-circulated newspapers in Brazil: *Folha de São Paulo, O Estado de São Paulo, O Globo* and *Zero Hora.* Chapter 5 has more details about the codebook, training, intercoder reliability and descriptive statistics for all the variables.

This project is guided by the definition of content analysis by Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2005) as "the systematic assignment of communication content to categories according to rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those categories using statistical methods" (p.3). As such, the analysis does not address implicit meanings or the motivations behind producers, but instead focuses on the statistical analysis of manifest content.

Following a deductive approach, each story was coded for the characteristics of the protest paradigm: marginalization devices, sources, frames and evaluations. Newspapers were compared to test if alignment to the government actually influences protest coverage. Then, content was analyzed over time for the course of four weeks after the initial demonstrations began in both 2013 and 2015. Statistical tests were also conducted to assess the relationship between sources and negative coverage. Finally, results from 2013 and 2015 were compared to test if coverage changed as protests became more elite-driven. Appendix A has the codebook for this analysis.

Survey

The main input (independent variables) for this project comes from the results of an online survey of Brazilian journalists conducted in December, 2015 - January, 2016 through a collaboration with the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas at The University of Texas at Austin. This data includes self-reported news gathering routines, attitudes towards the protests and evaluations of the coverage by journalists' outlets and mainstream media. Chapter 6 has the details about the survey sampling strategies, participation rate, date administered and descriptive statistics of the variables.

The quantitative measures on this survey stem from the literature on media sociology, most notably the work of Weaver and Willnat (2012), Herzcovitz (2012) and the Worlds of Journalism project (Moreira & Rodrigues Helal, 2009). Questions specifically designed to measure protest attitudes were based on research conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, 2014). Hosted at Vanderbilt, LAPOP is the main academic institution conducting public opinion research in Latin America. Their Americas-Barometer questionnaire has been carried out for more than 30 years in 26 countries in the region. For this project, I used the project's battery on protest attitudes and political participation. Appendix B has the full questionnaire for this study.

Chapter 6 (The Journalist) brings the "self-contained" results of the survey analysis, with individual attitudes as the outcome of the models. I am particularly interested in the gap between individual journalists' personal support for the demonstrations and the way they perceived the support given by their news outlet. Models in this chapter address which variables lead to different degrees of self-reported

support for the protests, and which variables account for the personal-outlet attitudinal gap.

Linking content to creators

The last set of research questions and hypotheses connects individual characteristics and *actual* content, which has been rare in communication research (Weaver, 2015). Previous studies have attempted to include multiple levels in the same analysis (Fahmy & Johnson, 2012; Voakes, 1997), but relied exclusively on self-reported data for both the dependent and independent variables, similar to the results presented in Chapter 6. For example, in a study about the Iraq Coverage, Fahmy and Johnson (2012) analyzed the multiple influences that lead to self-reported performance attitudes using responses from individual workers. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by connecting survey results from a selected sample of individual journalists to content analysis of news stories produced by them.

Twenty three journalists who answered the survey were selected for this analysis, yielding 90 stories with their byline. The journalists were selected based on convenience sampling. First, the data was scanned for journalists who a) answered the full survey, b) covered the protests, and c) worked at a mainstream newspaper or online news outlet at the time of the protests. Journalists who are currently not working, worked at alternative outlets or television/radio were not used. Then, using Factiva and Google, stories by those journalists were collected. Priority was given to the journalists who worked for the four newspapers analyzed in the content analysis portion.

The analysis was conducted at two levels: individual journalist and individual

story. At the level of the individual journalist, correlations addressed the link between journalists' characteristics and the average content they produced. At the story level, hierarchical regression analyses assess how individual level, organizational level and routines level variables increase the odds of a certain protest paradigm characteristic appearing in the coverage.

Two biases must be addressed in this method. First, only journalists working for print outlets - web-based, newspaper or magazine - were included. This analysis, therefore, excludes visual elements (video, photo, infographics, etc.). Second, it tends to favor mainstream larger organizations whose material is available online, and underrepresent journalists working for smaller local publications or alternative media.

QUALITATIVE METHODS

After the quantitative analyses from survey and content analysis, a combination of qualitative methods was used on data from two sources: answers to open-ended questions in the survey and semi-structured interviews with journalists. As mentioned before, this analysis was done to complement, contextualize and clarify relationships identified in the quantitative models. Therefore, I do not fully follow an inductive methodology actively seeking patterns emerging from the data, as advocated by interpretive, critical or constructivist approaches. Instead, qualitative results are used here to reduce bias and ensure accuracy and validity (Tracy, 2013). More specifically, the interviews addressed specific findings from the quantitative models, and journalists were asked to explain the processes behind them.

Open-ended questions

The survey of journalists included two sets of open-ended questions that were asked referring to the 2013 and 2015 protests separately:

1 - Overall, what do you think the 2013/2015 protests were about?

2- How do you think the media covered the protests in 2013/2015?

3 - How do you think media coverage of the protests in 2013/2015 evolved over time?

Journalists were also asked: "What were, in your opinion, the main differences between the 2013 and 2015 protests?"

For this project, I focus only on responses by journalists who are or were formally employed at the time of the protests. The list compiled by the Knight Center includes journalism educators, students and former journalists who are not currently working for a news organization, but their responses were not included in this analysis. This decision was made because, ultimately, this project does not seek to explain general attitudes towards the protests and the media. Instead, I focus on how members of a *specific group* – mainstream professional journalists – assess the demonstrations and the work of the institution they are part of. It is worth noting that in Brazil, anyone with a journalism diploma is generally considered a journalist, even if they work as a public relations, for example. To avoid confusion, this project opted for the most conservative route to ensure validity of the qualitative findings and consider only those working for a news organization at the time of the survey.

Interviews with journalists

Finally, the last step of this project involves interviews with selected journalists who answered the survey and were selected for the linked analysis. Interviews were conducted after the results from quantitative analyses were finalized and sought to specifically address the processes that were identified. These conversations were semi-structured, with questions based on the literature and theoretical foundation of this research project (Appendix C), but also allowing follow-ups and particular details that may arise from interview responses (Tracy, 2013). More importantly, this step put quantitative results in the context of a first person perspective – the *verstehen* – regarding the influences on journalists' work.

Semi-structured interviews addressed more nuanced ways in which journalists perceived the protests, their work, their roles and the importance of social media for their reporting practices. Interviews were conducted, recorded and transcribed by myself, and results were weaved through the chapters, providing accounts, rationales, explanations and justifications for the findings. A total of eight journalists were interviewed for this project, all from the subsample of 23 mainstream journalists who were used for the linked analysis. Some journalists were contacted for follow up questions. Interviews and follow-ups were conducted by phone, Whatsapp, Skype and email and generally lasted about one and a half hour.

HUMAN SUBJECTS AND SAFETY

This project received approval from The University of Texas Institutional Board Review (IRB) before proceeding with any human subject data collection. Participation in

the survey was voluntary and participants were informed of the nature of the study. This study involved no vulnerable populations and the potential risk to the participants was no greater than everyday life. Survey identifiers and interviews were recorded, but participants were assured that the data would be kept anonymous. Identifiers, including the name of the journalist and the media organization they work for, along with all other survey information, were not mentioned in the final manuscript. This is particularly important because only a handful of journalists working for each organization covered the protests, and revealing the name of the outlet would jeopardize their anonymity. The data is currently stored on a password protected cloud service. Unobtrusive methods (content analysis) are exempt of IRB approval.

RESULTS

Chapter 5 - The Coverage

This chapter focuses on coverage of the protests in 2013 and 2015 from the four most-circulated mainstream newspapers[1] in Brazil: *Folha de São Paulo*, *Estado de São Paulo*, *O Globo* and *Zero Hora*. In this chapter, I analyze stories based on the four pillars of the protest paradigm identified by the literature: marginalization devices, reliance on official sources, frames of protest and negative evaluations. Then, I assess how these characteristics changed by week within each protest wave and how the use of official sources relates to negative coverage. Finally, I compare the coverage in 2013 and 2015 looking for larger patterns of differences. Results reveal that the coverage in 2013 emphasized violence, but sometimes blamed the police for starting it. As protests evolved, news stories became more legitimizing to the protestors in 2013. In 2015, coverage was thematic, putting the demonstrations into the larger context of the political crisis facing the country. Official sources from opposition parties were used to legitimize the movement in 2015.

Historically, each of the four newspapers analyzed has a different tradition in covering protests. *Folha de São Paulo* is the largest newspaper in circulation in Brazil and has usually been supportive of massive urban protests, openly campaigning for the

[1] Source: IVC – Instituto Verificador de Circulação available at: http://www.anj.org.br/maiores-jornais-do-brasil/. The third highest circulation publication, Super Noticia, is a popular tabloid and its content was not available.

"Diretas Já!" movement at the end of the military regime, and the "Fora, Collor!" demonstrations for the impeachment of President Collor (Matos, 2008; Azevedo, 2006). Published in Rio de Janeiro, *O Globo* is the flagship publication of the largest media conglomerate in Brazil, *Grupo Globo*. Initially supportive of the military regime and the election of President Collor, *O Globo* was the last daily to give space to both "Diretas Já!" and "Fora, Collor!" (Conti, 1999; Matos, 2008). Published in São Paulo, O *Estado de São Paulo* openly supported the military coup in 1964, but gradually started supporting the direct elections movement, albeit coverage remained skeptical of protestors' motives (Matos, 2008). Together, the three newspapers are elite-oriented and pivotal in defining the news agenda in the country (Kucinski, 1998). *Zero Hora* is the only regional paper in the sample, published in Rio Grande do Sul by *Grupo RBS*. According to Lopes (2007), *Zero Hora* covered the "Diretas Já!" movement in a positive way.

METHODS

Sampling

The articles for this study were selected via Factiva, a research tool owned by Dow Jones & Company that aggregates content from more than 32,000 sources in 28 languages. Articles were identified by using a string of key words derived from the words "protests" "protestors" and "demonstrations" in Portuguese: (protestos OR protesto OR manifestacao OR manifestacoes OR manifestante OR manifestantes). For each case, the sampling covered a 30-day period beginning with the first day of street demonstrations. For the 2013 protests, this period ranged from June 6, 2013 to July 4, 2013. For the 2015

protests, it ranged from March 15, 2015 to April 11, 2015. This query yielded 4,082 stories for 2013, and 1,180 for 2015.

Since one of the goals of this project is to assess coverage variation over time, sampling using randomly selected weeks would not be appropriate; i.e., by chance, it could be that two or three days of the randomly constructed week were from the same week, and no days from other weeks were selected. In order to capture daily and weekly variations, this project uses multistage sampling combining two different techniques: proportionate sampling and systematic random sampling within strata. This procedure was done in the following way: first, the frequency of articles from each week was counted to assess for proportion by time period. For example, if 10 percent of the total population was published on week 1, then the sample would reflect that same distribution. The same procedure was done for the proportion of coverage stemming from each outlet. This technique, called *proportionate sampling*, allows for the selection of sample sizes from within strata based on the stratum's proportion of the population (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 2005). Finally, using systematic random sampling (every *n*th article), a 15 percent random sample was selected considering time and outlet proportions, following the recommendation of Neuendorf (2012). Table 5.1 contains the number of articles retrieved within each strata, the proportion they account for in the population and in the sample. The final sample contained 727 stories, 550 from 2013 and 177 from 2015.

Before coding for the article, coders identified if the story was about the 2013 protests in June or the 2015 protests in March. Stories about other protests (e.g. Arab

Spring, Ukraine protests, landless protests in the country, etc.) were not coded further. A total of 378 stories for 2013 and 104 stories for 2015 were relevant to this analysis, yielding a precision rate of 0.67 to the string search (Percent Agreement = 98%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.87, Cohen's kappa=0.87).

Table 5.1 – Proportional sampling strategy by time frame and by outlet

2013

Proportionate sampling by time				Proportionate sampling by week			
Week	N total retrieved	Proportion	N stories in the sample	Outlet	N Total retrieved	Proportion	N stories in the sample
1	233	6.36%	35	Folha	1018	28%	153
2	814	22.2	122	Estado	920	25	138
3	1417	38.65	213	O Globo	1148	31	171
4	1202	32.79	180	Zero Hora	580	16	88
Total	3,666	100%	550	Total	3,666	100%	550

2015

Proportionate sampling by time				Proportionate sampling by week			
Week	N total retrieved	Proportion	N stories in the sample	Outlet	N Total retrieved	Proportion	N stories in the sample
1	505	42.80%	76	Folha	331	28%	50
2	240	20.34	36	Estado	307	26	46
3	193	16.36	29	O Globo	389	33	58
4	242	20.51	36	Zero Hora	153	13	23
Total	1,180	100.%	177	Total	1,180	100%	177

For the 2013 protests, the final sample of relevant stories (N=378) had 122 (29.6%) articles from *Folha de São Paulo,* 116 (30.7%) from *O Estado de São Paulo,* 92 (24.3%) from *O Globo,* and 58 (15.3%) from *Zero Hora.* The sample in 2015 had 104 stories from 2015, 31.7% (N=33) from *Folha de São Paulo,* 27.9% (N=29) from *O*

Estado de São Paulo, 26.9% (N=28) from *O Globo,* and 13.5% (N=14) from *Zero Hora.*

Intercoder reliability and training

Coding was divided among three coders who are native Portuguese speakers and graduate students at the University of Texas at Austin. After three training sessions, intercoder reliability was established on a subsample coded independently by each trained coder and the author of this dissertation. Reliability tests were performed using a representative sample of population containing 52 stories, following the recommendation of Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2005) for 95% level of probability. Krippendorff's alpha and Cohen's kappa scores were used to calculate inter-coder reliability (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) using ReCal (Freelon, 2013). Alphas ranged from 0.67 to 1 and the specific values for each variable are described below.

Measures

The codebook for this study contained four types of variables accounting for the parts that form the protest paradigm: devices, frames, sources and evaluations. Overall, the coding scheme included the presence or absence of frames and devices, the count of sources mentioned and an ordinal assessment of evaluations. This codebook (Appendix A) is based on previous studies on protest coverage (Hertog & McLeod, 2003; Dardis, 2006; Shahin et al, 2016; Weaver & Scacco, 2013). The unit of analysis for this study is the individual news article.

Devices. Stories were coded for the presence or absence of marginalization or legitimization devices; stories could have one or more devices as they are not mutually exclusive:

a) Appearance: does the story mention how the protestors look? (Percent Agreement = 96%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.88, Cohen's Kappa=0.88)

b) Idiot: Does the story portray the protestors as "idiots;" that is, whether protesters engage in behaviors that make them appear less than serious, politically extreme, unintelligent, or immature about their cause? (Percent Agreement = 92%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.67, Cohen's Kappa=0.67)

c) Peaceful: Does the story say the protests were peaceful? (Percent Agreement = 96%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.87, Cohen's Kappa=0.87)

d) Violent: Does the story say the protests were violent? (Percent Agreement = 90%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.80, Cohen's Kappa=0.80)

e) Cause mentioned: What was the mentioned reason why protests are taking place or the mentioned goals of the protestors? If not present, code 0. (Percent Agreement = 84%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.79, Cohen's Kappa=0.79)

Frames. Stories were coded for the presence or absence of each frame of protest:

a) Circus: the portrayal of protests as spectacle, carnival or odd/deviant (Percent Agreement = 98%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.79, Cohen's Kappa=0.79).

b) Confrontation: emphasis on the conflict between protestors and police; protestors as combatants, focusing on clashes between the two groups (Percent Agreement = 90%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.76, Cohen's Kappa=0.77).

c) Riot: highlights conflict between protestors and society; mentions of looting, violence by protestors, law-breaking behavior (Percent Agreement = 94%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.87, Cohen's Kappa=0.87).

d) Debate: the social critique brought by the protests is at the center of this frame, protestors treated as legitimate political actors (Percent Agreement = 94%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.84, Cohen's Kappa=0.84).

e) Thematic/Episodic: this item measures if the article was mostly thematic or episodic; most stories will have a combination between episodic and thematic frames, this item measures the predominant one. Episodic: the sum of the article describes a specific event or moment in time; the who, where, when and what of particular events; episodic frames focus on individual behaviors and events. Thematic: coverage places political issues and events in some general context, focusing on "grand scheme" of the issue or the issue over time (Percent Agreement = 94%, Krippendorff's alpha=0.84, Cohen's Kappa=0.84).

Sources. For each story, how many of these types of sources were directly quoted?

a) Official: Elected officials or those appointed by elected officials, including police (Krippendorff's alpha for ratio = 0.98).

b) Protestor: protestor or social movement leaders (Krippendorff's alpha for ratio = 0.75).

c) Bystander: eyewitnesses who are neither officials nor protesters, but passers by or other "common people" affected by protests (Krippendorff's alpha for ratio = 1).

d) Social media: sources from social media (Krippendorff's alpha for ratio =0.66).

e) Other: other sources like experts, scholars, other NGOs, etc. (Krippendorff's alpha for ratio = 1).

Evaluation. Stories were coded for the way they portray protestors, their cause and their opponents (administration), as well as who is to blame for violence when present. Evaluations can be 1 (negative), 2 (neutral or balanced) and 3 (positive):

a) Violence blame: who does the story blame for the violence from 1 (protestors), 2 (balanced) to 3 (police/administration)? (Krippendorff's alpha for ordinal = 0.76)

b) Protestor: Overall, how does the story evaluate the protestors, from 1= negative, 2 = neutral or 3= positive? (Krippendorff's alpha for ordinal = 0.74)

c) Cause: How does the story evaluate the cause from 1= negative to 3= positive? (Krippendorff's alpha for ordinal = 0.72)

d) Administration: Overall, how does the story evaluate the administration (police, government, etc.), from 1= negative, 2= neutral or 3= positive? (Krippendorff's alpha for ordinal = 0.77)

Data analysis

Research questions 1 and 2 ask about the use of marginalization devices, frames, sources and evaluations in news about protests in 2013 and 2015. Descriptive statistics by year were used to assess the frequency of those elements in the coverage. RQ3 and 4 inquire about the evolution of the use of marginalization devices, frames, sources and evaluations over time. Chi square and ANOVA tests were used to assess the differences in coverage by week for each protest cycle.

Hypothesis 1 predicts that the more adversarial to Rousseff's government the outlet, the more legitimizing to the protests the coverage will be in both years. To test this hypothesis, this study uses a content analysis by the group *Brasil de Fato*[2] measuring the level of support for the President during the 2014 elections in the news. Between August 28 and September 27, 2014, *O Globo* did not publish any headline supportive of Rousseff's government, 70% of its coverage was negative and 30% was neutral/unrelated. *O Estado de São Paulo* published 73% negative stories about the President, 30% neutral/unrelated and 3% positive. About 60% of the headlines published by *Folha de São Paulo* in that period was negative towards the President, 33% was neutral and 7% positive. The study did not analyze the content from *Zero Hora,* but RBS group is affiliated to *Organizações Globo.* As such, this study predicts that coverage by *O Globo* and *Zero Hora* will be more supportive of the protests than coverage by *Estado* and *Folha de São Paulo.* Chi-square and ANOVA tests were used to assess the differences by outlet.

Based on the indexing theory, the next set of research hypotheses assesses the relationship between official/protestor sources and the protest paradigm. H2 predicts that the more stories use official sources, the more they will adhere to the protest paradigm. Conversely, H3 predicts that stories that use non-official sources will be more likely to be legitimizing to the protestors. Hypotheses were tested using t-tests.

Finally, H4 inquiries about differences between the coverage in 2013 and 2015.

[2] Brasil de Fato is an activist research project that focuses on raising awareness to media portrayals of leftist groups in Brazil. This study is a content analysis of headlines during the 2014 elections and is available at: www.brasildefato.com.br

Because all newspapers tend to be opposed to Rousseff's government and the 2015 protests were not characterized by the violence seen in 2013, this study predicts that newspapers will be more likely to adhere to the protest paradigm in 2013 than 2015. Once again, Chi-square and ANOVA tests were used to assess the differences by year.

RESULTS – 2013

Data Characteristics

RQ1 inquiries about the devices, frames, sources and evaluations in the coverage of the 2013 protests. Overall, the coverage in 2013 tended to focus on tactics (violence/peace) rather than protestors' characteristics (appearance/idiot) or ideas (demands/grievances). Of the stories analyzed, 11.1% mentioned the "appearance" of protestors, 7.4% treated them as "idiots," and 40.5% did not mention any "cause" of the protests. When it comes to tactics, 15.9% said the protests were "peaceful" and 44.7% said protests were "violent." Of those, 52.7% blamed the protestors for the violence, 21.3% blamed the police, and 26% blamed both. When it comes to frames (RQ1b), only 4% of the stories had the "circus" frame, while 27.5% had the "riot" frame, 32% had the "confrontation" frame, and 30.5% had the "debate" frame. In 2013, only 18.3% of the stories were predominantly "thematic."

Stories were coded for the number of quoted sources who are official, protestor, bystander, social media and other (experts, NGOs, etc) (RQ1c). About half of the stories (N=180), had no sources at all. The average number of sources per story was 0.32 for official sources, 0.26 for protestors, .02 for bystanders, 0.03 for social media, and .33 for other sources. However, the absolute number of sources provides a limited account of

how much each story relies on each type of source; i.e., a story could have three protestor sources but accompanied of a equal or greater number of official sources. A better measure of patterns of representation is to consider *share* or *proportions* of all voices reported belonging to each group in the coverage. In order to do this, all sources mentioned in a story were added (N total) and a proportion for each group was calculated (N group/N total). Stories without sources were not computed. Stories with sources had an average of 36% of its voices coming from official sources, 23% from protestor sources, 35% from other sources, such as academic experts or opinion leaders, 3.76% from social media sources, and 1.5% from bystanders. Because only two stories had bystanders' quotes, they were removed from the analysis, which would violate chi-square assumptions of five observations per cell.

For evaluations (RQ1d), stories were coded from 1 'negative' to 3 'positive' in regards to their portrayal of the protestors, their cause and the administration (government/police). The average evaluation for the protestors was 2.01, for the cause 2.19 and for the administration 1.77. Appendix D has a table with operationalizations, means, range and standard deviations for all the variables in the content analysis.

Coverage over time

RQ3 asks about the evolution of a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources and d) evaluations overtime in 2013. Table 5.2 shows the results of chi-square tests for devices and frames by each week. For devices (RQ3a), results show that there was a statistically significant decrease on mentions of violence over time [χ^2 (3)= 28.34, p<.001]. To further probe these differences, the column proportions test assigns a letter

key to each category (week), and these proportions are compared using *z* tests. When a pair of columns is significantly different from another at the p<.05 level, they are assigned different subscript letters. For the violence device, weeks 2, 3 and 4 are statistically different from each other at the p<.05 level. When is comes to mentioning "peacefulness," results also reveal a marginally significant difference across each week, with coverage on week 3 mentioning that protests were "peaceful" the most time [χ^2 (3)=7.41, p<.10].

Table 5.2 – Evolution of the use of devices and frames in the coverage of the 2013 protests

	Week 1	**Week 2**	**Week 3**	**Week 4**	
Devices	%	%	%	%	**χ^2 (df=3)**
Appearance	33.3 $_{a}$	12.4 $_{a,b}$	13 $_{a,b}$	6.6 $_{b}$	6.19$^{\#}$
Idiot	0 $_{a}$	7.6 $_{a}$	10.3 $_{a}$	4.1 $_{a}$	4.12
Peaceful	16.7 $_{a,b}$	14.3 $_{a,b}$	21.9 $_{b}$	9.9 $_{a}$	7.41$^{\#}$
Violent	83.3 $_{a,b}$	61 $_{b}$	45.2 $_{a}$	28.1 $_{c}$	28.34***
Cause mentioned (1=yes)	83.3 $_{a, b}$	68.6 $_{b}$	58.9 $_{a,b}$	51.2 $_{a}$	8.45*
Frames					
Circus	0 $_{a}$	5.7 $_{a}$	4.8 $_{a}$	1.7 $_{a}$	3.05
Riot	66.7 $_{a}$	38.1 $_{a,b}$	26.7 $_{b,c}$	17.4 $_{c}$	16.82***
Confrontation	66.7 $_{a}$	53.3 $_{a}$	27.4 $_{b}$	17.4 $_{b}$	38.62***
Debate	0 $_{a}$	26.7 $_{a}$	26.7 $_{a}$	40 $_{b}$	9.46*
Thematic	0 $_{a}$	19 $_{a}$	15.1 $_{a}$	22.3 $_{a}$	3.71

$^{\#}$p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

^{a,b,c} The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column variable. For each pair, the column proportions are compared using a *z* test. If a pair of values is significantly different (p<.05), the values have *different* subscript letters assigned to them.

Stories were also more likely to mention the appearance of the protestors on week

1 (33.3%) than week 4 (6.6%). For the cause mentioned, stories on week 1 were more likely to mention a cause (83.3% did) and that gradually decreased as demands became broader.

For frames (RQ3b), results show that weeks 1 and 2 were more likely to have the "riot" frame, emphasizing vandalism, looting, destruction of private and public property, etc. [χ^2 (3)= 16.82, p<.001]. Similarly, weeks 1 and 2 were also more likely to have the "confrontation" frame, which focuses on clashes between police and protestors [χ^2 (3)= 38.62, p<.001]. This is closely associated with reality on the streets: on week 2, violent police response was emphasized in the news and on week 4, most mentions of violence were about the anarchic group "Black Blocs," who were a minority, but used radical tactics to protest. Week 3 was characterized by less confrontations with the police. Therefore, coverage was responsive not only to the demands and tactics of the protestors, but also to the degree of police response to the protest.

As emphasis on violence decreased, the legitimizing "debate" frame increased. On the first week of the protests, no stories were published treating protestors as legitimate actors. By week 4, 40% of the stories had the debate frame, which included stories not only recognizing the public transportation demand as legitimate, but also linking the protests to a generalized dissatisfaction with the government [χ^2 (3)= 9.46, p<.05].

Table 5.3 contains the evolution of sources and evaluations over time. When it comes to sources (RQ3c), the only difference over time was that protestor sources were gradually less common in the coverage from week 1 to week 4 [F (3, 165) = 2.38, p <

.10]. This means that while coverage became more legitimizing, protestor voices were actually *less* common.

When violence was present, an ANOVA test showed a statistically significant mean difference on who stories blamed for it overtime [F (3, 165) = 5.86, p < .01]. Post hoc test using the Tukey HSD showed that violence blame on week 2 was statically more leaning towards neutral than week 4.

Table 5.3 – Percentage of quotes coming from different types of sources in a story and evaluations in the coverage of the 2013 protests

	Week 1	**Week 2**	**Week 3**	**Week 4**	
Sources	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	**F(df=3)**
Official	40	35.93	32.88	41.10	0.38
Protestor	26.67	19.20	31.73	15.11	2.38[#]
Social Media	10	6.64	4.21	0	1.75
Other	10	36.39	30.17	42.94	1.47
Evaluation[1]					
Violence blame	1.6	2	1.46	1.56	5.86**
Protestors	1	1.98	2.01	2.08	4.54***
Cause	2	2.18	2.16	2.24	0.56
Administration	2	1.6	1.88	1.79	5.45***

[#]p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

[1]Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive and violence blame was measures as 1= protestors, 2= balanced, and 3= police.

Finally, for evaluations (ranging from 1= negative to 3= positive), coverage on week 1 was completely negative to the protestors (M=1), neutral to their cause (M=2) and to the administration (M=2). This gradually shifts, with coverage in week 4 being slightly positive for the protestors (M=2.08), very positive to their cause (M=2.24) and negative

towards the government (M=1.79). The differences for the way protestors [F (3, 378) = 4.54, p<.001] and administration [F (3, 378) = 5.45, p < .001] were portrayed are statistically significant. Appendix D has the standard deviations of all variables mentioned.

Coverage across outlets

To test Research Hypothesis 1 (the more adversarial to Rousseff's government the outlet, the more legitimizing to the protests the coverage will be), a series of cross tabulations was performed. Table 5.4 depicts the use of devices and frames by outlet.

Table 5.4 – Use of devices and frames by outlets covering the 2013 protests

	Folha	**Estado**	**O Globo**	**Zero Hora**	
Devices	%	%	%	%	χ^2 **(df=3)**
Appearance	6.3 $_{a}$	8.6 $_{a,b}$	17.4 $_{b}$	15.5 $_{b}$	8.22*
Idiot	2.7 $_{a}$	10.3 $_{b}$	6.5 $_{a,b}$	12.1 $_{b}$	7.05$^{\#}$
Peaceful	9.8 $_{a}$	12.1 $_{a,b}$	21.7 $_{b,c}$	25.9 $_{c}$	11.03*
Violent	44.6 $_{a,b}$	35.2 $_{b}$	52.2 $_{a}$	51.7 $_{a}$	7.32$^{\#}$
Cause mentioned (1=yes)	55.4 $_{a}$	62.1 $_{a}$	59.8 $_{a}$	62.1 $_{a}$	1.27
Frames					
Circus	2.7 $_{a}$	1.7 $_{a}$	6.5 $_{a}$	6.9 $_{a}$	4.91
Riot	22.3 $_{a}$	25 $_{a}$	31.5 $_{a}$	36.2 $_{a}$	4.82
Confrontation	31.3 $_{a,b}$	25 $_{b}$	43.5 $_{a}$	29.3 $_{a,b}$	8.40 *
Debate	30.4 $_{a}$	19 $_{b}$	35.2 $_{a,c}$	46.6 $_{c}$	15.26**
Thematic	13.4 $_{a}$	17.2 $_{a,b}$	25 $_{b}$	19 $_{a,b}$	4.68

$^{\#}$p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

^{a,b,c} The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column variable. For each pair of media outlets, the column proportions are compared using a *z* test. If a pair of values is significantly different (p<.05), the values have *different* subscript letters assigned to them.

For devices, results reveal that *Folha de São Paulo* was statistically less likely to

mention the appearance of the protestors [χ^2 (3)= 8.22, p<.05] and treat them as idiots [χ^2 (3)= 7.05, p<.10] than all the other outlets. When it comes to tactics, *O Estado de São Paulo* was less likely to mention violence and the difference was marginally significant [χ^2 (3)= 7.32, p<.10]. *O Globo* and *Zero Hora* were more likely to mention that protests were peaceful [χ^2 (3)= 11.03, p<.05]. Because protests in São Paulo were more violent, with several days of clashes between police and protestors, it is possible that the geographical location of the outlets accounts for this difference. For frames, *Zero Hora* and *O Globo* were more likely to have the legitimizing "debate" frame, and *O Estado de São Paulo* was statistically less likely have the "debate" frame and also less likely to emphasize "confrontation" [χ^2 (3)= 8.40, p<.05 for confrontation, and χ^2 (3)= 15.26, p<.01 for debate].

Table 5.5 – Percentage of quotes coming from different types of sources in a story and evaluations by outlet in 2013

	Folha	***Estado***	***O Globo***	***Zero Hora***	
Sources	**Mean**	**Mean**	**Mean**	**Mean**	**F(df=3)**
Official	49.55	28.21	29.18	45.76	3.13*
Protestor	19.09	27.19	22.42	22.88	.45
Social Media	1.52	5.83	4.97	0	1.12
Other	28.94	36.89	42.12	29.09	.93
Evaluation[1]					
Violence blame	1.84	1.59	1.75	1.46	1.69
Protestors	1.93	2.03	2.18	1.84	3.39*
Cause	2.1	2.13	2.24	2.39	3.41*
Administration	1.81	1.78	1.70	1.81	.84

* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

[1]Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive and violence blame was measures as 1= protestors, 2= balanced, and 3= police.

For sources, *Folha* and *Zero Hora* relied more heavily on official sources [F (3, 165) = 3.13, p < .05]. For evaluations, ANOVA tests reveal a statistically difference between outlets for protestor evaluation [F (3, 378) = 3.39, p < .05] and cause [F (3, 378) = 3.41, p < .05]. Post hoc test using the Tukey HSD showed that cause evaluation was statistically more positive in *Zero Hora* than *Folha* and *Estadão.* For protestor evaluation, *O Globo* was more likely to portray protestors positively than *Folha* and *Zero Hora*. Table 5.5 shows the results of the ANOVA tests for sources and evaluations.

Overall, these results suggest that, while *Estado de São Paulo* was the paper that emphasized violence the least and *Folha de São Paulo* did not focus on appearance or treated protestors as "idiots," *Globo* and *Zero Hora* were more likely to have the legitimizing debate frame, be supportive of protestors' cause and mention peaceful parts of the demonstrations (H1a was supported). As such, for the newspapers that are more adversarial to Rousseff's government, coverage was more legitimizing.

Sources and the protest paradigm

Finally, H2 and H3 inquire about the relationship between sources and the protest paradigm. Table 5.6 shows t-tests from reliance on each type of sources and devices, Table 5.7 from frames, and Table 5.8 shows correlations between reliance on each type of source and evaluations.

H2a tests if the more stories use official sources, the more likely they will adhere more closely to the protest paradigm in 2013. Results from Table 5.6 suggest that the more stories rely on official sources, the *less* they mention appearance [t(196) = -3.64, p

= .001] or treat protestors as idiots [t(196) = -2.13, p = .05]. The relationship between official sources and other marginalization devices and frames was not statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 was rejected for 2013.

Table 5.6 – Relationship between percentage of quotes coming from different types of sources and presence of devices and protests frames in the coverage of the 2013 protests

	Official		**Protestor**		**Social Media**		**Other**	
Devices	Mean	t	Mean	t	Mean	t	Mean	t
Appearance		-3.64***		5.93 ***		0.44		-2.04*
Yes	7.05		62.18		5.13		18.59	
No	40.77		17.35		3.56		37.67	
Idiot		-2.13 *		5.17***		-0.5		-1.75#
Yes	14.81		65.74		1.85		17.59	
No	38.49		18.98		3.95		36.92	
Peaceful		- 0.93		3.45**		- 1.29		- 1.51
Yes	29.08		45.63		0		23.56	
No	37.59		19.39		4.41		37.15	
Violent		- 1.43		1.93*		.29		-.86
Yes	31.15		29.24		4.16		32.04	
No	40.41		18.53		3.45		37.61	
Cause mentioned		- 1.49		3.94 ***		- 0.54		-1.35
Yes	32.69		31.19		3.27		31.92	
No	42.71		9.31		4.63		40.84	

#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

It is important to note that the tone of quotes from official sources also changed as protests increased. Initially, quotes from the governor of São Paulo - who is from the opposition party - harshly criticized the movement. A story from *O Estado de São Paulo* print:

> In the morning, during an event to announce a Police Operation in the countryside, [governor] Alckmin criticized MPL. “What we saw in the last few

> days were acts of vandalism, violence, leaving a trail of destruction and a political movement," he said. He also assured that the police worked to "protect" the protestors. (Rodrigues, 2013, my translation)

About two weeks later, quotes from him were used to legitimize the protests:

> Alckmin said yesterday that society is "unsatisfied with its political representation. It is up to us to be humble enough to listen, to understand the demonstrations and to act. It's not just talk, it's is about working, governing, cutting budgets, increasing investments." (Folha de São Paulo, 2013, my translation)

For H3a, results show that the use of protestor sources is positively associated with all marginalization devices, suggesting that protestor's quotes can be used to portray them as idiots [$t(196) = 1.87$, $p = .001$], for example.

For frames (Table 5.7), a higher percentage of protestor voices is also associated with riot [$t(196) = 3.15$, $p = .001$], circus [$t(196) = 3.30$, $p = .001$] and *negatively* associated with the legitimizing debate frame [$t(196) = -4.07$, $p = .001$] and thematic coverage [$t(196) = -2.89$, $p = .001$]. This effectively means that access to the news via quotes do not benefit protestors. When they appeared, protestors' quotes were characterized negatively and associated with coverage that delegitimized the movement. One story from *Folha de São Paulo* entitled "*Por que vim?* [Why am I here?]" published in June 18, 2013 exemplifies:

> Maiara Cesário, 22, faced her first demonstration wearing workout leggings, pink Nike shoes, Nike backpack and mascara. In her "protest kit" she also had a mask for tear gas, protection goggles, and vinegar. Maiara, who is a law student from Univap, came from Campinas in a chartered bus. Her sign said: "I represent you, seating on the couch."
> "I'm here against corruption and for rights," she said. Which ones? "Ah, all of them." And the bus fare in Campinas, is it expensive? "Camila, how much is the bus fare in Campinas anyways?," she asked her friend. (Mello, 2013, my translation)

Table 5.7 – Relationship between the percentage of quotes coming from different types of sources used and presence of protests frames in the coverage of the 2013 protests

	Official		Protestor		Social Media		Other	
Frames	**Mean**	**t**	**Mean**	**t**	**Mean**	**t**	**Mean**	**t**
Circus		-1.25		3.30***		-0.64		-1.19
Yes	16.67		66.67		0		16.67	
No	37.17		21.40		3.92		35.94	
Riot		-0.57		3.15***		-1.90*		-1.70 #
Yes	33.30		37.33		0		26.23	
No	37.45		18.08		5.13		38.43	
Confrontation		-0.77		1.29		-1.55		-0.30
Yes	32.51		28.70		0.90		33.68	
No	37.96		20.91		4.98		35.79	
Debate		.32		-4.07***		.40		3.65***
Yes	38.27		5.19		2.88		53.65	
No	35.90		29.86		4.10		28.08	
Thematic		1.13		-2.89**		-1.50		2.08*
Yes	43.92		6.85		0		48.84	
No	34.60		27		4.63		32.02	

# p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

The story brings several quotes from other protestors, all highlighting the contradictions between their demands, oddities in their behaviors and their physical appearance. At the end, it concludes:

> At *Largo do Batata*, a meeting place for the beginning of the demonstration, participants played samba, a few of them drank beers, and the atmosphere was festive, with police observing from far away. Some chanted: "what a shame, bus fares more expensive than weed." That was actually not lacking: everywhere one looked there were people rolling joints. (Melo, 2013, my translation)

For "other sources," their presence was strongly associated with the debate frame

[t(196) = 3.65, p = .001], and also led to more thematic coverage [t(196) = 2.08, p = .05] and less emphasis on riot [t(196) = 1.70, p = .10] and appearance [t(196) = -2.04, p = .05]. These sources were mainly academic experts or opinion leaders.

Correlations presented on Table 5.8 reinforce these findings: the presence of protestor sources were associated with *negative* portrayal of the protestors (r=-.16, p<.05). Conversely, correlations show that the presence of sources like experts, NGOs and other non-official opinion leaders is associated with positive portrayals of protestors (r=.20, p<.01) and their cause (r=.20, p<.05).

Table 5.8 – Correlations between the percentage of quotes from different types of sources, violence blame and evaluations of protestors, their cause and the administration in 2013

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**
1.Violence blame	-							
2. Cause Evaluation	-.01	-						
3. Protestor Evaluation	.42***	.26***	-					
4. Administration Evaluation	-.47***	-.28***	-.24***	-				
5. Official sources	-.01	-.03	-.04	-.01	-			
6. Protestor sources	-.10	-.13	-.16*	.01	-.41***	-		
7. Social media sources	-.02	.01	.05	.01	-.16*	-.11	-	
8. Other sources	.12	.20*	.20**	-.04	-.58***	-.40***	-.13#	-

#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

Note: *Evaluations are measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral and 3= positive. Violence blame is measured as 1=protestors, 2=balanced, 3= police.*

As opposed to protestor quotes, academics and other activists not associated with

the movement were frequently used to legitimize protestors' motives. The following story from *Zero Hora* exemplifies:

> For activist Robert Kennedy Jr., nephew of President Kennedy, people are protesting because the country is growing economically and becoming more democratic. "Movements are a reflex of Brazil's economic growth and represent people's desire for changes in public policies," the economist said. (Zero Hora, 2013, my translation)

Scholars, experts and NGO activists were frequently asked to comment on the use of social media for protests, police brutality, and transportation demands, just to cite a few. Overall, results suggest that when protestor voices are presented, they serve to delegitimize the movement. But when other non-official sources are cited, they are associated with more legitimizing coverage. As such, H3a (the more stories use non-official sources, the more legitimizing to the protestors they will be in 2013) is partially supported.

RESULTS - 2015

Data characteristics

RQ2 asks about the a) devices, b) frames, c) sources, and d) evaluations present in the coverage. About 11.5% of the stories mentioned protestor's appearance, 7.7% portrayed them as idiots, 6.7% mentioned the protests were peaceful, 5.8% mentioned the protests were violent, and 75% mentioned the reason why protests were taking place. For frames (RQ2b), the legitimizing "debate" frame was the most common in the sample, present in more than 42% of the stories coded. The circus frame was present in 8.7% and the "riot" and "confrontation" frames were present in less than 5% of the coverage. Because demonstrators did not clash with the police - in fact, protestors were openly

supportive of the role of military police in Brazil - the "confrontation" frame was present in only two stories mentioning the arrest of a group of skinheads for carrying weapons during the demonstrations. The "riot" frame was present when protestors acted as a violent mob, threatening to hurt supporters of the government that crossed the marches. About 41.3% of the coverage was primarily thematic.

When it comes to sources (RQ2c), about half of the stories did not quote any group. When sources were present, 59.69% came from official sources, 11.5% from protestors, 25% from other sources and less than 4% from social media. No bystander sources were mentioned. For evaluations (RQ2d), stories were on average supportive of protestors (M=2.10) and their cause (M= 2.14), and negative towards the administration (M=1.59).

Coverage overtime

RQ4 asks about the evolution of a) marginalization devices, b) frame, c) sources and d) evaluations overtime in 2015. For RQ4a, the devices "violent," "peaceful," "idiot" and "appearance" were mentioned in less than 10 stories (less than 5 units per category), violating the assumptions required to run chi-square tests. Regarding "cause mentioned" no statistically significant difference emerged between the weeks analyzed. RQ4b asks about the frames present in the coverage. Once again, because less than 10 stories contained the circus, riot and confrontation frames, this analysis focuses on the differences overtime regarding the debate and thematic/episodic frames. Results reveal coverage did not differ overtime when it comes to the debate frame, but it became more thematic in the period after week 1 [χ^2 (3)= 7.80, p<.05].

For sources (RQ4c) results presented on Table 5.9 show that official sources were used the most during the initial phase of protests [F (3, 50) = 3.21, p < .05]. Conversely, nonofficial sources like experts and NGOs were more used in weeks 2, 3 and 4 [F (3, 50) = 4.31, p < .001]. There were no significant differences in the use of protestor and social media sources overtime, and week 3 had no sources of these types.

Table 5.9 – Evolution of the use of devices, frames, sources and evaluations in the coverage of the 2015 protests

	Week 1	**Week 2**	**Week 3**	**Week 4**	
Devices	%	%	%	%	**χ^2 (df=3)**
Cause mentioned	71.4 $_a$	80.8 $_a$	66.7 $_a$	84.6 $_a$	1.82
Frames					
Debate	46.4 $_a$	42.3 $_a$	33.3 $_a$	30.8 $_a$	1.39
Thematic	32.1 $_a$	57.7 $_b$	66.7 $_b$	30.8 $_b$	7.80*
Sources	**Mean**	**Mean**	**Mean**	**Mean**	**F(df=3)**
Official	73.81	36.36	50	28.57	3.21*
Protestor	9.52	9.09	0	28.57	0.83
Social Media	5.71	0	0	0	0.37
Other	10.95	54.55	50	42.86	4.31**
Evaluation[1]					
Protestors	2.23	1.88	2	2	2.45
Cause	2.05	2.19	2.33	2.27	0.71
Administration	1.57	1.65	1.56	1.54	0.16

[#]p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

[a,b,c] Note: The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column variable. For each pair of media outlets, the column proportions are compared using a *z* test. If a pair of values is significantly different (p<.05), the values have *different* subscript letters assigned to them.

[1]Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive

As such, stories emphasized the 2015 protests from the viewpoint of official sources, mainly those of opposition groups, and experts. Finally, for evaluations (RQ4d), results show that coverage was consistently supportive of protestors and their cause, and critical to the administration, with no statistically significant variation overtime.

Coverage across outlets

Table 5.10 shows the cross tabulations and ANOVAS between the four outlets analyzed to assess the Research Hypothesis 1b (the more adversarial to Rousseff's government the outlet, the more legitimizing to the protests the coverage will be).

Table 5.10 – Use of devices, frames, sources and evaluations by outlets covering the 2015 protests

	Folha	**Estado**	**O Globo**	**Zero Hora**	
Devices [1]	**%**	**%**	**%**	**%**	**χ^2 (df=3)**
Cause mentioned	75.8 $_a$	82.8 $_a$	67.9 $_a$	71.4 $_a$	1.8
Frames [2]					
Debate	39.4 $_a$	44.8 $_a$	39.3 $_a$	50 $_a$	0.63
Thematic	24.2 $_a$	51.7 $_b$	46.4 $_{a,b}$	50 $_{a,b}$	5.99
Sources	**Mean**	**Mean**	**Mean**	**Mean**	**F(df=3)**
Official	55.44	66.67	75	25	2.23 $^{\#}$
Protestor	8.89	0	12.50	37.50	2.81*
Social Media	0	6.25	0	12.5	1.07
Other	36.67	27.08	12.50	25	0.83
Evaluations[1]					
Protestors	1.97	2.28	2.14	1.93	1.93
Cause	1.92	2.29	2.11	2.4	2.38
Administration	1.73	1.59	1.46	1.5	1.15

$^{\#}$p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

^{a,b,c} The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column variable. For each pair of media outlets, the column proportions are compared using a *z* test. If a pair of values is significantly different (p<.05), the values have *different* subscript letters assigned to them.

[1]Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive.

For sources, *O Globo* and *O Estado de São Paulo* relied more on official voices [F (3, 51) = 2.23, p < .10] and *Zero Hora* relied more on protestor sources [F (3, 51) = 2.81, p < .05]. No statistically significant differences emerged between the outlets in terms of frames, devices and evaluations. H1b was rejected.

Sources and the protest paradigm

Research hypotheses 2 and 3 ask about the relationship between sources and the protest paradigm. Table 5.11 shows that the only type of source that is significantly associated with a frame or device is the "other" (nonofficial experts, NGOs or groups), which is higher for thematic stories [t(51) = 2.95, p = .01]. Table 5.12 shows that the presence of official sources is marginally and *positively* associated with support for the protestors (r=.23, p<.10); suggesting that the official sources quoted were from the opposition and, as such, supportive of the movement (H2b was rejected).

Table 5.11- Relationship between proportions of sources used and presence of devices and protests frames in the coverage of the 2015 protests

	Official		Protestor		Social Media		Other	
Devices	**Mean**	**t**	**Mean**	**t**	**Mean**	**t**	**Mean**	**t**
Cause mentioned		-1.31		1.76#		-.65		.48
Yes	54.27		16.24		2.56		26.92	
No	72.92		0		6.25		20.83	
Frames								
Debate		1.33		.49		-1.26		-1.30
Yes	69.44		13.89		0		6.45	
No	52.15		9.68		6.45		16.67	
Thematic		-1.59		-.79		-0.91		2.95**
Yes	43.75		6.25		0		50	
No	66.24		13.68		5.13		14.96	

#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

Quotes from the runner-up of the 2014 election, who obviously supported the anti-government demonstrations, were very frequent. One example from *O Estado de São Paulo* illustrates how senator Aécio Neves quotes were used*:*

> Aécio - who disputed the presidential election in 2014 and was defeated by Dilma - said once again that PSDB [his party] is only supportive of the protests, which are not partisan but instead "Brazilian." "PSDB is not behind this movement and it should not be, but it absolutely supports it and all its demonstrations. What I see today is an increasing presence of our militants, our friends, and our leaders in the movement. I will evaluate if I will attend this Sunday [demonstrations]," he said. (O Estado de São Paulo, 2013, my translation)

Aécio Neves was not the only 2014 Presidential Election candidate to openly support the protests. Marina Silva - third place in the race - was interviewed many times by the outlets analyzed. Although Silva is a former Workers' Party member and ran in 2014 as part of a center-left coalition, her quotes were widely used to legitimize protestors' demands:

> "It is evident that the president, her government and her coalition will have a lot of difficulty to solve this crisis. The main problem is that her government and PT [the Workers' Party] abandoned politics as a form of dialog, negotiation, mobilization, and are not proposing a project for the country." (Folha de São Paulo, 2015, my translation)

Other non-official sources, like academic experts, were associated with thematic coverage, but this coverage was *negative* towards the protestors ($r=-.32$, $p<.05$) (Table 5.12). As such, H3b is also rejected. Those were mainly quotes from scholars who disapproved the demand for impeachment and military intervention. For example, *Zero Hora* published:

> For journalist and writer Roberto Sander, demands for military intervention that were displayed in signs by protestors come from a "minority who is uninformed and has no political culture"…"The Impeachment would be too traumatic for

Brazil and for democracy. I think this is also the demand of a minority. We have to work for political reform, because campaign financing is the source of corruption." (Zero Hora, 2015, my translation)

Table 5.12 – Relationship between sources and evaluations of protestors, cause, administration and violence blame in the coverage of the 2015 protests

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Cause Evaluation	-						
2. Protestor Evaluation	.12	-					
3. Administration Evaluation	-.31**	-.25**	-				
4. Official sources	-.13	.23 #	-.08	-			
5. Protestor sources	.16	.20	.02	-.43**	-		
6. Social media sources	.01	-.19	-.05	-.24	-.07	-	
7. Other sources	.01	-.32*	.10	-.70***	-.22	-.13	-

#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

[1]Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive

COMPARISON

Research hypothesis 4 predicts that newspapers will be more likely to adhere to the protest paradigm in 2013 than 2015. This final section will address the differences in marginalization devices, frames, sources and evaluations by year. Table 5.13 shows the results of chi-square tests for differences in devices and frames, and t-tests for sources and evaluations between the two years.

Results reveal that coverage in 2013 focused more on tactics, with mentions of "peacefulness" and "violence" statistically more frequent than 2015. About 15.9% of the stories in 2013 mentioned protests as "peacefulness," compared to 6.7% in 2015 [χ^2 (1)=

5.70, p<.05]. In 2013, 44.7% of the coverage mentioned "violence," almost nine times more than 2015 [χ^2 (1)= 53.48, p<.001]. This seemingly contradiction can be explained by stories that emphasize conflict, but also highlight that some protestors were peaceful. For example, *O Estado de São Paulo* published the following piece in June 19, 2013:

> The sixth day of demonstrations from *Movimento Passe Livre* in São Paulo started peacefully in *Praça da Sé* and ended with attempts to invade the City Hall, looting, the return of the riot police, and at least 47 arrested. According to the Police, most of the looters were homeless people and addicts. The Municipal Theater was vandalized. In *Rua Augusta*, protestors were dispersed with tear gas. The group was divided at the end of the afternoon. As opposed to the vandalism downtown, the group that marched *Avenida Paulista* was peaceful. (Estado de São Paulo, 2013b, my translation)

Rather than viewing these two devices as mutually exclusive, their presence suggests an emphasis on the tactics used by the protestors in 2013, as opposed to their ideas. This becomes more evident when assessing the presence of a "cause mentioned:" in 2013, about 40% of the stories had no mention of protestor's grievances and demands at all. This gradually went down over the four weeks analyzed in 2013. In 2015, only 25% of the stories did not mention the cause of the protests.

For frames of protests, results presented in Table 5.13 show that stories from 2013 had a significantly higher proportion of the riot [χ^2 (1)= 24.03, p<.001] and confrontation [χ^2 (1)= 38.85, p<.001] frames. Conversely, the legitimizing "debate" frame was more prevalent in the 2015 coverage [χ^2 (1)= 5.13, p<.05], which was also twice more thematic than 2013 [χ^2 (1)= 24.38, p<.001]. Although uncommon in both years, the circus frame was more used in 2015 (8.7%) than 2013 (4%) [χ^2 (1)= 3.79, p<.05]. Figure 5.1 depicts the differences between frames in 2013 and 2016.

Table 5.13 – Comparison between coverage of the 2013 and the 2015 protests by use of devices, frames, sources and evaluations

	Year		
	2013	**2015**	**χ^2 (df=1)**
Devices			
Appearance	11.10%	11.50%	0.01
Idiot	7.40	7.70	0.01
Peaceful	15.90	6.70	5.70*
Violent	44.70	5.80	53.48***
Cause mentioned (1=yes)	59.50	75	8.37**
Frames			
Circus	4	8.70	3.79*
Riot	27.50	4.80	24.03***
Confrontation	32.00	1.90	38.85***
Debate	30.50	42.30	5.13*
Thematic	18.30	41.30	24.38***
Sources	**Mean**	**Mean**	**t(df=251)**
Official	36.34	59.70	-3.33***
Protestor	23.23	11.52	2.05*
Social Media	3.76	3.64	0.05
Other	35.16	25.15	1.48
Evaluation[1]			
Protestors	2.01	2.10	0.65
Cause	2.19	2.14	-1.15
Administration	1.77	1.59	2.95***

#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

[a,b,c] The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column variable. For each pair of media outlets, the column proportions are compared using a *z* test. If a pair of values is significantly different (p<.05), the values have *different* subscript letters assigned to them.

[1]Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive

Figure 5.1 – Comparison between frames of protest used in 2013 and 2015 by % of stories containing each frame



When it comes to the use of sources (Figure 5.2), journalists relied more heavily on official sources in 2015 [$t(251) = -3.33$, $p = .001$], reinforcing the finding that, in this case, official viewpoints are not harmful to protestors. Instead, official sources from the opposition of Dilma Rousseff's government were the leading voices in stories about the movement, successfully managing to exploit the street demonstrations.

Figure 5.2 – Proportion of quotes from different types of sources in 2013 and 2015



Conversely, protestor sources were more common in 2013 [$t(251) = 2.05$, $p = .01$]. This means that, while coverage emphasized protestors' *ideas* more in 2015, protestors' *voices* were heard more in 2013. In 2015, the grievances and demands of the protestors were voiced by elected officials from opposition parties.

Finally, when it comes to evaluations, overall coverage in both years tended to be slightly positive to the protestors and their motives (no statistically significant difference found). However, newspapers evaluated the administration much more negatively in 2015 than 2013 [$t(480) = 2.95$, $p = .001$].

DISCUSSION

This section focused on the coverage of the 2013 and 2015 protests by four leading mainstream newspapers in Brazil, looking for patterns that characterize the "protest paradigm." The findings presented here suggest that the presence of official sources and marginalization devices is not always harmful to protestors. Mentions of violence were often equally critical to the police, boosting public support for the movement in the face of intense police brutality. Similarly, official sources from opposition parties were used the most to legitimize protestors' grievances and demands, while protestors' quotes were used to ridicule them.

In tandem with the literature on the protest paradigm, this study finds that when violence is present coverage will emphasize it. In 2013, both riot and confrontation frames were common, although stories often mentioned that demonstrations were "peaceful, with events of violence." Protest paradigm scholars argue that focus on violence is detrimental to movements because it serves as deterrent for potential supporters, inflates the rhetoric and tactics used, and takes away space from protestors' ideas in the story (McLeod, 2007; Gitlin, 1980). In the Brazilian case, this was not so straightforward: the more nuanced variable "violence blame" (who is to blame for the conflict?) revealed that emphasis on violence is not always equally delegitimizing to

social movements. Violence can be initiated by protestors or police, and the results presented here suggests that journalists are able to make that distinction. When police response increases - such as on the second week of the 2013 protest - coverage reflected that. Overall, the first week of coverage was characterized by emphasis on violence by the protestors, but it shifted to a more balanced violence blame after episodes of police brutality.

In the semi-structured interviews, journalists working for these four publications revealed that they went to the streets with a checklist of what should be covered related to violence: which streets were blocked, how many episodes of looting, what was the damage to private or public property, confrontations with the police and number of arrests. According to one of them: "violence was a major editorial concern for the newspaper. It was always like: are there Black Blocs[3] or not? Violence or not? Are people looting stores? Are they attacking the City Hall?"[4]

Regarding the evolution of the "violence blame" over time, journalists explained:

> In the first demonstrations [in 2013], the narrative was that protestors initiated confrontation [with police]; they did not respect the police. In the following one, it was the police response. They [police] brought more people, were more prepared, had shields and all. And they came with more violence than normal. Downtown became a war zone. That exponentially increased the number of protestors and support for the group. … There were two moments in [name of outlet] and also mainstream media's coverage. In the first one, we identified protestors as more violent, who assaulted police officers, destroyed buses, looted stores; our coverage reflected that. Something like 'look, protests are legitimate, but the violence is going too far, protestors are going too far.' This ended up giving support for the police to act more forcefully in the next protest. And that's

[3] Black Blocs were an extremist anarchic group that used masks to conceal their identity and resorted to violent tactics during the demonstrations

[4] Personal communication, my translation

> when it [police] acted so strongly that it hurt journalists, hurt innocent people, and ended up using violence in an indiscriminate way. Then, [outlet] did an editorial condemning police violence.[5]

Ultimately, findings presented here strongly suggest that when violence is present, it trumps all other information in the coverage. However, there was no evidence that emphasis on violence meant less space given to the ideas of protestors. In fact, presence of riot/confrontation frames and the legitimizing debate frame equally averaged 30% of the coverage. Newspapers that emphasized violence the most (*O Globo* and *Zero Hora*) were also the ones that had higher percentages of presence of debate frame and more positive portrayals of protestors. This effectively means that not all coverage of violence is equal: in the Brazilian case, coverage of violent police response served to legitimize the 2013 movement. In 2015, because there were no confrontations with the police, mentions of violence were virtually non-existent.

Another important finding from this section refers to the use of sources. According to the literature, social movements do not have automatic standing in the media, and official voices' dominance delegitimizes protestors (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). Findings here suggest that official voices were indeed dominant, but were used to *legitimize* the movement. In particular, politicians from opposition parties were quoted highlighting the validity of protestors' demands in both 2013 and 2015. Quotes from other expert sources, like academics and NGO leaders, were also correlated with positive and thematic coverage. In the case of Brazil, when the demands of protestors and the interests of opposition leaders converged, quotes from these politicians commending the

[5] Personal communication, my translation

movement dominated coverage.

Conversely, protestor quotes were used to ridicule them and strongly associated with a negative portrayal of the movement in both years. The quotes from protestors published were the ones in which their demands were portrayed as naïve, highlighting contradictions in their discourse. From a practical standpoint, these findings suggest that protestors are better off not talking to the media at all, regardless of the way the press portrays their movement. Even in 2015, when coverage was overall legitimizing, protestor quotes focused on the more extremist ideas, such as those asking for military intervention, even when they did not represent the majority of the movement. Instead, building strong alliances with political elites and academic experts is key to positive coverage as news grants automatic legitimacy to those sources. For the Brazilian protestors, key symbiotic alliances were formed with opposition party PSDB, specially senator Aécio Neves, who often became the spokesperson of the movement.

Finally, this project also focuses on differences by year. In 2013, coverage emphasized protestors and their tactics. Initially, stories focused on *Movimento Passe Livre* and clashes with the police. By the end of June, as demands became unclear and leadership diffused, news stories focused on smaller conflicts between police and the radical fringe subgroup known as "Black Blocs." By the end of the month, the narrative of protests as a response to failures of Rousseff's administration gained strength, although the range of demands encompassed left and right-leaning groups.

In 2015, coverage was about the Workers' Party administration, and protests were portrayed as part of a bigger anti-government narrative. News stories were thematic, with

overwhelming use of official sources that challenged the President. Very frequently, stories focused on corruption scandals and only briefly mentioned demonstrations to illustrate popular dissatisfaction with Rousseff's administration. When I asked journalists about these differences, they explained:

> I think in 2013, no one knew what was going on. First, it was excitement, followed by fear of violence and we did not talk about demands a lot. I think in 2015 demands were in the front page of every newspaper in the country: corruption and the "Car Wash Operation" [a corruption investigation by the Federal Police]. The Operation was the "filet mignon" in all newspapers. Protests were at the background of that political crisis…Newspapers tended to treat demonstrations within a macro perspective: look, the government is shit, Car Wash is revealing all the problems on Workers' Party alliances, people are dissatisfied, unemployment is rampant…look, protests are legitimate.[6]

For another journalist, the focus on violence was prevalent before June 2013, but this mentality changed as protests unfolded:

> Until June, our reporting mentality was this: we need to see what trouble demonstrations are causing. It was either confrontations with the police, or rioting around banks, or blocking traffic. Blocking *Avenida Paulista* [major avenue in São Paulo] during rush hour has a lot of impact, for example. After June, everything changed. A small protest is now newsworthy and we cover it because it became an issue in itself; [June] changed how we saw it [protesting]. It became part of our daily routine. Our views on protests changed, absolutely.[7]

The findings presented here, therefore, strongly add to the recent literature that the protest paradigm has less to do with general suspicion of the protests and more to the way the government is seen, how rifts between elites play out it and how demonstrations fit within a larger political narrative in the country (Weaver & Scacco, 2013; Shahin et al, 2016). Despite the emphasis on violence, which in itself was not followed by *negative*

[6] Personal Communication, my translation
[7] Personal Communication, my translation

coverage, all newspapers in Brazil were supportive of the protests after they became part of a larger criticism to the administration. In 2013, the more critical to Rousseff's government the newspaper, the more positive the portrayal of the protests, even if the outlets are traditionally conservative, which is contrary to the bulk of research on the protest paradigm. Results here suggest that, rather than "paradigmatic," negative coverage is contingent upon the relationship between protestors and powerful elites, who are then used by journalists to legitimize grievances and demands.

Chapter 6 - The Journalist

This chapter focuses on a survey of Brazilian journalists examining news routines, reporting practices and political attitudes towards the 2013 and 2015 protests. The goal is to understand how individual, organization and routine-level influences impact the way journalists perceived the protests, their outlet's coverage and mainstream media's coverage of the demonstrations. Additionally, survey responses were used to assess how new media were incorporated into journalists' routines when covering protests. The analysis proceeds in the following way: first, details on the methodological procedures used are presented. Second, I describe how journalists used social media for reporting. Third, a set of models assesses journalists attitudes towards the protests and how they perceive mainstream media coverage in general. This step was conducted for all respondents in the sample, regardless of employment status, that is, those who identify themselves as journalists but are not currently working on news organizations were included in this first analysis. Then, for employed journalists in the sample, the analysis includes how they perceived their outlet's level of support for the movement. Throughout the chapter, quotes from open-ended questions and interviews with journalists are used to illustrate the findings.

Findings reveal that journalists from the right viewed the 2015 demonstrations more favorably, while those who are younger were more supportive of the 2013 protests, regardless of their political alignment. Journalists from both sides of the political spectrum viewed mainstream media and their outlet's coverage as adversarial to their own. Findings also reveal that social media was widely adopted as a reporting tool during

the demonstrations, serving as a "thermometer" to alert journalists about the importance of each scheduled event.

METHOD

Sampling and response rate

Surveys capture individual characteristics and attitudes (Babbie, 2013; Weaver, 2015), and results can be generalized to the whole population of journalists if sampling is representative. In some countries, there are complete lists of journalists who are required to belong to specific professional organizations, making representative sampling accessible. However, in countries like Brazil and the United States, there is no such list. The population for this study comes from a list of Brazilian journalists aggregated by the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas at the University of Texas at Austin, which comprises more than 10,000 media professionals, journalism students and journalism educators in Brazil. This non-probability Internet panel includes the Center's newsletter subscribers, alumni, members of email discussions lists, and people who participated in the Center's Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). It is impossible to assess the representativeness of this convenience sample to the greater Brazilian journalist population, an issue that remains consistent for scholars interested in the state of journalism in Latin America (Herscovitz, 2012; Mellado, 2012, Schmidt-Weiss, 2015). However, the geographical distribution of this sample is very similar to the overall population in the country. The map presented in Figure 6.1 reveals this sample to be more geographically diverse than most studies of journalism in the region, which rely on

findings coming primarily from the main cities like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasília (Herscovitz & Cardoso, 1998).

Figure 6.1 – Geographic distribution of journalists in the sample



The survey was administered online using Qualtrics, a web survey software, from December 15th, 2015 to January 5th, 2016. An invitation was sent to approximately 10,000 respondents, including journalists, journalism students and journalism educators in Brazil, yielding 1,250 responses. According to the American Association of Public Opinion Research's guidelines (AAPOR, 2015) "response rates" should not be calculated

for non-probability samples, since they are not based on a known sampling frame with known probabilities of selection. Instead, AAPOR recommends the use of a simple measure of "participation rate" which is the number of respondents who have provided a usable response divided by the total number of initial personal invitations requesting participation. AAPOR cautions that "using such a rate as an indicator of possible nonresponse error makes little sense" (p.40). Instead, participation rate only measures the efficiency of a panel and how much effort is required to recruit members. Participation rates should be used primarily to detect inactive panel members for future surveys. As such, this metric has no utility as a basis for comparison across different studies (AAPOR, 2015). The participation rate for this study was 12.5% and detected about 300 inactive participants (emails bounced). About 30% of the users opened the invitation email, suggesting that they are active users; that is, they a) get emails from the Knight Center, b) the email does not go directly into spam, and c) they actively open the messages. Although "response rate" standards are not appropriate for non-probabilistic samples, this study's 12.5% participation rate is within the typical survey response range for web-based surveys (Dillman, 2007; Saldaña et al., 2016). The survey questionnaire took an average of 20 minutes to complete, with respondents ranging from 10 minutes to 1 hour and 30 minutes for those who wrote longer responses for the open-ended questions. All questionnaires were conducted in Portuguese. The database does not distinguish between journalists, journalism students and journalism educators, and the invitation for the survey was sent to the three groups. This study uses responses from journalists only. Missing data was random (Little's MCAR not significant), allowing

listwise deletion for final models. Given the large number of absolutely complete cases from journalists (N=798), no data imputation or missing data treatment was necessary.

The measures on this survey are a combination of standardized demographic questions based on the work of Weaver and Willnat (2012), questions from previous work on journalists and political communication borrowed from Howard and Chadwick (2008) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), and questions specifically designed to measure protest attitudes and behaviors based on the survey by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (2014). Appendix B contains a copy of the questionnaire with the exact wordings and presentations for questions used in the survey. Appendix D contains the descriptive statistics of the variables below, including standard deviation, range and operationalizations used.

Independent variables

Individual-level variables

Demographics. Three key demographic variables were used in this study: age, gender and perceived social class. For age, respondents were asked to enter their age in years (M=33.08). Females made up 52.5% of respondents. For social class, this item was measured with a question that inquired: "would you say that your household growing up was…1=lower class, 2= lower middle class, 3= middle class, 4= upper middle class, 5= upper class" (*M*=3.02). Social class is used in Latin American research instead of income (Canache & Allison, 2005; Cao & Zhao, 2005; Cramer & Kaufman, 2010) and it is especially useful when assessing class differences between people from the same profession, like the journalists in this sample.

Political variables. Political *leaning* was measured in a 10-point scale item where 1= strong left and 10= strong right. Respondents were asked to think of their own political leanings and place themselves on this scale (M= 3.89). Political *participation* was measured using seven questions on a 10-point scale (1=never, 10=all the time). These items combine online and offline measures of political participation that the respondent may have engaged in the previous 12 months ("Please tell us how often you have been involved in the past 12 months in the following activities"). Voting is universal and compulsory in Brazil and, therefore, was not included:

1. Attended a political protest
2. Donated money to a campaign or political cause
3. Been involved in public interest groups, political action groups, political clubs, political campaigns, or political party committees
4. Created an online petition
5. Changed your social media profile picture in support of a cause
6. Joined a political or cause-related group on a social media site
7. Tried to persuade your friends and acquaintances about a social cause, political cause or to support a candidate

All responses were added into a single index (7 items averaged scale, Cronbach's α=.79). The average political participation was 3.34.

Overall, the average respondent in this sample was a middle-class 35-year-old woman who is slightly left-leaning and, on a scale of 1 to 10, averages 3.34 on political

participation levels.

Organizational level

Respondents were asked about the statements that best described their current work situation to assess organizational-level variables. About one-quarter of the sample described themselves as a journalist in a news organization, 10.7% work as trainee/interns, and 5.6% have their independent outlet. About 9.3% of the journalists interviewed work as freelancers and 14% work as public relations but consider themselves journalists. Unemployed journalists comprised 13.6% of the sample, and 6.2% considered themselves primarily a journalist, but working exclusively as a professor at the moment. About 15% reported they were "other," which included press secretaries for politicians and governmental institutions, consultants, data analysts, bloggers, and web designers for news organizations, just to cite a few.

Given the lack of clarity on who is a journalist in the country, the survey also included a specific question regarding job status: "Do you currently work full time at a news organization?" and 39.7% of respondents marked "yes." After pre-testing the questionnaire with a small sample of journalists, results revealed that several of them worked for multiple news organizations and government agencies, some full-time and some part-time. To overcome this, the questions regarding organizational level variables explicitly stated: "in case you work for more than one organization, choose the one you consider your primary employer."

Type of outlet. The majority of employed respondents in the sample work for print outlets (36.8%) and 28.2% work for online-only news media. About 14% work for

television networks and less than 8% work for radio, which were combined into a single TV/Radio variable. Journalists from news agencies comprised 4.7% of the sample, and 9.1% reported they worked for "other."

Scope of outlet. Journalists working for national outlets comprised the majority of the sample (38.1%), followed by those employed by regional companies (32.7%). About 14.3% worked for local organizations, and 14.8% worked for organizations with an international scope.

Size of the newsroom. Respondents were also asked a question regarding the size of their newsroom, ranging from 1=very small (1 to 5 people) to 6=very large (more than 100 people). The average was 3.20.

Routines

At the routines level, this project evaluates the impact of social media on reporting practices and how it may have affected the way journalists perceive the protests. All journalists in the sample were asked about their presence on social media platforms. Facebook was the most dominant platform, with 93.4% of the journalists in the sample, followed closely by Whatsapp, an instant messaging app, with 91.7%. Twitter users comprised 63% of the sample, and 70% had Instagram. About 67% of the journalists in the sample had an account on Linkedin, 64.4% on YouTube, 51.2% on Google Plus, 29.3% on Pinterest, and 25.7% on Snapchat. Other networks used were Flickr (22.1%), Tumblr (17.7%), and Reddit (3.5%). Only six (<1%) journalists in the sample did not have an account on any social media site.

Social media for reporting. Journalists in the sample were asked about their use of

social media for distinct reporting practices via eight questions asking "how often do you use social media for…."

1. Receiving people's feedback on the stories you write
2. Publicizing your own work
3. Finding sources for news stories
4. Finding ideas for news stories
5. Search or receive press releases
6. Keep up with the news by reading other news organizations' websites or social media pages
7. Fact-check information
8. Finding out what people are talking about

For the matched analysis with the 23 journalists who covered the protests, more specific questions regarding their use of social media for reporting were asked: "In a scale of 1 to 10, how often did you use social media to…"

1. Find out the details of the protest organization (date, location, etc.)
2. Contact protest organizers
3. Find sources for news stories
4. Receive people's feedback on the stories you wrote about the protests
5. Find out what people are talking about regarding the protests

Dependent variables

This chapter focuses on how individual, organizational and routines-level variables impact attitudes towards the protests. The outcomes of this section also include

the way journalists viewed their outlet and mainstream media's support for the movement.

Protest attitudes

Mainstream coverage. To evaluate the way journalists perceived mainstream media coverage, the survey asked: "In general, do you think mainstream media coverage of the protests was: (1= totally unfavorable toward the protest, 10= totally favorable toward the protest)." The question was asked separately for the 2013 and 2015 protests. For 2013, the average response was 4.98. Overall, journalists perceived that the 2015 protests mainstream media coverage was considerably more favorable (M=7.21).

Outlet coverage. Employed journalists were also asked about their employer's coverage through the following question: "In general, you think the editorial line of the media outlet you work for was… (1= totally unfavorable toward the protest, 10= totally favorable toward the protest)." Results reveal that journalists perceived their outlet's coverage as fairly balanced for both protests, although the 2015 coverage (M=5.89) was rated slightly more positive that 2013 (M=5.82)

Individual support for protests. Finally, journalists were also asked about their views on the protests ("In general, are you…1= unfavorable toward the protest to 10= favorable toward the protest?"). Respondents were in average more supportive of the 2013 protests (M=7.72) than the 2015 protests (M=4.67).

Data Analysis

RQ5 asks about how journalists used social media for reporting. A factor analysis was conducted to identify the uses of social media for reporting. Then, ANOVAS and

correlations assessed the relationship between social media uses and journalists' characteristics.

The next set of RQs and Hypotheses assesses the impact of individual, organizational and routine variables on journalists' attitudes towards the protests. These questions were answered in two ways. For all journalists in the sample, two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted with each level of influence entered as a separate block to assess their influence on individual support and on their perceived level of mainstream media support for the protests. Then, for the journalists formally employed by a news organization in the sample, four hierarchical regression models were conducted to predict the following outcomes: perceived level of mainstream media support, perceived level of outlet support, and personal support for demonstrations. Variables were assessed by comparing their standardized coefficients (Betas).

RESULTS

Social media for reporting

Research question 5 addresses the ways journalists incorporate social media into their reporting practices. A factor analysis identified two dimensions of the use of social media for reporting: social media for "awareness" and social media for "gatekeeping," which are consistent with the literature on the topic (Hermida, 2013). As an awareness system, journalists use social media to passively monitor "what is going on?." When used for gatekeeping, social media serves as a place where journalists actively parse information and reinforce their role as disseminators. Table 6.1 shows the rotated component matrix for these items.

Table 6.1 – Factor analysis of uses of social media for reporting

	Component	
	Gatekeeping	Awareness system
Receiving people's feedback on the stories you write	.86	.16
Publicize your own work	.75	.04
Finding sources for news stories	.71	.37
Finding ideas for news stories	.69	40
Search or receive press releases	.45	.53
Keep up with the news by reading other news organizations' websites or social media pages	.04	.86
Get background information	.20	.78
Finding out what people are talking about	.25	.57
Initial Eigenvalue	3.69	1.15
Percent explained variance	46.12%	14.32%
Cumulative percent	46.12%	60.37%

The first factor relates to finding sources, story ideas, receiving feedback and publicizing own work on social media. Those are activities related to *gatekeeping* (Eigenvalue= 3.69, Cronbach's α=.80, M=6.80). The second factor refers to activities associated with using social media as an awareness system. These include finding out what people are talking about, following news from other organizations, and getting background information (Eigenvalue= 1.15, Cronbach's α=.70, M=7.73). The item "searching and receiving press releases" loaded more strongly on this factor, although it was also associated with the gatekeeping.

The correlations table 6.2 reveals that journalists who are younger (r=-.15, p<.001), women (r=-.14, p<.001) and working for smaller newsrooms (r=-.21, p<.001)

use social media for awareness more. The use of social media for verification is not associated with gender, age, class, size of newsroom and outlet scope.

Table 6.2 – Correlations between journalists' characteristics and social media for reporting

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
1.Age	-						
2.Gender (male=1)	.20***	-					
3.Social class	.16***	.02	-				
4.Outlet scope	.1	.03	.17**	-			
5.Size of newsroom	.03	-.05	.23***	.11*	-		
6.Social media for reporting: Gatekeeping	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.03	-.08	-	
7.Social media for reporting: Awareness	-.15***	-.14***	-.07	-.04	-.21***	.57***	-

* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

For the journalists who covered the protests, another factor analysis was conducted with specific questions related to the demonstrations. Similarly, these items yielded two factors: gatekeeping and awareness. Table 6.3 displays the rotated component matrix. The factor analysis detected the use of social media to contact organizers to be more strongly associated with awareness practices. Additional Cronbach's alpha tests of reliability were conducted including this item with the two possible factors, which confirmed that it was a better fit for "awareness" (Cronbach's α=.76). When combined with the two "gatekeeping" factors, alpha was .68 and if the variable is deleted, it increases the consistency of the item to .85. The two factors were used as part of the "routines" block on regression analyses.

In general, journalists used social media as an awareness system to keep track of what was going on during the protests all the time (M=9.19), and also used the platform for gatekeeping very frequently (M=6.27). This rate of social media for protest reporting is vastly higher than the average daily use, especially when it comes to "awareness system."

Table 6.3 – Factor analysis of uses of social media use for reporting protests in 2013 and 2015

	Component	
	Gatekeeping	Awareness system
Finding sources for news stories	.92	.05
Receiving people's feedback on the stories you wrote about the protests	.94	.11
Finding out what people are talking about regarding the protests	.10	.73
Finding out the details of the protest organization (date, location, etc)	-.03	.79
Contacting protest organizers	.16	.95
Initial Eigenvalue	2.31	1.53
Percent explained variance	46.09%	30.62%

For example, during the in-depth interviews, reporters explained that they started using Facebook when the scope of demands increased:

> In the beginning, *Movimento Passe Livre* would tell when the next protest would take place at the end of a demonstration. It was their practice to schedule that, tell the place, day, and time [of the next event]. But when demands increased, it became very difficult to do this because different groups scheduled protests. What helped a lot was Facebook. People would create an event and there was a

"thermometer" on how many people were interested.[8]

A reporter from a mainstream newspaper in Rio de Janeiro also described the Facebook "Event" as one of the main reporting tools during the demonstrations, serving both as an awareness system and a place to find and contact sources:

> [During protests] I used social media a lot more than on daily life. I used Facebook every day to find protests, to find protestors, to interview them…I never used Facebook so much in my entire life than during the 2013 protests… I feel like the main reason why Facebook was so important was its capacity to "create an event." What happened was that we saw an event tomorrow at Candelária with 10 thousand confirmed, we knew that there would be about one thousand people there, so we had to send one reporter. It was usually like that, about 10% of Facebook confirmed people would show up. So if we saw an event with 100 thousand confirmed, we would need to send more reporters. I think on Facebook we identified when the event was going to happen and, among those who confirmed, who were more active and could be used as sources. And we contacted them on Facebook itself.[9]

As of WhatsApp, reporters identified the messaging app as a key tool for internal communication:

> The coverage was like this…for the first time I can remember, we created a WhatsApp group with all the reporters covering the protest, a guy in the newsroom, our editor, our assignment editor, photographers, everyone…there were groups with 20, 30 people. Each one of us would send information like: "I'm here at place X, walking with them, this road is blocked, I just saw a Black Bloc breaking an ATM…all the time, every minute, I would be sending WhatsApp messages. Then, someone in the newsroom would put those together in our LiveBlog.[10]

Taken together, the evidence presented here shows that journalists in Brazil have widely adopted social media for reporting, using it both for awareness and gatekeeping. These uses are similar to those of U.S. journalists (Hermida, 2013), although journalists

[8] Personal communication, my translation
[9] Personal communication, my translation
[10] Personal communication, my translation

in Brazil use Facebook and WhatsApp at higher rates. The journalists interviewed did not report using Twitter as a reporting tool during the protests. The next section addresses how social media use can impact the way journalists perceived the demonstrations.

Individual attitudes towards the protests

RQ6 to RQ8 and H5 to H8 assess the relationship between journalists' characteristics and attitudes towards the protests in 2013 and 2015. The analysis will continue in the following way: first, descriptive statistics for individual attitudes, perceived outlet attitudes, and mainstream media attitudes will be displayed. Then, two linear regressions assess personal support for protests and journalists' perception of mainstream media's support. These models include all respondents in the sample, regardless of employment status. Third, regression analyses were conducted for employed journalists assessing their individual attitudes, the way they perceived their outlet's attitudes and mainstream media's attitudes. Appendix D contains the descriptive statistics for all the variables used, including standard deviations, operationalizations and ranges.

Data characteristics

Results show that journalists were more supportive of the protests in 2013 (M=7.72) than in 2015 (M=4.67). However, they perceived mainstream media coverage of the protests as the opposite: 4.98 for 2013, and more favorable in 2015 (M=7.21). The graphs in figure 6.2 depict these relationships. For the employed journalists in the sample, they perceived their outlet as slightly more favorable to the 2015 coverage when compared to 2013.

Figure 6.2 – Journalists, outlets and mainstream media attitudes towards the protests as perceived by individual journalists (1= very unfavorable to 10= very favorable) in 2013 and 2015



All respondents

Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 further explore differences between individual, outlet and mainstream attitudes towards the protests. Table 6.5 shows the results of hierarchical regression analyses for all respondents in the sample, regardless of their employment status. Block 1 contained their demographics and block 2 their presence on social media platforms. Because they were not formally employed, the model does not have organizational level influences. The outcomes tested were individual support for protests and perceived mainstream media support for the protests by year.

Table 6.4 – Effect of demographics and social media use on perception of mainstream media and personal attitudes towards protests in 2013 and 2015 protests (1= very unfavorable, 10=very favorable). All journalists in the sample

	2013		2015	
	Perception of mainstream media	Personal attitudes	Perception of mainstream media	Personal attitudes
Model	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Block 1: Demographics				
Age	0.11**	-0.16***	-0.10**	0.16***
Gender	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02
Class	0.03	-0.08*	0.05	-0.05
Political Ideology	0.24***	0.01	-0.24***	0.46***
Political Participation	-0.08*	0.07*	0.06	0.04
ΔR^2 (%)	0.10***	0.04***	0.08***	0.24***
Block 2: Social media use				
Twitter	0.04	-0.08	0.07	-0.07*
Facebook	-0.09**	0.02	-0.03	-0.02
Whatsapp	0.04	0.04	0.03	-0.01
ΔR^2 (%)	0.01*	0.01·	0.01	·0.01
Total R^2 (%)	0.11***	0.05***	0.09***	0.25***

- p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

For 2013, results reveal that journalists who are older (β= .11, p<.01), more aligned with the right (β=.24 . p<.001), and who participate less (β=-.08, p<.01) perceived mainstream media coverage as supportive of the protests, which is the inverse of their personal attitudes. Facebook use also emerged as a negative predictor of perceived mainstream media support: those who use the social network platform were less likely to view mainstream coverage as supportive of protests. For their personal attitudes, journalists who are younger (β= -.16, p<.001), with lower socioeconomic status (β=-0.08, p<.05) and higher levels of political participation (β=.07, p<.05) are more supportive of the 2013 protests. Political ideology did not predict individual support for protests in 2013 (Hypothesis 6 was rejected). The models explained 11.3% of the variance for mainstream media attitudes and 5% of the variance for individual attitudes.

For the 2015 protests, these numbers flipped: those who were younger (β= -.10, p<.01) and more aligned with the left (β= -.24 p<.001) viewed mainstream media coverage as more supportive of the protests. Once again, the perceived mainstream media coverage was the opposite of one's personal attitudes. This means that journalists were critical of mainstream media, and viewed coverage as adversarial to their own personal beliefs. Those who are older (β=.16, p<.001) and more aligned with the right (β=.46, p<.001) were significantly and strongly more supportive of the protests. H7, which predicts that ***"****Journalists who are more aligned with the right will be more supportive of the 2015 protests than those who are aligned with the left"* was supported. Social media use did not influence attitudes for this sample in 2015. The model explained about 8% of the variance for perceived mainstream media attitudes, and 25% for individual attitudes.

Taken together, these results confirm that the 2013 protests were viewed more sympathetically by those who are younger while the 2015 protests gained support from those who are older and aligned with the right. Both sides, though, viewed mainstream media support as adversarial to their personal attitudes.

Employed journalists

Separate analyses were conducted for the employed journalists in the sample. Table 6.5 shows results for 2013, with each column assessing perception of mainstream media, outlet, individual and the gap between individual and outlet support, answering RQ6 (*What factors influence the way journalists perceived a) the 2013 protests, b) their outlet's coverage of the 2013 protests, c) mainstream media's coverage of the 2013 protests?)*.

Results show that those aligned with the right (β=.23, $p<.001$) perceived mainstream media as more supportive of the protests. No organizational level variables or social media for reporting practices were associated with perceived mainstream attitudes. For the way journalists saw their outlets' support, those who are aligned with the right (β=14, $p<.05$) and who participate more frequently (β=.20, $p<.01$) perceived their outlet as more supportive of the 2013 protests. Conversely, women (β=-.14, $p<.05$) and those who directly covered the protests (β=-.13, $p<.05$) perceived their outlet's coverage as more negative.

Organizational level blocks yielded a poor model fit for perceived mainstream media and outlet's attitudes, suggesting those variables have a very small impact (R-square change not significant) and do not predict outcomes beyond chance. When it

comes to personal attitudes, those who are older (β-.19= p<.01) and working for bigger outlets (β= -.14, p<.05) were less supportive of the 2013 protests. Those working for national and international outlets were more supportive of the protests than those working for local and regional newspapers (β=.15, p<.01).

Table 6.5 – Effect of demographics, social media use and organizational characteristics on perception of mainstream media, individual outlet and personal attitudes towards protests in 2013. Only journalists formally employed.

	Perception of mainstream media	Perception of outlet coverage	Personal attitudes
Model	Beta	Beta	Beta
Block 1: Individual Level			
Age	0.06	0.05	-0.19**
Gender (1=male)	-0.08	-0.14*	-0.03
Class	-0.01	0.06	-0.09
Political Ideology	0.23***	0.14*	-0.01
Political Participation	-0.10	0.20**	0.05
Covered protests (1=yes)	-0.03	-0.13*	-0.19
ΔR^2 (%)	0.09***	0.06**	.06**
Block 2: Organizational level			
Print (ref)			
Radio/TV	-0.03	-0.09	-0.08
Online	0.01	-0.06	-0.05
Other	-0.02	-0.15*	-0.07
Scope	-0.09	0.06	0.15*
Size	0.08	-0.11	-0.14*
ΔR^2 (%)	0.02	0.03	0.04*
Block 2: Social media use			
Gatekeeping	0.02	0.15*	0.08
Awareness	-0.07	-0.06	-0.01
ΔR^2 (%)	0.01	0.01	0.01+
Total R^2 (%)	0.11***	0.11**	.10**

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 6.6 shows the impact of different levels of influence on individual, outlet and mainstream media support for the 2015 protests (RQ7), as perceived by the journalists in the sample. At the mainstream media level, journalists who are older (β= -.18, p<.01), more aligned with the right (β=-.22, p<.001), and who participate less (β=.18, p<.01) perceived mainstream media as less supportive to the 2015 protests. Overall, right-leaning and older journalists were more likely to be critical of mainstream media's coverage of the 2015 protests. Neither organizational level variables nor social media for reporting use emerged as significant predictors of perceived mainstream media support for protests in 2015.

For the way journalists perceive their outlet's support for the 2015 protests, no demographics emerged as a significant predictor. At the organizational level, journalists working for bigger newsrooms perceived their outlet's coverage as more supportive of the 2015 protests (β=.19, p<.01). Conversely, journalists working for online platforms viewed their employer company as less supportive of the protests (β=-.12, p<.10).

When it comes to personal attitudes, the demographics block explains more than one-quarter of the variance observed. Those who are older (β=.18, p<.01) and more aligned with the right (β=.45, p<.001) were more likely to support the 2015 protests. However, lower socioeconomic class is associated with more support for the 2015 protests, counter to the idea that only richer segments supported the anti-government movement.

Table 6.6 - Effect of demographics, social media use and organizational characteristics on perception of mainstream media, individual outlet and personal attitudes towards protests in 2015. Only journalists formally employed.

	Perception of mainstream media	Perception of outlet coverage	Personal attitudes
Model	Beta	Beta	Beta
Block 1: Individual Level			
Age	-0.18**	-0.01	0.18**
Gender (1=male)	0.04	0.04	-0.02
Class	0.16**	0.02	-0.16**
Political Ideology	-0.22***	0.01	0.45***
Political Participation	0.18**	-0.01	-0.01
Covered protests (1=yes)	0.03	-0.02	0.04
ΔR^2 (%)	0.18***	0.01$^{\cdot}$	0.29***
Block 2: Organizational level			
Print (ref)			
Radio/TV	-0.03	-0.11	0.02
Online	0.01	-0.12$^{\#}$	-0.09
Other	-0.02	-0.06	-0.04
Scope	-0.09	-0.05	0.02
Size	0.08	0.19**	-0.11
ΔR^2 (%)	0.01	0.06**	0.01$^{\cdot}$
Block 2: Social media use			
Gatekeeping	0.02	0.14*	0.08
Awareness	-0.07	-0.08	0.01
ΔR^2 (%)	0.00	0.01	0.01
Total R^2 (%)	0.19***	0.08*	0.31***

$^{+}$ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

DISCUSSION

This section focuses on journalists reporting practices and attitudes towards the protests and the media. Two main findings emerged. First, social media was widely adopted for protest coverage, serving as a "thermometer" during demonstrations. Second, individual-level characteristics were the strongest predictors of journalists' attitudes, and reporters, especially those who are left-leaning, viewed their outlet's position and

mainstream media as adversarial to their own.

When it comes to social media, results suggest that Facebook and WhatsApp have been incorporated into newsroom practices, and this use increased substantially during the protests. During in-depth interviews, journalists revealed that Facebook's "Events" served as a thermometer indicating which demonstrations were taking place, how many people were going and who could be used as sources. WhatsApp groups became "virtual" newsrooms where reporters shared information from the streets with editors and each other. However, the impact of this adoption on attitudes towards the protest was statistically hard to detect: since social media use averaged 9.19 out of 10-point scale with a standard deviation of 1.09, there was not enough variance in the independent variable to assess effect sizes for attitudes in this sample. Hypotheses 5 ("The more journalists incorporate social media routines to their reporting, the more supportive they will be to the protests") was rejected, although the next chapter will assess the impact of social media use for actual content in more nuanced ways.

Research questions 6 and 7 ask about the relationship between journalists' characteristics and protest attitudes. The models presented here reveal that demographic characteristics were the strongest predictors of support for protests and also of the way journalists perceived mainstream media and their outlets' levels of support for the demonstrations. In general, journalists who are younger were more supportive of the 2013 demonstrations and viewed mainstream and outlet's coverage as negative. Conversely, journalists who are older and aligned with the right viewed the 2015 protests more positively, and mainstream media and their outlet as slightly less supportive of the

movement. As a whole, these results show that individual-level influences are the strongest predictors of support for protests, and journalists perceive mainstream media and their own outlet's coverage as adversarial to their own, for both 2013 and 2015.

From the organizational level variables, size of the newsroom was the main predictor of attitudes, with those working for bigger outlets perceiving them as more supportive of the 2015 protests and less supportive of the 2013 demonstrations. The discrepancy between personal, outlet and mainstream media attitudes suggests that journalists have a critical view of their outlet and of the press as a whole. When I asked reporters about the way they evaluated media coverage of the protests, a journalist from a mainstream newspaper explained that the criticism comes not from the actual stories that were published in 2013, but instead from the parts that were omitted:

> Maybe the criticism [from journalists toward outlet's coverage] comes from what did not make it to the story. It's not the final result, but about what didn't make it that explains the conflict between reporters and editors. I remember that they [reporters and editors] would have heated arguments because the reporter wanted to have a graph saying this and that and the editor would say "no, this is not going to be there." The criticism was more about the process than the final result.[11]

In 2015, reporters across the political spectrum were critical of what they perceived as "disproportional attention" given to the protests:

> This time [2015], mainstream media gave a large space to protest coverage right at the beginning, maybe even because of the 2013 protests. Here, I think in some moments the media even contributed to expanding the movement, giving space to small demonstrations that would not normally be covered. Fearing being negligent, the press was forced to cover each step of the protestors exhaustively.[12]

For left-leaning reporters, it was precisely the excessive space given to the 2015

[11] Personal communication, my translation
[12] Open-ended response, my translation

demonstrations that made the coverage biased, which in turn fueled the movement: "I believe that mainstream media coverage was partial, supportive of the [2015] movement and helped create a wave of discontentment towards the government. I believe media coverage helped foment a wave of protest that had already lost its force."[13] Conversely, right-leaning reporters viewed that mainstream media coverage was too episodic, but "not in-depth because journalists feared being seen as part of a coup d'état." [14]

According to a center-right journalist:

> Mainstream media focused only on the size of the demonstrations, on how many people went to the streets. Part of the coverage showed that protestors were ignorant, did not know what was going to happen after Dilma falls, etc. Others focused on the fact that protestors "voted for Aécio." They [mainstream media] 'enjoyed' saying that people went to the streets wearing soccer jerseys, which became the new way of delegitimizing the protest [by highlighting the festive characteristics of the demonstrations].[15]

In sum, journalists from both sides of the ideological spectrum were critical of mainstream media and, to a lesser extent, their own outlet's attitudes towards the protests. They viewed coverage produced by others as adversarial to their own beliefs, and biased coverage happened through patterns of omission or overestimation of demonstrations. But beyond perceptions, how do those attitudes translate into actual content? How does this ideological struggle play out? The next chapter brings together journalists' personal attitudes and organizational constraints into a predictive model that simultaneously tests the impact of variables from all levels of influences of the hierarchical model.

---

[13] Open-ended response, my translation
[14] Open-ended response, my translation
[15] Open-ended response, my translation

Chapter 7 - Linking journalists and coverage

The last part of this dissertation connects journalists to the content they produced, simultaneously examining the various influences shaping their coverage. The models presented in this chapter come from a matched analysis combining independent variables from survey data to content generated by those same journalists. Twenty-three journalists were selected to represent a variety of newsrooms from different sizes, scopes, and geographical regions. Ultimately, the models presented here attempt to answer the following question: can variables coming from the different levels of the hierarchical model predict the protest paradigm?

Results show that social media use is positively associated with coverage that emphasizes confrontations between police and protestors, but one that blames the police for starting it. Social media use for reporting is also correlated with a positive portrayal of protestors' causes. At the individual level, findings reveal that the relationship between personal attitudes and coverage is inverse: the more a journalist supports the movement, the *less* legitimizing the coverage will be. This effect held true even controlling for the way journalists perceived their employer's editorial lines to be.

DATA ANALYSIS

Using Factiva and Google search, stories produced by a subsample of journalists who answered the survey were collected for content analysis via identifying their byline. Only stories on the 2013 and 2015 protests were content analyzed. Table 7.1 has the name and type of outlet for the journalists in this subsample. The subsample's demographic and political characteristics closely match the general one: 56.5% women,

middle-class, and 31 years old. Politically, the subsample is more balanced than the larger sample, with a mean of 4.69 (range 1 ‘strong left' to 10 ‘strong right'). In the larger sample, the average was 3.89. The levels of support for the protests in the subsample ranged from 1 to 10, with an average of 5.86.

Table 7.1 – List of journalists analyzed and the outlets they work for

	N journalists in the sample	Scope	Type of outlet
Correio Braziliense	4	National	Newspaper
Folha de São Paulo	3	National	Newspaper
G1	3	National	Online
RBS/Zero Hora	2	Regional	Newspaper
BBC Brasil	1	International	Online
Correio Bahia	1	Local	Newspaper
Correio do Povo	1	Regional	Newspaper
Diario de Santa Maria	1	Regional	Newspaper
Estado de Sao Paulo	1	National	Newspaper
Folha da Regiao	1	Regional	Newspaper
IG	1	National	Online
IstoÉ	1	National	Magazine
Jornal do Commercio PE	1	Regional	Newspaper
NY Times	1	International	Newspaper
Terra	1	National	Online
Total:	23		

The data analysis was done in two levels: the individual journalist (N=23 individual journalists) and the individual story (N=90 news articles total). Because of the nature of the codebook, this analysis was limited to journalists who produced print content for newspapers, online-based outlets or magazines. As such, audiovisual elements were not coded. At the level of the journalist, correlations revealed how individual

characteristics and attitudes relate to the features of the content produced by that journalist. This procedure compares the correlations between journalists' characteristics, including the type of outlet they work for and their use of social media for reporting, to the percentage of their content containing various frames, marginalization devices, sources and positive/neutral/negative evaluations. For each journalist, all stories were averaged, e.g., if journalist A produced 10 stories and 6 of them contained the "riot" frame, then 60% was entered for the riot variable of journalist A.

At the story level, hierarchical logistic and linear regression analyses assess how individual, organizational and routines-level variables relate to content. These models allow for the simultaneous testing of all variables, predicting how changes in independent variables increase the odds of a particular frame or marginalization device to appear in a story (logistic regression). For the way stories portrayed protestors, their cause and the administration (negative, neutral or positive), linear regressions were conducted.

RESULTS AT THE INDIVIDUAL JOURNALIST LEVEL

RQ8 asks how journalists' characteristics relate to their coverage of protests regarding a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources, and d) evaluations. Three sets of correlation tables were used to answer this research question, evaluating the relationship between demographics, outlet's characteristics, social media use for reporting and coverage outcomes. Table 7.2 shows the correlations between journalists' characteristics and marginalization devices used.

Table 7.2 – Correlations between journalists' characteristics and average use of marginalization devices in their coverage

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**	**13**	**14**
1.Age	-													
2.Gender	.29	-												
3.Income	-.09	-.10	-											
4.Personal attitudes	-.04	-.24	-.50*	-										
5.Scope of newsroom	.08	.47*	.29	-.46*	-									
6.Size of newsroom	-.08	-.13	-.14	-.18	-.10	-								
7.Outlet attitudes	.02	.01	-.15	.05	.21	.28	-							
8.SM Gatekeeping	-.05	-.43*	-.25	.04	-.59**	.24	-.09	-						
9. SM Awareness	.12	-.21	.27	.21	-.13	.01	.21	0	-					
10. Idiot	0	-.19	-.01	.17	.16	.01	-.23	-.27	.12	-				
11.Peaceful	-.26	-.18	-.07	.00	-.29	-.09	.18	.06	-.20	-.26	-			
12.Violent	.19	.29	-.08	.06	-.10	-.03	.09	-.08	.40	-.21	-.04	-		
13.Violence blame (+adm)	-.01	.06	.03	.18	-.20	.16	-.27	.08	.51*	-.09	-.53*	.88***	-	
14. Cause mentioned (1=yes)	-.16	-.05	.14	-.43*	.09	.14	-.13	.25	.01	.26	.06	-.07	-.06	-

* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Results from Table 7.2 show journalists' use of social media for awareness was strongly and significantly correlated with blaming the administration for starting the violence ($r=.51$, $p<.05$), suggesting that following conversations on social media leads to coverage more critical of the police. Mentioning the cause of the protests was *negatively* associated with journalists' own views on the movement ($r=-.43$, $p<.05$). That means the more journalists support a movement, the less common is for their coverage to mention the cause of the protests. No other characteristic was significantly correlated with marginalization devices used.

RQ8b) asks about frames used by journalists when covering the demonstrations (Table 7.3). The "confrontation" frame emphasizing the clash between police and protestors was correlated with the use of social media as an awareness system. Taken together, the evidence from "devices" and "frames" correlation tables suggests that journalists who turn to social media to find out what is going on with the protests will give more space to the confrontation between police and protestors, but also blame the administration for starting this confrontation. Research hypothesis 8 (The more journalists incorporate social media into their reporting routines, the less they adhere to the protest paradigm) was partially accepted.

The legitimizing "debate" frame was negatively and strongly associated with journalists' personal support for the protests ($r= -.53$, $p<.01$). This effectively means that the more reporters supported the movement, the less they used legitimizing frames in their stories.

Table 7.3 – Correlations between journalists' characteristics and average use of frames in their coverage

Correlations	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**	**13**	**14**
1. Age	1													
2. Gender	.29	1												
3. Income	-.09	-.10	1											
4. Personal attitudes	-.04	-.24	-.50*	1										
5. Scope of newsroom	.08	.48*	.29	-.46*	1									
6. Size of newsroom	-.08	-.13	-.14	-.18	-.10	1								
7. Outlet attitudes	.02	.01	-.15	.05	.21	.28	1							
8. SM: Gatekeeping	-.05	-.43*	-.25	.04	-.59**	.24	-.09	1						
9. SM: awareness	.12	-.21	.27	.21	-.13	.01	.21	0	1					
10. Circus	-.11	.23	-.12	-.35	.4	.11	.45*	-.13	.01	1				
11. Riot	.27	.26	.01	.20	-.28	-.23	-.06	-.18	.38	-.17	1			
12. Confront.	.07	-.07	.16	.33	-.22	-.09	.04	-.14	.44*	-.26	.67**	1		
13. Debate	-.29	.09	.17	-.53**	.39#	.23	-.03	-.01	-.11	.38	-.43*	-.51*	1	
14. Thematic/ Episodic	.08	-.10	-.23	.33	-.33	-.23	.21	-.05	-.14	.14	.28	.16	-.61**	1

# p<.10, * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

While this could mean that journalists are under editorial constraint and were censored to match the outlet's views on the protest, results from correlations do not support that rationale: the outlet's degree of support for protests - as identified by journalists themselves - is not significantly correlated with coverage outcomes. Because correlation tables do not control for other levels of influence, this finding will be further probed later at the story-level regression analyses. Results also reveal that the scope of the newsroom (local, regional, national or international) is correlated with legitimizing coverage; that is, the broader the scope, the more the coverage will have the "debate" frame.

For sources (RQ8c), organizational-level variables were associated with use of different source types. Correlations presented on Table 7.4 show that journalists who worked for outlets supportive of the protests used less official sources ($r=-.42$, $p<.05$). Those working for national outlets used protestor sources more ($r=.43$, $p<.05$).

Finally, for evaluation of protestors (RQ8d), younger journalists in this sample had a coverage that was more positive to the protestors ($r=-.45$, $p<.05$). The coverage of those working for bigger newspapers was more critical of the administration ($r=-.43$, $p<.05$). For "cause evaluation" results show an inverse correlation with individual's support for the protests ($r=.-.45$, $p<.05$). Table 7.5 has the correlations between journalists' characteristics and their portrayal of the protests.

Table 7.4 – Correlations between journalists' characteristics and average use of sources in their coverage

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
1.Age	-											
2.Gender	.29	-										
3.Income	-.09	-.10	-									
4.Personal attitudes	-.04	-.24	-.50*	-								
5.Scope of newsroom	.08	.48*	.29	-.46*	-							
6.Size of newsroom	-.08	-.13	-.14	-.18	-.10	-						
7.Outlet attitudes	.02	.01	-.15	.05	.21	.28	-					
8.SM: Awareness	-.05	-.43*	-.25	.04	-.59**	.24	-.09	-				
9. SM: Gatekeeping	.11	-.21	.27	.21	-.13	.01	.21	0	-			
10. Official sources	-.33	.04	.28	-.21	-.08	.19	-.42*	-.11	.22	-		
11. Protestor sources	-.11	-.05	-.05	-.23	.43*	.19	.36	-.18	.02	-.12	-	
12. Other sources	-.22	.16	-.35	-.03	.14	.23	.39	-.17	.04	.10	.41	-

Table 7.5 – Correlations between journalists' characteristics and average protestors, cause and administration evaluations in their coverage

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
1.Age	-											
2.Gender	.29	-										
3.Income	-.09	-.10	-									
4.Personal attitudes	-.04	-.24	-.50*	-								
5.Scope of newsroom	.08	.47*	.29	-.46*	-							
6.Size of newsroom	-.08	-.13	-.14	-.18	-.10	-						
7.Outlet attitudes	.02	.01	-.15	.05	.21	.28	-					
8.SM: Gatekeeping	-.05	-.43*	-.25	.04	-.59**	.24	-.09	-				
9.SM: Awareness	.12	-.21	.27	.21	-.13	.01	.21	0	-			
10. Cause evaluation	-.31	-.15	.25	-.45*	.39	.29	.26	.25	-.01	-		
11. Protestor evaluation	-.45*	-.09	-.06	-.10	-.16	-.18	-.03	.25	-.16	.40	-	
12. Adm. evaluation	.28	.25	.03	.28	-.07	-.43*	.13	-.40	.19	-.43	.05	-

Once again, journalists' individual attitudes seem to have a reverse impact on the way they portrayed the movement. Results here confirm findings from the "frames" correlations: the more a journalist support a movement, the more negative the coverage will be, but there is no indication that this comes from the way they perceive their outlet's support for the cause to be. This finding may seem counterintuitive, and the analyses presented in the next section will further explore if it holds when controlling for the way journalists' perceive their outlet's editorial position in regards to the protests.

RESULTS AT STORY LEVEL

The final set of research questions in this dissertation refers to how individual, organizational, routine and contextual variables together predict adherence to protest paradigm's patterns of news coverage. RQ9 (how do influences at different levels influence coverage of protests regarding a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources, and d) evaluations?) requires the simultaneous test of variables from all levels of influence on content. To answer these questions, a series of hierarchical logistic and linear regressions were conducted. For the individual-level influences, the first block contained demographic variables (age, gender, class) and personal attitudes (degree of support for the protests). At the organizational level block, variables included the scope of the outlet and the size of the newsroom, as well as outlet's attitudes towards the protests as identified by the journalists themselves. At the routines level (block 3), the two factors for social media use for reporting were entered: awareness and gatekeeping. These were based on the factor analysis for journalists' use of social media for reporting. Finally, the last block included contextual factors via assessing the sole importance of the

year of the protests (2013 or 2015), when controlling for all other variables.

Because the outcome of "marginalization devices" and "frames" is dichotomous - presence or absence - this section uses logistic regression models. Logistic regressions can evaluate, for example, the probability of "violence" to appear in coverage given the patterns in outlet type, journalists' attitudes or social media use (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). For outcomes that are numeric - number of sources and evaluations ranging from negative to positive - multiple linear regressions were used.

Devices

The first model of Table 7.6 depicts the impact of the influences on the odds that the coverage will have specific devices: peaceful, violence and cause mentioned (RQ9a). “Peaceful” refers to mentions of protest tactics as non-violent. Conversely, “violence” is about stories mentioning looting, clashes between police and protestors, destruction of property, etc. “Cause mentioned” assesses if the story mentioned the reason why protestors were taking place.

For the presence of the "peaceful" device, the model fit was not good as indicated by non-significant chi-square tests. Chi-square tests here assess the difference between the logistic model with all predictors and one with no predictors. If the result is not statistically significant, the model with predictors is no better at predicting the outcome than the one with just the intercept (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).

For the presence of devices related to "violence," the odds increase by hundreds of times with an increase in the scope of the organization ($p<.001$). While this number seems very large, it is important to note that national and international organizations are

located in São Paulo, which is also the place where demonstrations were most violent. Regional protests, such as the ones in the Northern region, happened weeks later and were supported by the police already (Mesquita, 2013).

The use of social media for awareness increases the odds of a story mentioning violence by 157%. From the contextual variables, a story from 2015 was 99% less likely to mention violence than a story of 2013, in tandem with findings from content analysis that showed violence was not present in 2015. In other words, violence in the coverage will always follow violence in the streets, regardless of individual or outlet's support for the movement, and social media use actually increases the odds of violence appearing the coverage. Not enough stories in this subsample had violence to allow for the testing of the more nuanced "violence blame" variable with a good model fit.

Model 3 from Table 7.6 assesses if the cause of the protests was mentioned in the story. Results reveal that each year increase in the age of the journalists decreased the odds of the cause being mentioned by 22%. Organizational-level influences did not increase probability beyond chance (chi-squares not significant). At the routines level, each increase in the use of social media as an awareness system led to a 155% increase in the odds of a story mentioning the cause of the protestors. Because all stories from 2015 mentioned a cause, there was no variance to assess the particular impact of contextual variables on the probability.

For sources used (RQ9c), the models did not yield good fits, suggesting that there is no prediction for the presence of a type of source based on these variables beyond chance.

Table 7.6 – Logistic regressions assessing the impact of journalists' characteristics on presence of marginalization devices

	Model 1 Peaceful		**Model 2 Violence**		**Model 3 Cause mentioned**	
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR
Block 1: Individual						
Age	-0.09	0.92	0.02	1.02	-0.12	0.88*
Gender (M= 1)	-0.07	0.94	0.93	2.54	-0.30	0.74
Class	0.31	1.36	-1.98	0.14	-1.30	0.27
Personal support for the protest	-0.35	0.71*	-0.25	0.78	-0.55	0.58
Block 2:Organizational						
Scope						
regional (ref)						
national	-2.55	0.08	3.30	27.06*	1.09	2.97
Size	-0.36	0.70*	-0.04	0.96	-0.24	0.79
Outlet attitudes	0.18	1.20	-0.21	0.81	-0.03	0.97
Block 3: Social Media Routines						
Awareness	-0.34	0.71	0.94	2.57*	0.94	2.55*
Gatekeeping	-0.15	0.86	0.23	1.26	-0.28	0.76
Block 4: Context						
Year					N/A[1]	
2013 (ref)						
2015	-0.12	0.89	-4.40	0.01**		
Nagelkerke R-sq.	0.21		0.51		0.27	
Chi-square	15.23		42.05***		6.23*	

*p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

[1]Note: All stories in 2015 mentioned a cause.

Frames

A second set of logistic regressions was run to answer RQ9b, which relates to the presence of four frames of protest: riot, confrontation, debate and thematic/episodic. Table 7.7 depicts those results. For the "confrontation" frame, results reveal that a year increase in the age of the journalist leads to a 14% increase in the odds of the story to emphasize the clash between police and protestors. Personal attitudes are also associated with the presence of the "confrontation" frame, with an increase in the level of support for the protests leading to an increase in 109% in the odds. Stories from national outlets are vastly more likely to have the confrontation frame (OR=17.39, $p<.001$). For the “riot” frame, Hosmer and Lemeshow tests of goodness of fit revealed that the model does not increase the odds of prediction beyond chance. In other words, the variables included in this model fail to reject the null hypothesis.

For the "debate" frame, results continue to confirm that each year of age decreases the odds of legitimizing coverage by about 10%. In other words, stories written by those who are older are less likely to have the legitimizing "debate" frame. Once again, personal support for the protests actually has a negative impact on legitimizing coverage (OR=0.72, $p<.05$).

Only organizational-level variables predicted thematic coverage. One unit increase in the size of the newsroom led to a 90% increase in the odds of thematic coverage. Regional outlets are a lot less likely to have thematic coverage: only four stories in regional outlets provided context, explaining the odds ratio of 316.13 for the scope. Overall, national and international outlets with bigger newsrooms are more likely

to bring thematic coverage, while local newspapers are more likely to have episodic stories.

Table 7.7 – Logistic regressions assessing the impact of journalists' characteristics on presence of frames

	Confrontation		Debate		Thematic/Episodic (1= Thematic)	
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR
Block 1: Individual						
Age	0.13	1.14*	-0.12	0.89#	-0.06	0.94
Gender (M=1)	-0.01	0.10	-0.23	0.79	-0.72	0.49
Class	1.28	3.58	-1.34	0.26	-0.81	0.44
Personal support for the protests	0.74	2.09**	-0.34	0.72*	0.43	1.54
Block 2: Organizational						
Scope						
regional (ref)						
national	2.86	17.39*	1.44	4.22	5.76	316.13**
Size	0.46	1.58	-0.20	0.82	0.67	1.96*
Outlet att.	-0.29	0.75	0.18	1.20	-0.42	0.66
Block 3: Social Media Routines						
Awareness	0.76	2.13	0.63	1.87	0.77	2.17
Gatekeeping	0.18	1.20	-0.11	0.90	0.15	1.17
Block 4: Context						
Year						
2013 (ref)						
2015	N/A[1]		N/A[1]		1.85	6.34
Nagelkerke R-sq.	0.36		0.3		0.361	
Chi-square	27.44**		21.76*		23.86**	

# p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

[1]No stories in 2015 had confrontation and riot frames

Because it was so rare, there was not enough variance on the presence of the "circus" frame to generate models that can predict it beyond chance. The 2015 protests did not have any incidence of violence in this subsample, so the last block was not included in the models for "confrontation" and "riot" frames. Similarly, because all of the 2015 stories in this subsample did contain the legitimizing "debate" frame, it was not possible to assess the impact of contextual variables on the analysis.

Evaluations

Finally, the set of linear regressions on Table 7.8 show the impact of each level of influence in the way stories evaluated the protestors, their cause and the administration that they were challenging. Evaluations ranged from 1= negative, 2= neutral to 3= positive. Results reveal that stories written by those who are younger (β=-.35, $p<.01$) and female (β=-.26, $p<.05$) were more likely to portray protestors more positively. However, once again, personal support for the protests was *negatively* associated with positive coverage (β=-.45, $p<.01$). The individual-level block accounted for 27% of the variance observed. Stories written by those who support the movement are more likely to be negative, controlling for everything else.

Influences from organizational, routine and context levels did not yield a significant R-square change (F tests not significant). It is worth noting that in the final model, organizational-level influences are marginally significant, suggesting that national newspapers are more likely to portray protestors negatively. Stories written by journalists who think their outlet is supportive of the protests are also more likely to have a positive portrayal of the protestors. However, these effect sizes are much smaller. Overall, the

negative impact of a journalist's personal attitudes towards protestors goes beyond the way they perceive their outlets' attitudes to be. In other words, when a journalist is supportive of the movement, the coverage will be the opposite and this holds true beyond the outlet's level of support for the movement as measured by the journalist.

Table 7.8 – Linear regressions assessing the impact of journalists' characteristics on evaluations of protestors, cause and administration

	Protestor	Cause	Administration
	Betas	Betas	Betas
Block 1: Individual			
Age	-0.35**	-0.06	0.08
Gender (M = 1)	-0.26*	-0.20	0.14
Class	-0.18	0.15	0.18
Personal attitudes	-0.45**	-0.04	-0.05
ΔR2 (%)	0.27***	0.08	0.21***
Block 2: Organizational			
Scope			
regional (ref)			
national	-0.37#	0.27	-0.25
Size	-0.19	0.38*	-0.32*
Outlet attitudes	0.24#	0.27	0.15
ΔR2 (%)	0.04	0.02	0.04
Block 3: Routines			
SM Awareness	-0.15	-0.16	-0.07
SM Gatekeeping	-0.02	0.54**	-0.12
ΔR2 (%)	0.01	0.13*	0.01
Block 4: Context			
Year			
2013 (ref)			
2015	-0.20	-0.43*	-0.31*
ΔR2 (%)	0.02	.077*	0.05*
Total R2	0.34***	.31**	.31**

# p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001

For the portrayal of the cause defended by the protestors, results show that only social media use for gatekeeping practices - such as contacting sources, verifying information, and broadcasting own work - was associated with coverage that portray protestors' causes more positively (β=.54, $p<.01$). For contextual variables, results reveal that 2015 protests had a more overall negative causal evaluation (β=-.45, $p<.01$). This seemingly contradictory results can be explained by the overall descriptives of this subsample: while the 2013 protests had an actual range of evaluations from 1 (negative), 2 (neutral) to 3 (positive), no stories in 2015 had a negative cause evaluation (less than 2). As such, this variable only assesses the range from neutral (2) to positive (3).

Finally, for administration evaluation, outlet size was positively and significantly more associated with negative (β=-.32, $p<.05$) portrayal of the government. The larger the outlet, the more critical of the administration its coverage will be. In 2015, portrayal of the administration was also substantially more negative (β=-.31, $p<.05$) than 2013.

CONCLUSION

The last set of research questions and hypotheses in this dissertation connects variables from a survey of journalists to the content they produced. Using data from 23 journalists from various print and online-based organizations, the goal was to assess which variables have predictive power when it comes to the protest paradigm. Results reveal that individual-level variables and using social media for reporting have the strongest impact on coverage, and the relationship between personal attitudes and portrayal of protestors is *negative*.

The first main finding of this chapter refers to the impact of using social media for

reporting during protests. Journalists who used online networks as an awareness system were more likely to emphasize violence, but also to blame the police for starting it. When used for gatekeeping, social media practices were associated with stories portraying the cause more positively. While the literature identifies the "confrontation" frame as part of the protest paradigm, the "violence blame" variable reveals that not all emphasis on violence is necessarily negative to protestors, as seen on Chapter 5. In this case, although social media use was linked to stressing clashes between police and protestors, it was also strongly correlated with journalists blaming the police for starting the violence.

These findings may come from the influence of online activism during the demonstrations. In 2013, groups like the independent media collective Mídia Ninja broadcasted live from the streets confrontations between police officers and protestors (Mayotte, 2013). The impact of citizen journalists did not go unnoticed by journalists in this sample:

> [Mídia Ninja] was important part of alternative media, profoundly impacting the coverage of the 2013 protests and those after that, and changing mainstream media. They were relevant because they were closer to the demonstrations and showed facts that traditional media did not, but at the same time with strong political views. This is not necessarily a problem, but should be understood as part of their coverage[16].

While it is not within the scope of this paper to go into details regarding the relationship between citizen journalism (Mídia Ninja) and mainstream media, the results presented here add to the body of research suggesting social media could be used by activists to influence news-making processes (Chadwick, 2013). In the case of Brazil,

[16] Open-ended response, my translation

this was done mainly by highlighting police brutality and pushing forward idea that protestors' causes are legitimate.

At the individual level, age was the primary demographic factor impacting coverage, with younger journalists more likely to mention demands and portray protestors positively. Women journalists were also more likely to produce coverage that was sympathetic to the protestors. While it is easy to speculate that because of age similarities younger reporters were more likely to take the student leaders from *Movimento Passe Livre* more seriously, future studies should further explore these gender and age differences.

One of the most puzzling findings from this chapter comes from the relationship between individual attitudes and protest coverage. Results strongly suggest that the more journalists support the movement, the *less* legitimizing the coverage will be. At first sight, one could argue that journalists simply calibrated their coverage to match how they perceived their employer's attitudes to be, but regression analyses showed that the negative relationship holds even when controlling for organizational-level attitudes. In other words, the regression models revealed that the impact of personal attitudes goes beyond the way journalists see their outlets' editorial lines, a finding that indicates self-correction is more than attempting to please employers. It is important to note that the way journalists in the sample reported their employers' biases is by no means an absolute measure of *actual* editorial leaning. In fact, findings from the content analysis (Chapter 5) showed that coverage was not extreme to any side of the political spectrum and had very similar characteristics across various outlets.

In other words, the evidence presented here reveals that journalists tend to "correct" their coverage and this goes way beyond the way they perceive their outlet's editorial leaning to be. For the Brazilian case, this process happened by giving less space to the movement's ideas, portraying their cause more negatively and not using the "debate" frame.

When I asked journalists about how they reconciled their personal attitudes with their professional role, they explained two processes happened at the same time: self-correcting and ideological struggles with editors in the newsroom.

First, self-correcting is a widespread practice, with journalists from mainstream media striving to be seen as objective and impartial, similar to the ways U.S. journalists would attempt to preserve their ideals of professionalism. According to a reporter from a weekly national magazine:

> Working for the big media, there is a type of "self-censorship" among journalists who avoid participating politically or taking sides publicly about political themes. I am afraid of showing support [on social media] for causes, for example, or give my opinion and be labeled as an activist journalists and, therefore, less impartial.[17]

Mainstream media journalists also evoked professionalism to differentiate themselves from activist groups. As put by a journalist from a big newspaper: "Even if you write a story favorable to a cause, it is fundamental to give voice to those who oppose it. That's what it means to be a journalist."[18] For journalists, guaranteeing that their viewpoints do not spill over into the coverage is an integral part of their professional

[17] Open-ended response, my translation
[18] Open-ended response, my translation

identity, and they often justified negative protest coverage as a result of adhering to journalistic norms. For social movements more associated with the left, self-correction can have damaging results because most journalists in Brazil are politically aligned with them. Rather than negative coverage coming from an ideological resistance to groups that challenge the status quo – as argued by Gitlin (1980) in the United States – Brazilian journalists are very supportive of leftist social movements, but self-correct their biases to remain objective.

Another explanation for coverage contrary to personal attitudes comes from ideological struggles in the newsroom, with a few journalists reporting that they disagreed with editors on the information to be published in the final product. Statistically, the impact of the outlet's editorial line was much smaller, but reporters explained that there was a battle regarding the focus on tactics or on ideas, which could account for the "cause mentioned" device. They reported that their editors would always prefer to emphasize conflict and violence, while limiting the space given to protestors' grievances and demands.

According to a reporter from a mainstream newspaper:

> In [outlet], we had reporters who were leftist and reporters who were very conservative, and editors who were leftist and others who were conservative. So at the end of the day, there was a conflict between the leftist reporter and the conservative editor on what to publish, for example. The editor wanted to emphasize violence, destruction, fire, rubber bullets, etc., and the reporter wanted to focus on why protests were taking place[19].

Another journalist revealed that it was harder for him as a reporter not to be

[19] Personal communication, my translation

sympathetic to protestors in 2013 because the scope of police brutality against them. But for the editor in the newsroom, that was a distant reality. At the end of the day, they already prioritized what they knew "the newspaper wanted to print ['o que vai sair no jornal'].[20]" With the exception of one journalist who worked as a freelancer for an international news organization, all journalists interviewed reported feeling "guilty" about their coverage of the 2013 demonstrations.

When stories they wrote highlighted demands, some journalists reported that it was common for them to be edited to fit editorial lines: "Mainstream media outlets have very defined editorial positions and it was common for my story to be edited (without asking me) to match those interests."[21] It is possible that editors were harsher when they knew the reporter's political leaning, which could account for negative coverage appearing more frequently on stories from reporters who support the movement. But overall, journalists in this sample viewed their outlets' constraints as much smaller than their level of self-correcting.

However, it is important to note that the processes of self-correcting and newsroom editorial conflict were more prevalent in 2013; in 2015, the anti-government narrative served to legitimize the movement, regardless of how aligned with it journalists were. Results presented here suggest that this was particularly true of larger national newspapers, who provided more thematic coverage critical of the administration.

[20] Personal communication, my translation
[21] Open-ended response, my translation

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Chapter 8 – Toward a typology of protest coverage

> *"Awareness of the media's routines and frames is no guarantee that a movement will be able to achieve publicity for its analysis and program on its own terms ... But surely ignorance of the media's codes condemn a movement to marginality"*
> — Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, 1980, p. 287

In the summer of 2013, a small demonstration against bus fare increases ignited a country-wide wave of protests in Brazil. Following outrage over intense police repression, citizens took to the streets to express their dissatisfaction with rampant corruption, human rights violations and excessive expenditures on the 2014 World Cup. After bus fare demands were met, right-leaning activists joined the demonstrations and widened the scope of the grievances against the government. By the end of the year, widespread participation in the protests had ceased, and would not begin anew until after the reelection of Dilma Rousseff in November 2014. In 2015, a second major wave of demonstrations hit the country. This time, protests were more elite-driven and with a clear anti-government agenda seeking the removal of the President. In May 2016, the senate voted to suspend Rousseff from power and began the process of impeachment.

This dissertation examined the factors influencing journalists' work covering protests in Brazil, with three goals in mind: (a) to analyze the way journalists framed the 2013 and 2015 protests; (b) to investigate the different levels of influences on journalists' work; and (c) to assess the impact of social media on the work of journalists covering the demonstrations. Guided by the literature on protest coverage, a media sociology approach

was employed to examine how protest coverage changes when movements become elite-driven. The Brazilian case is particularly unique in that it combines a press guided by North-American professionalism with a democratic system marked by a recent history of military interventions and impeachments.

This final chapter is organized in the following way: first, I present a review of the empirical findings from the content analysis, survey and matched data analyses. Then, I discuss the implications of those results for the literature on the protest paradigm and the impact of the findings for journalists and social movements. Finally, I address weaknesses and strengths of the study, along with the potential for future research.

REVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS

The findings from this project came from content analysis (Chapter 5), survey (chapter 6) and a linked analysis combining the two (chapter 7). Chapter 5 focused on stories published on the protests by the four most-circulated newspapers in Brazil. News during the two protest waves was compared based on the four characteristics of the protest paradigm: marginalization devices, sources, frames, and evaluations. Marginalization devices refer to depictions of protestor tactics as violent or mentions of their appearance or naiveté. The protest paradigm is also characterized by quotes from official sources who usually delegitimize the movement. Four frames of protest were used in this study: confrontation (emphasis on clashes between police and protestors), riot (emphasis on deviance), circus (emphasis on oddity) and debate (legitimizing frame). Finally, evaluations refer to the valence (positive/neutral/negative) of the portrayal of protestors, their cause and the administration they were challenging.

Three major findings emerged from the content analysis. First, the emphasis on violence was prevalent, but it did not necessarily lead to a negative portrayal of protestors. Second, official sources were used to legitimize the protests. Third, adherence to the protest paradigm had more to do with the way the government is viewed than with the movement per se.

The first main result concerns the emphasis on violent tactics, present throughout the 2013 protests. As the protest paradigm predicts, stories highlighted rioting and confrontations with the police, usually in the lead. However, findings also suggest that journalists were able to make a distinction between violence initiated by protestors and the police, and coverage emphasizing confrontation was often accompanied by frames legitimizing the movements. Thus, the focus on violence worked *in favor* of protestors' agendas, generating outrage against police brutality, expanding public support of the movements and legitimizing their grievances. It is important to note that negative coverage of the police only occurred following the second day of protests in 2013, when riot police responded violently not only towards demonstrators, but also journalists and bystanders.

The second main finding from the content analysis comes from the way official sources were beneficial to protestors when their interests aligned. As the protest paradigm predicts, quotes from official sources were predominant, but they were more often used in stories to legitimize the movement in both 2013 and 2015. Conversely, quotes taken from protestors were frequently used to ridicule them, even in 2015. For demonstrators, direct access to stories via quotes did not guarantee control over the discourse, even when

the press was sympathetic to the protests. A more effective strategy was to use official sources or academic experts to convey the movement's messages.

Results from the content analysis show an evolution and expansion in the news frames over time, as the narrative behind the protests went from movement-specific - bus fare rates - to generalized opposition to the government. Initially, stories focused on tactics and confrontations with the police, though they often blamed police for the clashes. By the end of 2013, coverage became more thematic, providing context and connecting protests to larger criticisms of Rousseff's administration. In 2015, the vast majority of news situated the demonstrations within a broader political story about the crisis in the Workers' Party. Articles were longer, elite-oriented and rarely quoted protestors, but portrayed their movement as a legitimate part of a bigger picture.

Chapter 6 discussed the results of a survey of Brazilian journalists, measuring their reported news gathering routines, their perception of the protests, and of the work of the press when covering the demonstrations. Because a great deal of protest activity was organized and negotiated online, I was particularly interested in how journalists incorporated social media into reporting practices.

Results revealed that online networks, most notably Facebook and Whatsapp, have been extensively assimilated into reporters' daily routines, and even more so during breaking news events like protests. Journalists in the sample most often used the platforms as a system of awareness, monitoring conversations on social media as a "thermometer" to determine how to go about covering future events. During the protests, reporters also used social media to contact sources, discuss the logistics of reporting with

their peers, and parse information to pass along to their audience.

About their norms, journalists consistently reported that violence was a major editorial concern in their outlet and intrinsically newsworthy to their audience. Reporters described how their news-making process started with a checklist of facts related to looting, destruction of private and public property, confrontations with the police, number of arrests, etc. In line with the literature, results show that norms and routines perpetuate a narrative of violence in coverage.

Results from the chapter focusing on journalists also addressed the relationship between their backgrounds and their perception of the protests. As expected, left-leaning journalists were more supportive of the 2013 demonstrations, while right-leaning reporters viewed the 2015 protests more positively. Both groups had a critical view of the coverage by their outlets and mainstream media in general, suggesting an awareness of the gap between their personal attitudes and the attitudes of their employers and their peers. During in-depth interviews, journalists revealed that this criticism did not necessarily come from an assessment of the news product itself, but instead from their experience negotiating what information was highlighted or omitted.

Finally, Chapter 7 linked the content to those who produced it by assessing how personal attitudes, organizational constraints, newsgathering routines and contextual variables translate into news stories. Results from regression analyses revealed a pattern: social media use for reporting was associated with coverage emphasizing violence, but also with blaming the police for escalating confrontations. In addition, journalists who used online platforms to contact sources were more likely to portray protestors' causes

more positively than those who did not.

One of the most significant findings from this dissertation comes from the relationship between journalists' personal attitudes and the characteristics of their coverage. Results showed that the more a journalist supported a movement, the less supportive of the protests the coverage was. This link held true even when accounting for journalists' perception of the editorial line of their employers. More specifically, the more a journalist supported a movement, the less coverage gave space to the protestors' ideas, portrayed their cause positively or used legitimizing frames.

Influences from the organizational level had a very limited direct impact on content. Instead, the results presented here show that, if present, organizational-level influences are mediated by individual-level characteristics. In other words, this study found that it is the individual set of characteristics that shaped stories, but not without acknowledging that organizational structures may have had an impact on those individual perceptions, which in turn influenced content.

Through interviews, journalists from this sample explained that they continually self-assessed and corrected for potential bias, a correction that they believe differentiated them from "activist journalists." In 2015, journalists also expressed a profound desire to avoid repeating mistakes from 2013, particularly in terms of dismissing legitimate grievances early on in coverage. According to them, the 2013 demonstrations altered journalists' views on protesting itself and how it should be covered. Perhaps not surprisingly, a few respondents reported that over-eagerness not to repeat mistakes may have led to coverage overestimating the importance of the initial demonstrations in 2015.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE

This case study provided an opportunity to examine how the protest paradigm responds to political uncertainty and when protestors' agendas converge with the interests of other political elites. The overarching conclusion is that *journalistic norms and routines can work in favor of protestors when demonstrations fit larger political narratives and against protests that are viewed positively by journalists themselves*.

Not all violence and official sources are equal

The literature on the protest paradigm identifies journalistic norms and newsgathering routines as the bedrock of coverage delegitimizing social movements. Since social movements are not a formal "beat," reporters do not develop a close relationship with protestor sources, as opposed to public officials who have automatic standing in the media (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). Through newsroom socialization, journalists learn to cover demonstrations favoring spectacle to the detriment of movements' ideas (Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1999; Boyle, Armstrong & McLeod, 2012, McLeod, 2007). The persistence of the protest paradigm has led scholars to consider that journalists may have a deep ideological resistance to groups that challenge the status quo (Entman & Rojecki, 1993). As Gitlin (1980) puts it: "there is a journalistic squeamishness at the unscripted disorder of protests. Unreadiness to take protest seriously amounts to unwillingness" (p. xix).

This study, however, moves away from understanding protest coverage as paradigmatic towards a more complex view of the relationship between journalists and protestors. Rather than treating frames as mutually exclusive, I was interested in whether

and how they appeared together in the same article. In the case of protests, stories contained frames emphasizing clashes between protestors and police, and simultaneously addressed the demands and grievances behind the movement.

In 2013, news stories indeed prioritized violence, including rioting, looting, and clashes with the police. However, after the second week of demonstrations, coverage became more critical of the police and sympathetic to protestors' ideas. As such, news was determined not only by protestors' actions but also by the police response to them. In the case of Brazil, the emphasis on violence neither took space away from ideas nor served as a deterrent for prospective supporters. In fact, it catalyzed public support for the initial demonstrators (Moares & Santos, 2013; Moreira & Lima Santiago, 2013).

As the protest paradigm predicts, official voices were dominant in news coverage. But because protests evolved into a generalized antagonism to the government in power, elected officials from opposition parties served to *legitimize* the movement. This is contrary to the bulk of the literature on the paradigm, which assumes that official sources and protestors have diametrically opposed goals. This result is an interesting point of convergence between indexing theory and the protest paradigm, suggesting that legitimizing and thematic coverage of protests can be provided by officials who share the movement's grievances and demands (Bennett, 1990, 1996, 2011; Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2007; Lawrence, 1995, 2012). In Brazil, as bus fare demands gave way to an anti-government narrative, news began portraying the movement's actions in a more thematic way, providing context behind protestors' demands. I argue that this transition occurred as a function of demonstrations becoming a political issue within the larger

context of the conflict between the ruling Workers' Party and oppositional parties.

Even when the overall coverage of protestors was positive, protestors' quotes were rarely used, and when used, served to ridicule the movements in both years. This finding speaks to the distinction between "access" and "meaning," an issue that indexing theorists have long been aware of (Lawrence, 2001). While sources are undoubtedly central to how protestors are framed, gaining access does not guarantee that coverage will be sympathetic to the movement. In fact, the results of this study suggest the opposite: protestor quotes were associated with an emphasis on physical appearance and highlighted contradictions in the movement's ideas. For social movements, the evidence presented here shows that powerful alliances with elites or academic experts is a more fruitful strategy and one that assures quotes will not be used to ridicule the movement in the news. This approach, of course, risks allowing elites to transform cooperation into cooptation, inherently changing the nature of the social movement (Coy, 2013). From the perspective of media coverage, however, harnessing the power of elite and academic expert allies was the key to positive portrayal of the Brazilian demonstrations as journalists gave these sources automatic standing.

Journalists' balancing act: self-assessments and self-corrections

Beyond describing coverage patterns, a media sociology approach focuses on *how* they happen. By matching journalists' survey results to the content they produced, this study showed that the more Brazilian journalists supported the protests, the more negative their coverage was, even when controlling for the way they perceive their outlet's editorial line. Overall, journalists were personally more supportive of the 2013

protests than the 2015 demonstrations, but the content they produced – and that of the Brazilian media in general – was the opposite. This finding defies the logic of the protest paradigm, which is rooted a notion that the press has an ideological resistance to protestors (Gitlin, 1980; Entman & Rojecki, 1993). Fearing being seen as activists, reporters evoked professionalism to justify a critical approach to protests they personally supported. As one newspaper reporter explained: "[in 2013] fear - shared with colleagues in the newsroom- helped keep us in a constant state of alert so that coverage was not biased or used by protestors to stir up conflict."

In 2015, journalists were also eager not to repeat mistakes from 2013. In particular, reporters from the four most-circulated newspapers perceive that their initial coverage and that of their outlet failed to report on demands and make sense of the chaos of the demonstrations. Interestingly enough, they also worry that correcting episodic patterns could have led to an overestimation of the 2015 protests, which were anticipated and promoted in the media even before the actual demonstrations took place.

Journalists in this sample displayed a great deal of critical assessment of their work and the work of the press, constantly self-checking for potential bias and calibrating their coverage with others in the newsroom. Of course, there is nothing wrong with journalists self-correcting in an attempt to remain impartial. But for leftist movements - precisely those viewed very positively by the journalists in the sample - this pattern could be quite damaging. In 2015, despite journalists general suspicion of the movement, a larger anti-government narrative combined with a fear of repeating mistakes from 2013 led to coverage that was more legitimizing to the movement. In other words, when

journalists were suspicious of protests, it did not matter: professionalism kept them at bay, and norms and routines actually weakened the protest paradigm in the sense that reporters could not ignore messages from official sources supportive of the movement.

From a sociological perspective, patterns of self-assessment and calibration can be understood as part of Brazilian journalists' processes of understanding their self-identity as a reflexive process. According to Giddens (1991), self-identity comes from actively shaping, reflecting and monitoring ourselves to craft and understand our own biographies. Reflexivity in modernity manifests through the "chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge" (Giddens, 1991, p.20). For the reporters in this sample, observations of their previous work, and evaluation and correction of their own biases is what defined their identities as *professional* journalists. These processes may be heightened by their intellectual training in communication schools in Brazil, which largely follow a critical tradition.

The findings from this dissertation speak to what journalism scholar Bernardo Kucinski described as the "Brazilian paradox" – the constant tension between the country's leftist journalist and the conservative mainstream press. The author describes self-censorship as an integral part of the ethos of journalists who intentionally hide information from readers as a survival strategy in newsrooms owned by conservative families:

> [leftist journalists] adopted a low profile approach, a rehearsed alienation, which implied patterns of self-censorship. For the politically aware journalist, participation must happen outside of the newsroom. 'Journalists' freedom of opinion is limited by their bosses' political leaning' and democracy is a bourgeois facade. (Kucinski, 1998, p.68, my translation)

I hesitate, however, to call the results here "self-censorship" for two reasons. First, journalists' efforts to avoid political bias went way beyond the way they perceived bias from their employers. Second, differences between coverage in 2013 and 2015 did not come from actively hiding information from audiences in 2013, but instead from providing a more thematic coverage anchored in legitimizing discourses from official sources in 2015.

Implications for the practice and social movements

Beyond theory, this project has several implications for the practice and for social movements. In both years, protestor quotes continued to be employed in superficial ways, highlighting naivety and physical traits. Even when coverage was positive, the voices heard came from official sources and academic experts. To put it bluntly: Brazilian protestors were better off not speaking to the press at all, even when coverage seems to be sympathetic to their causes. In fact, protestors were more able to shape news narratives through social media than via in-person interviews. Because online platforms have been largely adopted by journalists during breaking news events, they provided protestors with a direct channel to news producers. The results presented here show that online strategies mattered: journalists who used social media for reporting were more likely to blame the police for confrontations and portray protestors' causes more positively.

Recently, protestor groups in the United States - most notably the students fighting racial discrimination at the University of Missouri - have reacted to this pattern by creating "safe spaces" from the press and speaking to supporters directly via social

media (Starr, 2015). Similarly, during the Ferguson protests, activists were able to promote Black Lives Matter without relying on mainstream media (Freelon, McIlwain & Clark, 2016). The findings from this project provide support for those strategies. If journalists do not want to become irrelevant in protest coverage, they must seek to treat protestors in the same way they would treat an official source or an academic expert.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Much of the literature on protest coverage focuses on the content and its effects, and very few studies, if any, have attempted to understand how journalists on the ground navigate political turmoil to cover street demonstrations. The primary strength of this dissertation comes from its media sociology approach that shed a spotlight on how the norms and routines behind the protest paradigm operated in Brazil.

One of the biggest contributions of this project comes from its multi-method design combining survey, content analysis and in-depth interviews. This approach was selected to provide both depth and breadth to this study. On a macro level, the content analysis of stories from four mainstream newspapers provided a picture of how protests were covered and how coverage trends evolved over time. Then, results from a survey with more than 1,250 Brazilian journalists revealed their reporting practices and attitudes towards the movement, their work, and the work of the press. Together, those two analyses provided the "big picture" of how protests were portrayed and seen by mainstream media professionals.

Then, this project went into depth by linking survey responses to content analysis of stories produced by 23 selected journalists. The matched analysis, rare in

communication research, allowed for the simultaneous testing of influences from all levels of the hierarchical model into actual content. Following the quantitative analyses, in-depth interviews with journalists in this subsample allowed for clarification and elaboration of the processes behind their coverage. This method can be replicated in any study that attempts to quantitatively disentangle processes behind news making, allowing for hypothesis testing and replication. When combined with qualitative methods - such as in-depth interviews and ethnography - the matched analysis can provide a holistic and robust approach to studying journalistic production.

Another strength of this project is that it addressed the importance of social media for mainstream news reporting practices. A great deal of attention has been devoted to the role of online platforms for protest organization, but only briefly mentioning its potential for disrupting the news routines followed by journalists when covering demonstrations. This study quantitatively assessed this potential, with findings that are encouraging to social movements.

More broadly, this study matters because it undertook the question of under which conditions negative coverage appeared, and under which conditions the protest paradigm was weakened. The findings presented here are particularly relevant as similar protest dynamics unfolded in several countries, such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Egypt. For example, protests in Tahir Square ousted President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi became the first democratically-elected President of Egypt. Only a year later, after protests that many believed to be the continuation of the 2011 revolution, a coup d'état ousted President Morsi, putting the military back into

power (Kingly & Chulov, 2013). Similar to Brazil, shifting and often unlikely alliances between protestors and powerful elites have led to fluid political systems with volatile governments. As electorates in the United States and Europe become more polarized, the findings from this project can also help in elucidating how the press covers right-wing protests with an anti-immigrant agenda, for example.

The quantitative design of this study comes with some weaknesses. Looking at the bigger picture, this study treated media content purely as dependent variables, ignoring their role in transforming the social movement in return. This is one of the main weaknesses of the quantitatively-driven approach: it requires "freezing" the independent variables to assess their importance for content, but it does not take into consideration how content in turn influences protestors.

Regarding the survey, Brazil does not have a comprehensive list of working journalists and results from the convenience sample compiled by the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas cannot be generalizable to the whole population. Because the sample comes from users who subscribed to the Center's newsletter, email discussions and online courses, it is possible that journalists here are more international, tech savvy and with better Internet access than average.

Another caveat comes from the content analysis only including print media, especially because broadcast television remains the dominant source of news in the country. Although this study included newspaper *O Globo*, from the same conglomerate as TV-leader *Globo,* it is likely that coverage patterns had variations across platforms. Furthermore, refinements on the content analysis could include coding visual elements,

such as pictures and infographics, and front page placement.

For the matched analysis, three main methodological limitations must be addressed. First, stories were selected for analysis based on availability and, therefore, privileging journalists working for larger organizations that have online archives. Second, because this study focused on the mainstream press, the work of journalists from alternative outlets was generally ignored. Third, newspaper stories do not always have bylines, and it is possible that the sample selected does not include all the stories produced by that journalist during that time period.

Finally, this case study is about journalists embedded in a particular context: a developing country governed by a center-leftist Party on the verge of political crisis. The unique combination of U.S. journalistic norms and battling elites yielded theoretical insights suggesting that protest coverage can vary under different conditions. However, this was just a first step towards a typology of the relationship between press coverage and protests, and results cannot be generalized beyond the two waves of protests studied. I strongly urge scholars interested in the protest paradigm to replicate this design in other countries experiencing an upsurge of right-leaning protests, including those that do not so closely share U.S. norms of professional journalism. For Brazilianists, protests following President Rousseff's removal provide an optimal scenario to assess if the power of elite voices remain even when protest allies are from the left. Will demonstrations be legitimized through quotes from Workers' Party officials? How will the press respond to the "new" anti-government narrative during the vice-president's term, especially considering that he is from a center-right party? Will emphasis on violence make it back

to coverage as the police responds to protests?

Because this study is deductive and quantitatively-driven, in-depth interviews were only used to supplement numeric findings. Future studies should also address the process of news making during protests following an inductive approach. A qualitatively-driven mixed design could start from in-depth interviews or ethnography, and then develop quantitative instruments to address the phenomena emerging from the data. For example, during in-depth interviews, journalists expressed concerns about their role in inflating the importance of protests in 2015. A qualitatively-driven design would allow for tailoring survey questions to address that attitude. Similarly, questions directly assessing journalists' attitudes towards specific political parties could provide a more nuanced view of the relationship between their alignments, those of their outlets, and their coverage.

Another opportunity for future research comes from the possibility of adding content from journalists' social media accounts into the matched data analysis. With the help of data-scrapping tools, content produced by journalists on their personal social media accounts could be compared to content produced as a news product for their outlets. This provides a unique opportunity to further isolate influences that come from editorial policies and influences that come from individual characteristics.

CONCLUSION

Mainstream media journalists in Brazil are constantly under attack for being "golpista" (pro-coup), anti-democratic and always supportive of conservative sectors. Coined by journalist Paulo Henrique Amorim, the term "Pro-Coup Press Party" is widely

adopted by the left to describe a press that "historically defends coup d'états whenever the Brazilian President is not elected from among members of the ruling elites." In 2013 and 2015, it was not different: numerous opinion leaders and members of the alternative press accused mainstream journalists of fomenting social unrest against Dilma Rousseff.

Conversely, the literature on protest coverage produced in the United States and Europe predicts that news gathering routines combined with journalists' skepticism towards social movements lead to coverage that is detrimental to protestors. Because Brazilian journalists are guided by U.S. norms of professionalism, this body of research foresees that news would closely follow the paradigm, especially as protests gained traction (Entman & Rojecki, 1994).

In this dissertation, I argue that Brazilian media was not inherently pro-protest nor pro-government. This is because norms and routines worked in favor of protestors and journalists' personal support for a movement was not associated with positive coverage. As such, guided by indexing theory and media sociology, this project moved away from a linear view of the relationship between protestors and the press, and towards a typology that can help predict when favorable media coverage happens and which processes are behind it. In this typology, ranging from completely favorable to completely unfavorable coverage, the case of Brazil would be an example of news stories that portray movements positively despite reliance on official sources and emphasis on violence traits.

In Brazil, as protests evolved into a more coherent anti-government narrative, coverage became legitimizing. But the evidence presented here reveals that legitimacy did not come from closed-door agreements between politicians and news outlets that then

censor their journalists. In other words, negative portrayals of protestors had less to do with active manipulation of information, and more to do with how protestors fit within disputes between elites.

As a result of constant scrutiny, Brazilian journalists' work became a delicate balancing act involving correcting personal biases, learning from past mistakes, critically assessing their role as media professionals, bringing editors around to their point of view, and responding to criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. Because the majority of journalists in the country are left-leaning, this process of self-calibration worked in favor of right-leaning protests that had elite support. This was not self-censorship in the sense that reporters were attempting to manipulate information to toe the editorial line of their bosses. Rather, it arose from notions of professionalism that privilege official sources and led to a deep preoccupation over being labeled an "activist" rather than a "professional journalist."

From a theoretical perspective, this project found that the process behind indexing – reliance on official sources – can challenge the negative patterns of coverage of the protest paradigm. When disaggregated, the components of the paradigm pulled coverage in different directions, but the narrative pushed by official sources prevailed over other marginalization devices. As a result, news was sympathetic to the demonstrations. The protest paradigm was, thus, contingent upon elite disagreement.

At the core of this project was the opportunity to assess how the protest coverage responded when a small leftist demonstration morphed into a widespread anti-government movement. The narrative presented here showed how the very same norms

and routines that sustain the protest paradigm can serve to validate demonstrations under one condition: that they are part of narrative put forward by elite groups contesting power.

In a broader sense, protest coverage matters because it can foment radicalization of demonstrators as they struggle to get media attention. Traditionally, when movements get covered, news stories condemn them to marginality, leading to state escalating repression or protestors violently attempting to overthrow governments. The story presented here suggests that press coverage can also operate in a different way. News can help institutionalize protestors' demands into more moderate forms of action aligned with interests of sectors of the political elite.

The impact of those findings for democratic processes is not linear. On the one hand, when the press legitimizes movements and gives less emphasis to violent traits, it helps prevent social chaos by channeling grievances into moderate means of collective action. For democratic stability, even a controversial impeachment process is preferable to a military coup d'état or a violent revolution. On the other hand, this process only favors a certain type of protest: the one that overlaps with interests from opposition elite groups. For protestors outside of the range of elite disagreement, such as movements associated with minority groups in Brazil, police repression continues to escalate, coverage remains focused on violence and it is much harder for protestors to escape the protest paradigm.

When social movements attempt to get news attention, resorting to violence and sensationalism is a risky strategy that can easily backfire. The lesson from Brazil is that

strengthening alliances with established sources and investing in social media content can be an effective way to use journalistic codes in protestors' favor. While this tactic may be too much of a compromise for some groups, it does offer an institutional alternative to legitimate media representation.

Appendices

APPENDIX A - CONTENT ANALYSIS CODEBOOK

Variable	Description	Code
Storynum	Assign number to entry	
Coder	Coder number	1= Rachel, 2= Giovana, 3= Heloisa
PubName	Publication Name	1= FSP, 2=ESP, 3=Globo, 4=ZH
Date	Day/Month/Year	day/month/year
Byline	What is the name of the journalist that wrote the story?	
Editorial	Is this an editorial?	1=yes 0=no
Relevance	Is this article about the 2013 massive protests (June 7-11, 17-22, passe livre) or 2015 protests (march 15)? If about any other protest or not mentioning protest at all, stop coding.	1= yes 0= no
Official_sources	Number of official sources quoted (direct quote, using quotation marks, of five or more words); make sure they're named official sources; that is, elected officials or those appointed by elected officials, including police. Includes quotes from websites, official memorandum, etc. Includes quotes from official sources on social media.	Number of official sources
Protestor_source	Number of protestor or social movement leaders quoted in the story (direct quote, using quotation marks, of five or more words). Do not include signs or chanting.	Number of protestor sources
Bystander_source	Number of eyewitnesses who are neither officials nor protesters, but passers by or other "common people" affected by protests.	Number of eyewitness sources
Socialmedia_sources	Number of non-official sources from social media. Only include social media with identifiable. If multiple posts/tweets are posted from one person, that only counts as one source.	Number of social media sources
Other_source	Other sources like experts, scholars, other NGOs, etc.	Number of other sources
Frames	Does the story contain the frame…	
a. Circus	Circus is the portrayal of protests as a spectacle, carnival or odd/deviant.	1= yes 0= no
b. Riot	Protests as conflict between protestors and society; mentions of looting, violence by protestors, law-breaking behavior	1= yes 0= no
c. Confrontation	Conflict between protestors and police; protestors	1= yes 0= no

	as combatants, emphasizes clashes between the two groups	
d. Debate	The social critique brought by the protests is at the center of this frame	1= yes 0= no
Appearance	Does the story mention how the protestors look?	1= yes, 0= no
Idiot	Does the story portray the protestors as "idiots;" that is, whether protesters engage in behaviors that make them appear less than serious, politically extreme, unintelligent, or immature about their cause?	1= yes, 0=no
Peaceful	Does the story say the protests were peaceful?	1= yes, 0=no
Violent	Does the story say the protests were violent?	1= yes, 0=no
Violence_blame	Who does the story blame for the violence? If "no cause mentioned," mark 2 (will be removed from analysis later).	1= protestors 2= balanced 3= administration/police
Cause_evaluation	How does the story evaluate the cause? If "no cause mentioned," mark 2 (will be removed from analysis later)	1= negative 2= neutral 3= positive
Protestor_evaluation	Overall, how does the story evaluate the protestors? In an overall assessment of the story, does the article: 3=Partially legitimize/legitimize: The article's general object is to legitimize the protestors by accentuating their demands and efforts at the forefront, even if there are mentions that delegitimize protests in the article. The article overall appears to cover the protestors as a legitimate cause, highlighting demands and objectives. 2=balanced: The overall article makes equal attempts to legitimize and delegitimize aspects of protestors. If no explicit evaluation, also mark neutral. 1=Delegitimize: The article appears to cover the protestors in a negative way. For example, articles may protestors by portraying protests entirely as a spectacle, a spoof, claiming the entirety of the movement is not worthwhile or is ridiculous.	1= negative 2= neutral 3= positive
Administration_evaluation	Overall, how does the story evaluate the administration (police, government, etc.)? In no explicit evaluation, mark 2.	1= negative 2= neutral 3= positive
Thematic/Episodic	Is the article predominantly Thematic or Episodic? Classify based on the predominant frame. Most stories will have a combination between episodic and thematic frames. *Episodic:* the sum of the article describes a specific	1=thematic 2= episodic

	event or moment in time; the who, where, when and what of particular events; episodic frames focus on individual behaviors, events or single issues. *Thematic:* coverage which places political issues and events in some general context, focusing more on "grand scheme" of the issue or the issue over time. Thematic Frames give a larger 'theme' to a story, placing it in the context with larger issues.	

APPENDIX B – SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Welcome to the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas' survey

Conducted by: Rachel R Mourao, School of Journalism, University of Texas - Austin, 300 W Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78712. 512-471-1845, rachelmourao@gmail.com

This is an online survey for journalists, journalism professors and journalism students who live and work in Brazil. You are invited to participate in a survey examining the influences on your work covering protests in 2013 and 2015. Participants will be contributing to critical knowledge of the way journalists in the country report on political events. Those who express an interest will be sent a copy of the final study and you are free to contact the investigator at the above address and phone number to discuss the study. You must be at least 18 years old to participate.
This form provides you with information about the study. Participation in this study is voluntary and refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Also, you may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. There are no anticipated risks to participants and your answers will be kept confidential. The principal investigator of the study will keep the data on her password-protected computer on the campus of the University of Texas at Austin. Participation is free.
We estimate that it will take about 15 minutes of your time to complete the questionnaire. If you have any questions or would like us to further inform you about the results of this research, do not hesitate to contact Rachel R. Mourao at rachelmourao@gmail.com, or (+1) 512-471-1845. You may also request a hard copy of the survey via the contact information above. To complete the survey, click CONTINUE (below) and follow the instructions. This study has been processed by the Office of Research Support. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, complaints, concerns, or questions about the research please contact the Office of Research Support at (512) 471-8871 or email: orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu.

Statement of Consent:

I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make a decision about participating in this study. By clicking YES below, I affirm that I am at least 18 years old, and I consent to participate in this study.

1. You are:
___ Journalist
___ Journalism educator
___ Journalism student
___ None of the above (leave the survey)

2. How many years have you been working in the news industry?
(Pull down)

3. Which of the following statements best describe your current work situation as it relates to the news business?
___ I work as a journalist in a news organization
___ I work as a trainee/intern
___ I work as an independent journalist (I have my own news outlet) (skip next 6 questions)
___ I work as a freelancer (for news organizations) (skip next 6 questions)
___ I am actually unemployed (skip next 6 questions)
___ Other (Please specify)_____ (skip next 6 questions)

4. What type of news organization do you work for?
___ Television Station
___ Cable News Network
___ Newspaper
___ Radio Station
___ Community Radio
___ Magazine
___ Newswire
___ Online news media
___ Other (Please specify) _____

5. In what state is your news organization located?
(Pull down)

6. What is the name of the organization you work for? _____

7. How many years have you been working in your current news organization?
(Pull down)

8. What is the geographic scope of the media organization you work for?
___ Local ___ Regional ___ National
___ International

9. What is your title? (editor, producer, reporter, etc.)
_____

10. How many people are employed in your newsroom?
___ 1-5 people
___ 6-10 people
___ 11-20 people

___ 21-50 people
___ 51-100 people
___ More than 100 people

Regarding your social media use

11. Do you have an account / profile in any of the following social platforms? Select all that apply.

___ Facebook
___ Twitter
___ Whatsapp
___ Snapchat
___ LinkedIn
___ Youtube
___ Instagram
___ Tumblr
___ Pinterest
___ Google Plus+
___ Flickr
___ Reddit
___ Hi5
___ Blogger
___ Wordpress
___ I don't use social platforms (skip 4 next questions)
____ Other (Please list _____)

12. What do you use social platforms for? Rank the following from 1 to 6 according to your main use:

___ To keep in touch with family/friends
___ To write/discuss about daily life events
___ To keep up with the news
___ To publicize your own work
___ To find ideas or sources for news stories
___ To find entertainment/distraction

12. On a scale where 1 is "Not reliable at all", and 10 is "Very reliable", how reliable is the information posted on social platforms by the follow sources?	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	8	9	10
12a. Information posted by journalists										
12b. Information posted by news organizations										

12c. Information posted by politicians										
12d. Information posted by opinion leaders (other than journalists or politicians). For example, community leaders, personalities, intellectuals, writers, etc.										
12e. Information posted by users you know (family, friends)										
12f. Information posted by users you don't know										

13. How often do you use social/digital platforms for: (1 = never, 10 = all the time)	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
13a. Finding ideas for news stories										
13b. Finding sources for news stories										
13c. Receiving people's feedback on the stories you write										
13d. Finding out what people are talking about										
13e. Download databases										
13f. Interview sources via email or direct messages										
13g. Get background information for stories from online sources										
13h. Fact-check using the web or databases										
13i. Keep up with the news by reading other news organizations' websites or social media pages										
13j. Search or receive press releases										
13k. Publicize your own work										

14. What do you do when you find story ideas on social platforms

___ You ask your boss if you should investigate it further

___ You ask your boss if you can publish the information as soon as possible
___ You don't need to ask anyone and make your own decision to investigate or publish the information
___ You never find information or story ideas on social platforms

15. Does your news organization have policies regarding the use of social platforms such as Facebook or Twitter?
____ Yes ____ No (skip to 17)

16. If yes, what are the main points of the policy?
_____

Now thinking about the 2013 June protests
17. In general, do you think social platforms were a useful tool for covering the protests? (1= not at all, 10= a lot)

18. Why? _____

19. On a scale where 1 is "Never" and 10 is "All the time", how often did you use social platforms when covering the protests:	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
19a. Finding out the details of the protest organization (date, place of demonstrations)										
19b. Contact the protest organizers										
19c. Finding sources for news stories about the protests										
19d. Receiving people's feedback on the stories you wrote about the protests										
19e. Finding out what people are talking about regarding the protests										

20. How often did you post material related to the 2013 protests on your **personal** social media account?
1= never to 10= all the time

21. In general, you think the mainstream media coverage of the protests was:
(1= unfavorable toward the protest, 10= favorable toward the protest)

22. In general, you think the editorial line of the media outlet you work for was:

(1= unfavorable toward the 2013 protest, 10= favorable toward the 2013 protest)

23. In general, are you…
(1= unfavorable toward the 2013 protests, 10= favorable toward the 2013 protests)?

24. When thinking about the protests in June of 2013, can you rank the main grievances that led to the demonstrations?
_____Economic factors (work, prices, inflation, lack of opportunities)
_____Education (lack of opportunities, high tuition, poor quality, education policy)
_____Infrastructure (public transportation, roads)
_____Political topics (protest against laws, parties or political candidates, exclusion, corruption)
_____Security problems (crime, gangs)
_____Human rights
_____Environmental themes
_____Lack of public services
_____Other _____

25. Did you participate in the 2013 mobilization as a protestor?
1 – yes
2 – no

26. In general, what do you think the 2013 protests were about?

The next questions will refer to the way you covered the 2015 March protests

27. In general, do you think social platforms were a useful tool for covering the 2015 protests?
(1= not at all, 10= a lot)

28. Why? _____

29. On a scale where 1 is "Never" and 10 is "All the time", how often did you use social platforms when covering the 2015 protests:	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
29a. Finding out the details of the protest organization (date, place of demonstrations)										
29b. Contact the protest organizers										
29c. Finding sources for news stories about the protests										

29d. Receiving people's feedback on the stories you wrote about the protests										
29e. Finding out what people are talking about regarding the protests										

30. How often did you post material related to the 2015 protests on your **personal** social media account?
1= never to 10= all the time

31. In general, you think the mainstream media coverage of the 2015 protests was:
(1= unfavorable toward the protest, 10= favorable toward the protest)

32. In general, you think the editorial line of the media outlet you work for was:
(1= unfavorable toward the 2015 protest, 10= favorable toward the 2013 protest)

33. In general, are you…
(1= unfavorable toward the 2015 protest, 10= favorable toward the 2015 protest)?

34. When thinking about the protests in June of 2015, can you rank the main grievances that led to the demonstrations?
_____Economic factors (work, prices, inflation, lack of opportunities)
_____Education (lack of opportunities, high tuition, poor quality, education policy)
_____Infrastructure (public transportation, roads)
_____Political topics (protest against laws, parties or political candidates, exclusion, corruption)
_____Security problems (crime, gangs)
_____Human rights
_____Environmental themes
_____Lack of public services
_____Other _____

35. Did you participate in the 2015 mobilization as a protestor?
1 – yes
2 – no

36. In general, what do you think the 2015 protests were about?

37. What were, in your opinion, the main differences between the 2013 and 2015 protests?

38. Now speaking about your own political engagement, listed below are some more activities that you may or may not have engaged in. Please tell us how often you have been involved in the past 12 months in the following activities.

	1 (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	5 (5)	6 (6)	7 (7)	8 (8)	9 (9)	(10)
a. Attended a political rally b. Donated money to a campaign or political cause c. Been involved in public interest groups, political action groups, political clubs, political campaigns, or political party committees d. Changed your social media profile picture in support of a cause e. Participated in an online question and answer session with a politician or public official 38g. Created an online petition f.. Tried to persuade your friends and acquaintances about political causes or a candidate										

40. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself politically more aligned to the left or right? Please rate yourself on a scale where 1 = Strong Left and 10 = Strong Right.

41. How interested are you in politics?
(1= not at all, 10= a lot)

42. How much do you approve or disapprove? 1 (strongly disapprove) to 10 (strongly approve)

a. Of people participating in legal street demonstrations.
b. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems.
c. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest.
d. Of people seizing private property or land to protest
e. Of people boycotting a product as a form of protest
f. Of people participating in sit-ins as a form of protest

g. Of people participating in a protest to impeach an elected government
h. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government.
i. Of people signing online petitions as a form of protest

43. In the last 12 months, how many times did you…
a. Attend public demonstrations_____
b. Block the roads to protest_____
c. Seize private property to protest_____
d. Attend political forums and debates _____
e. Sign a petition to authorities online_____
f. Sign a petition to authorities offline_____
g. Participate in meetings with authorities _____
h. Boycott a product_____
i. Participate in a sit-in_____
j. Send letters to the media about a grievance_____
k. Share content online related to a social movement (e.g. Used the hashtag #VemPraRua) _____

44. Thinking about the most recent time you participated in a protest or demonstration, what was the main grievance of that demonstration?
1. Economic factors (work, prices, inflation, lack of opportunities)
2. Education (lack of opportunities, high tuition, poor quality, education policy)
3. Political topics (protest against laws, parties or political candidates, exclusion, corruption)
4. Security problems (crime, gangs)
5. Human rights
6. Environmental themes
7. Lack of public services
8. Other
88. DK
99. Never participated

Now thinking about journalism and its role in society…

45. Rank your level of agreement with the following statements, 1= strongly disagree to 10= strongly agree:

a. My role as a journalist is to be a watchdog for society.
b. My role as a journalist is to be objective.
c. My role as a journalist is to give a voice to the voiceless.
d. My role as a journalist is to advocate for social justice.
e. Journalists should never make their standpoint transparent in a news article.

f. Journalists should never participate in political protests.

46. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all and 10= is a lot, how much do you agree with the following statements?

a. It is ethical for a journalist to take a stance against injustices, corruption, or other wrong-doings
b. Journalists should always remain objective, or neutral
c. Balance matters more than objectivity
d. Transparency matters more than objectivity
e. I consider myself to work for mainstream media.
f. I consider myself to work for alternative media.
g. Mainstream media do better journalism than alternative media.
h. Alternative media are valuable in society.
i. Alternative media are merely a supplement for mainstream media.
j. Alternative media play an important role in furthering democracy.
k. Mainstream media play an important role in furthering democracy.
l. Alternative media journalists are more ethical than mainstream media journalists.
m. Alternative media are more financially independent than mainstream media.
n. Alternative media journalists are activists.
o. Journalists should refrain from activism.
p. Some observers believe the truest form of journalism is to advocate and be an activist for society. Rate your level of agreement with this idea.
q. Alternative media use new technologies in more innovative ways than mainstream media.
r. Alternative media lack the funding that mainstream media have to adopt new technologies.

47. Now thinking about Midia Ninja, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements…

Ninja Media is practicing real journalism (1= strongly disagree, 10= strongly agree)
Midia Ninja are activists, not journalists. (1= strongly disagree, 10= strongly agree)

Finally, we have questions regarding your demographic characteristics:

45. What is the highest level of education you have achieved?
1. High school graduate
2. Technical school degree
3. Some college
4. College graduate
5. Some graduate or professional school
6. Graduate professional degree
7. Master's degree

8. PhD

46. Age: ____ years old

47. Gender: ____ Female ____ Male

48. Do you consider yourself as part of which social class?
1. Lower
2. Lower middle
3. Middle
4. Upper middle
5. upper
6. DK

APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW GUIDE

Interviewee (Title and Name): _____

Sections Used:

_____ A: Reporting protocol
_____ B: Social media
_____ C: Attitudes regarding the protests
_____ D: Attitudes regarding media coverage of protests
_____ E: Conclusion

Other Topics
Discussed:_____

Introductory Protocol

Good morning!
Thank you for your interest in participating in the follow-up interviews for our study on how journalists covered the 2013-15 protests in Brazil.
To help with our note-taking, we'd like to audio-tape our conversations today. For your information, I will be the only to have access to the tapes, which will be eventually destroyed after they are transcribed. You can withdraw from the study, without repercussions, before, during or after this interview is completed.
Anonymity will be ensured in the write-up by disguising your identity. Disguised extracts from your interview may be quoted in any subsequent publications, but neither your name or the name of your news organization will be used in the final study.
Data collected during this study will be retained for about two years and I will be the only person to have access to this data.
My guess is that this interview will take around twenty minutes. During this time, we have several questions we'd like to cover. Do you agree to continue participating in the interview?
We will start with a series of questions about your experience covering the protests:

Interview schedule

A. REPORTING PROTOCOL:

1. Did you cover the 2013 protests in Brasil? (If no, skip to section C)
2. Walk me through your reporting of the 2013 protests…

    a) How did you start covering them?
    b) When did you realize it was a big story?
    c) Which sources did you actively seek for when covering the protests?
    d) What types of activities did you prioritize in the coverage?

2. How about the 2015 protests?
   a) How did you start covering them?
   b) When did you realize it was a big story?
   c) Which sources did you actively seek for when covering the protests?
   d) What types of activities did you prioritize in the coverage?
3. Tell me about some of the differences between the coverage of the 2013 and 2015 protests

B. SOCIAL MEDIA:

1. How do you think social media has impacted your daily reporting routine?
2. In a regular day in the newsroom, what do you use social platforms for?
   Probing:
   a. To find sources?
   b. Find additional information?
   c. To monitor what is going on?
   d. To get feedback?
3. How did you use social media to cover the protests?
4. How do you think covering protests was different before and after social media

C. ATTITUDES REGARDING THE PROTESTS:

1. About the 2013 protests….
   a) In general, what do you think the 2013 protests were about?
   b) What do you think about the protestors' demands in 2013?
   c) What do you think about the protestors' tactics in 2013?

2. Now about 2015…
   a) What do you think the 2015 protests were about?
   b) What do you think about the protestors' demands in 2015?
   c) What do you think about the protestors' tactics in 2015?
   d) What were, in your opinion, the main differences between the 2013 and 2015 protests?

D. ATTITUDES REGARDING MEDIA COVERAGE OF PROTESTS

1. About 2013 protests:
   a) How do you view the media coverage of the protests?
   b) How do you view your outlets' editorial policies when covering the protests?
   c) How do you view your coverage of the protests?
   d) What would you say were some of the main constraints when covering the protests?

2. About 2015 protests:
   e) How do you view the media coverage of the protests?
   f) How do you view your outlets' editorial policies when covering the protests?

g) How do you view your coverage of the protests?
h) What would you say were some of the main constraints when covering the protests?

E. CONCLUSION

1. Is there anything else you'd like to say about your experiences?
2. Is there anyone else you suggest I contact for this research

APPENDIX D – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF MAIN VARIABLES OF INTEREST

Table D.1 – Descriptive statistics of variables from content analysis

			2013		2015	
Variable	**Definition**	**Range**	**M**	**SD**	**M**	**SD**
Violence blame	Who does the story blame for the violence	1= protestors, 2= balanced, 3= police	1.69	0.8	1.16	0.4
Protestor evaluation	Overall, how does the story portray protestors?	1= negative, 2= neutral, 3=positive	2.01	0.72	2.1	0.58
Cause evaluation	Overall, how does the story portray protestors' cause?	1= negative, 2= neutral, 3=positive	2.19	0.49	2.14	0.59
Administration evaluation	Overall, how does the story portray the administration (police, government, etc.)?	1= negative, 2= neutral, 3=positive	1.77	0.57	1.59	0.6
Percentage of official sources	Number of official sources quoted in the story divided by total sources quotes.	0-100%	36	45.4	59.69	48.19
Percentage of protestor sources	Number of protestor sources quoted in the story divided by total sources quotes.	0-100%	23	38.93	11.5	31.57
Percentage of other non-official sources	Number of other sources quoted in the story divided by total sources quotes.	0-100%	35	44.83	25	18.9

Table D.2 – Descriptive statistics of outcome variables from survey

			2013		2015	
Variable	**Definition**	**Range**	**M**	**SD**	**M**	**SD**
Individual support for protests	In general, you think the mainstream media coverage of the protests was:	1= 'totally unfavorable' to 10= 'totally favorable'	7.72	2.35	4.67	3.11
Outlet's support for protests	In general, you think the editorial line of the media outlet you work for is:	1= 'totally unfavorable' to 10= 'totally favorable'	5.82	2.29	5.89	2.45
Mainstream media support for protests	In general, you are:	1= 'totally unfavorable' to 10= 'totally favorable'	4.98	2.46	7.21	2.58

Table D.3 – Descriptive statistics of independent variables from survey

Variable	Definition	Range	M	SD
Age	Age in years	18 to 73	33.08	11.89
Social Class	Measured as "would you say that your household growing up was…1=lower class, 2= lower middle class, 3= middle class, 4= upper middle class, 5= upper class"	1 to 5	3.02	.83
Political leaning	Political *leaning* was measured in a 10-point scale item where 1= strong left and 10= strong right	1 to 10	3.89	2.07
Political participation	Index: a. Attended a political protest b. Donated money to a campaign or political cause c. Been involved in public interest groups, political action groups, political clubs, political campaigns, or political party committees d. Created an online petition e. Changed your social media profile picture in support of a cause f. Joined a political or cause-related group on a social media site g. Tried to persuade your friends and acquaintances about a social cause, political cause or to support a candidate	1 to 10	3.34	2.07
Size of the newsroom	What is the size of the newsroom the journalist work for from 1=very small (1 to 5 people) to 6=very large (more than 100 people).	1 to 6	3.20	1.83

Variable	Definition	Range	M	SD
Social media for daily reporting - Gatekeeping	Index of social media use for finding sources, story ideas, receiving feedback and publicizing own work on social media (1= never, 10= all the time)	1 to 10	6.80	2.04
Social media for daily reporting - Awareness	Index of social media use for finding out what people are talking about, following news from other organizations, and getting background information (1= never, 10= all the time)	1 to 10	7.73	1.82
Social media for protest reporting - Gatekeeping	Index of social media use for finding sources for news stories and receiving people's feedback on the stories you wrote about the protests (1= never, 10= all the time).	1 to 10	6.27	3.06
Social media for protest reporting - Awareness	Index of social media use for finding out what people are talking about regarding the protests, finding out the details of the protest organization (date, location, etc.) and contacting protest organizers (1= never, 10= all the time).	1 to 10	9.19	1.09

References

Abreu, A. A. (2002). *A modernização da imprensa (1970-2000)*. São Paulo, SP: Jorge Zahar Editor.

Albuquerque, A. (2012). On models and margins: comparative media models viewed from a Brazilian perspective. Comparing media systems beyond the western world, 72-95. In D. C. Hallin & P. Mancini (Eds.), *Comparing media systems beyond the western world* (pp. 72–95).

Albuquerque, A., & SILVA, M. A. R. D. (2009). Skilled, loyal and disciplined: the communist journalists and the adaptation of the American Independent Journalism Model in Brazil. *The International Journal of Press/Politics, Washington DC*, *14*(3), 376-395.

Artwick C (2013) Reporters on Twitter. *Digital Journalism* 1(2): 212–228.

Azevedo, F. A. (2006). Mídia e democracia no Brasil: relações entre o sistema de mídia e o sistema político. *Opinião Pública*, *12*(1), 88–113. doi:10.1590/S0104-62762006000100004

Azevedo, F. A. (2006). Mídia e democracia no Brasil: relações entre o sistema de mídia e o sistema político. *Opinião Pública*, *12*(1), 88–113. http://doi.org/10.1590/S0104-62762006000100004

Babbie, E. R. (2013). *The practice of social research* (Vol. 13th, student). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Barbosa, S. (2016). *Brasil*. In Salaverría, R. (Ed). Ciberperiodismo en Iberoamérica. Madrid, Spain: Editora Ariel.

Beauchamp, Z. (2016, April 13). Brazil's political crisis, explained in 500 words. *Vox*. Retrieved from: http://www.vox.com/2016/4/13/11416578/brazil-petrobras-rousseff-impeachment

Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements : An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *26*, 26:611–39.

Bennett, W. L. (1990). Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States. *Journal of Communication*, *40*(2), 103–125.

Bennett, W. L. (2009). News: the politics of illusion . New York, NY: Pearson Longman.

Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The Logic of Connective Action. *Information, Communication & Society, 15*(5), 739-768. doi:10.1080/1369118x.2012.670661

Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2013). *The logic of connective action : digital media and the personalization of contentious politics*: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bennett, W. L., Lawrence, R. G., & Livingston, S. (2007). When the press fails: political power and the news media from Iraq to Katrina . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press .

Boulianne, S. (2015). Social media use and participation: a meta-analysis of current research. *Information, Communication & Society*, 18(5), 524-538.

Boyle, M. P., McCluskey, M. R., McLeod, D. M., & Stein, S. E. (2005). Newspapers and protest: An examination of protest coverage from 1960 to 1999. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *82*(3), 638-653.

Boyle, M. P., McLeod, D. M., & Armstrong, C. L. (2012). Adherence to the Protest Paradigm: The Influence of Protest Goals and Tactics on News Coverage in U.S. and International Newspapers. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *17*(2), 127–144. http://doi.org/10.1177/1940161211433837

Breed, W. (1955). Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis. *Social Forces*, *33*(4), 326–335.

Bruns, Axel. 2005. Gatewatching: Collaborative Online News Production. New York: Peter Lang.

Bucci, E. (2000). *Sobre Ética e Imprensa*. São Paulo, SP: Companhia das Letras.

Chadwick, A. (2013). *The hybrid media system: politics and power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Conti, M. S. (1999). Notícias do Planalto. *São Paulo: Companhia das Letras*.

Cook, T. E. (2006). The News Media as a Political Institution: Looking Backward and Looking Forward. *Political Communication*, *23*(2), 159–171. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600600629711

Costa, C. (2013, June 11). Brasileiros 'descobrem' mobilização em redes sociais durante protestos. *BBC Brasil.* Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2013/07/130628_protestos_redes_personagens_cc

Coy, P. G. (2013). Co-Optation. In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Craft, S., & Wanta, W. (2004). Women in the Newsroom: Influences of Female Editors and Reporters on the News Agenda. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *81*(1), 124–138. http://doi.org/10.1177/107769900408100109

D'Angelo, P. (2011). Studying Framing in Political Communication with an Integrative Approach. *American Behavioral Scientist, 56*(3), 353-364. doi:10.1177/0002764211426332

Dardis, F. E. (2006). Marginalization Devices in U.S. Press Coverage of Iraq War Protest: A Content Analysis. *Mass Communication & Society*, *9*(2), 117–135.

de Vreese, C. H. (2012). New Avenues for Framing Research. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *56*(3), 365–375. http://doi.org/10.1177/0002764211426331

Duggan, M. (2016). *The Demographics of Social Media*. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from: http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the-demographics-of-social-media-users/

Entman, R.M., & Page, B. I. (1994). The news before the storm: the Iraq War debate and the limits to media independence. In Bennett, L., & Paletz, D.L. (eds.), *Taken by storm: the media, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf War,* p. 82-104. Chicago. IL: University of Chicago Press.

Entman, R. M., & Rojecki, A. (1993). Freezing out the public: Elite and media framing of the U.S. anti-nuclear movement. *Political Communication*, *10*(2), 151–167. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.1993.9962973

Fahmy, S., & Johnson, T. J. (2012). Invasion vs occupation: A hierarchy-of-influences analysis of how embeds assess influences and performance in covering the Iraq War . *International Communication Gazette* , *74* (1), 23–42. http://doi.org/10.1177/1748048511426988

Fishman, M. (1980). *Manufacturing the news*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Folha de São Paulo (2015, March 22). O fim da política como projeto para o país. Folha de São Paulo, retrieved from Factiva.

Folha de São Paulo. (2013, July 07). Poder: Interior salva Alckmim de recuo maior em pesquisa. *Folha de São Paulo*, retrieved from Factiva.

Fox, E. & Waisbord, S. (2002). Latin Politics, Global Media. Austin, TX: Texas University Press

Freelon, D. (2013). ReCal OIR: Ordinal, interval, and ratio intercoder reliability as a web service. *International Journal of Internet Science,* 8(1): 10-16.

Freeman, J. (1975). The politics of women's liberation: a case study of an emerging social movement and its relation to the policy process . New York, NY: Longman.

Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. H. (1965). The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers. *Journal of Peace Research*, *2*(1), 64–90. http://doi.org/10.1177/002234336500200104

Gamson, W. A. (2008). Bystanders, public opinion, and the media. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements.* (pp. 242–261.). John Wiley & Sons.

Gamson, W. a., & Wolfsfeld, G. (1993). Movements and Media as Interacting Systems. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *528*(1), 114–125. http://doi.org/10.1177/0002716293528001009

Gans, H. (1979). *Deciding what's news: A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news, Newsweek, and Time*.

García Canclini, N. (1997). *Hybrid cultures: strategies for entering and leaving modernity* (Vol. N - Newiti). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. http://doi.org/10.5749/j.cttts9sz

Garrett, K.R. (2006). Protest in an Information Society: a review of literature on social movements and new ICTs. *Information, Communication & Society*, *9*(2), 202–224. http://doi.org/10.1080/13691180600630773

Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self-identity: the self and society in late modern age.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching: mass media in the making & unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Gonzatto, M. (2015, March 14). Quem são os articuladores nacionais do protesto contra Dilma. *Zero Hora*. Retrieved from: http://zh.clicrbs.com.br/rs/noticias/noticia/2015/03/quem-sao-os-articuladores-nacionais-do-protesto-contra-dilma-4718377.html

Hall, S. (1982). The Rediscovery of Ideology: Return of the Repressed in Media Studies. In M. Gurevitch, T. Bennet, J. Curran and J. Woollacott (eds) *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Methuen. (pp. 56–90).

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing Media Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Harlow, S., & Harp, D. (2012). Collective Action on the Web. *Information, Communication & Society*, *15*(2), 196–216. http://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2011.591411

Hayes, A.F. & Krippendorff, K. (2007). Answering the call for a standard reliability measure for coding data. *Communication methods and measures* 1 (1): 77-89.

Hedman, U., & Djerf-Pierre, M. (2013). The social journalist: Embracing the social media life or creating a new digital divide?. *Digital Journalism*, *1*(3), 368-385.

Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (2002). *Manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Hermida, A. (2010). Twittering the news: The emergence of ambient journalism. *Journalism Practice*, *4*(3), 297-308. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17512781003640703

Hermida, A. (2013). # Journalism: Reconfiguring journalism research about Twitter, one tweet at a time. *Digital Journalism*, *1*(3), 295-313.

Hermida, A., Lewis, S. C., & Zamith, R. (2014). Sourcing the arab spring: a case study of Andy Carvin's sources on twitter during the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *19*(3), 479-499.

Herscovitz, H. (2012). Brazilian journalists in the 21st century. In: Weaver, D. & Wilnat, L. (eds.). *The Global Journalist in the 21st Century.* New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 365–381.

Hertog, J. K., & McLeod, D. M. (2003). A multiperspectival approach to framing analysis: a field guide. In S. Reese, O. Gandy, & A. Grant (Eds.), *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World* (pp. 139–161). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Howard, P. N., & Chadwick, A. (2008). *Routledge handbook of internet politics*. New York: Routledge.

Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a definition of mixed methods research. *Journal of mixed methods research*,*1*(2), 112-133.

Kraidy, M. M. (2002). Hybridity in cultural globalization. *Communication Theory*, *12*(3), 316–339. http://doi.org/10.1093/ct/12.3.316

Kucinski, B. (1998). *A síndrome da antena parabólica: ética no jornalismo brasileiro*

(Vol. 1a). São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo.

LAPOP. (2014). Latin America Research Project: Methods and Practices. Retrieved from: http://vanderbilt.edu/lapop/methods-practices.php

Laschever, E., & Boykoff, J. (2011). The Tea Party Movement, Framing, and the US Media. *Social Movement Studies*, *10*(4), 341-366. http://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2011.614104

Lasorsa, D., Lewis, S. & Holton, A. (2012). Normalizing Twitter: Journalism Practice in an Emerging Communication Space. *Journalism Studies*, 13, 19–36.

Lawrence, R. G. (2001). Defining events: Problem definition in the media arena. In: Hart, R.P., & Sparrow, B. H. (Eds.). (2001). Politics, discourse, and American society: New agendas. Rowman & Littlefield, 91-110.

Lawrence, R. G. (2012) Campaign news in the time of Twitter: An observational study, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, August 30 – September 2, 2012.

Lawrence, R. G. (1996). Accidents, icons, and indexing: the dynamics of news coverage of police use of force. *Political Communication*, *13*(4), 437–454. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.1996.9963130

Lawrence, R. G. (2012). Indexing. In *Oxford Bibliographies in Communication*. Retrieved from //www.oxfordbibliographies.com/document/obo-9780199756841/obo-9780199756841-0090.xml

Lawrence, R. G., Molyneux, L., Coddington, M., & Holton, A. (2014). Tweeting Conventions: Political journalists' use of Twitter to cover the 2012 presidential campaign. *Journalism Studies*, *15*(6), 789-806.

Lee, F. L. F. (2014). Triggering the Protest Paradigm: Examining Factors Affecting News Coverage of Protests. *International Journal of Communication*, *8*, 22. Retrieved from http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/2873

Lewis, S. C., Zamith, R., & Hermida, A. (2013). Content Analysis in an Era of Big Data: A Hybrid Approach to Computational and Manual Methods. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, *57*(1), 34–52. http://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2012.761702

Lima, V. A. de. (2006). *Mídia: crise política e poder no Brasil* (Vol. 1a.). São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo.

Lopes, P. (2007). O Movimento Diretas Já e a Cobertura do Jornal Zero Hora: uma

Análise a partir da Agenda-Setting (thesis). Retrieved from: http://www.bocc.uff.br/pag/lopes-poliana-o-movimento-directas-ja-e-a-cobertura-do-jornal.pdf

Matos, C. (2008). *Journalism and political democracy in Brazil*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Mattos, S. (2002). História da televisão brasileira: uma visão econômica, social e política. Petropolis, RJ, Brazil: Editora Vozes

McFarlane, T., & Hay, I. (2003). The battle for Seattle: protest and popular geopolitics in The Australian newspaper. *Political Geography*. Elsevier Ltd. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00090-2

McLeod, D. M. (2007). News Coverage and Social Protest: How the Media's Protect Paradigm Exacerbates Social Conflict. *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, 185.

McLeod, D. M., & Hertog, J. K. (1992). The Manufacture of `Public Opinion' by Reporters: Informal Cues for Public Perceptions of Protest Groups. *Discourse & Society*, *3*(3), 259–275. http://doi.org/10.1177/0957926592003003001

Mello, P.C. (2013, June 18). Por que fui?. *Folha de São Paulo,* retrieved from Factiva.

Miguel, L. F. (2001). Meios de comunicação de massa e política no brasil. *Diálogos Latinoamericanos*, *3*, 43-70.

Miguel, L.F. (2002). *Política e mídia no brasil: episódios da história recente*. Brasilia, DF, Brazil: Plano Editora, 2002.

Molyneux, L. & Holton, A. (2015). Branding (Health) Journalism: Perceptions, Practices, and Emerging Norms. *Digital Journalism* 3: 225–42.

Molyneux, L., Mourao, R.R., & Coddington, M. (2016). The Twitter Election: U.S. political journalists' use of Twitter during the 2012 elections. In M. Just, C. Holtz-Bacha & R. Davis (Eds.). *Twitter and Election Campaigns.* Forthcoming.

Mooney, P. H., & Hunt, S. A. (1996). A REPERTOIRE OF INTERPRETATIONS:. Master Frames and Ideological Continuity in U.S. Agrarian Mobilization. *The Sociological Quarterly*, *37*(1), 177–197. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.1996.tb02336.x

Moraes, T. & Santos, R. (2013). Os Protestos no Brasil. Um estudo sobre as pesquisas na web, e o caso da Primavera Brasileira. *Rev. Int. Investig. Cienc. Soc*., 9(2), 193-206.

Moreira, O. L., & Lima Santiago, I. M. F. (2013). Vem prá rua: os protestos de junho. In: Sousa, C., & Souza, A. (Eds). Jornadas de Junho: Repercussões e Leituras. Campina Grande, PB, Brasil: Eduepb. (Pp 13-22).

Moreira, S. V. & Rodrigues Helal, C. L. (2009). Notes on media, journalism education and news organizations in Brazil.*Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism, 10*, 91–107.

Moretzsohn, D. S. (2013, June 16) Muito além dos 20 centavos. *Observatório da Imprensa.* Retrieved from: http://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br/news/view/muito_alem_dos_20_centavos

Mourão, R., Diehl, T. & Vasudevan, K. (2015). I Love Big Bird: How Journalists Tweeted Humor during the 2012 Presidential Debates. *Digital Journalism*. Published online before print. doi:10.1080/21670811.2015.1006861.

Neuendorf, K. (2001). *The Content Analysis Guidebook* (1st edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Newman, N. & Levy, D. A. L. (eds.) (2014). Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2014 Tracking The Future Of News. Retrieved from: http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2014/

O Estado de São Paulo (2013b, June 19). SP tem noite de caos, com ataque à Prefeitura e onda de saques. *O Estado de São Paulo,* retrieved from Factiva.

O Estado de São Paulo (2015, April 04). De novo, tucano faz mistério sobre presença em protesto. O Estado de São Paulo, retrieved from Factiva.

Papacharissi, Z. (2010). *A networked self: identity, community and culture on social network sites*. New York: Routledge. http://doi.org/10.4324/9780203876527

Papacharissi, Z. (2014). *Affective publics: sentiment, technology, and politics*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Reese, S. (2003). Prologue-Framing Public Life. In S. Reese, O. Gandy, & A. Grant (Eds.), *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World* (pp. 11-36). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Reese, S. (2010). Finding frames in a web of culture 17-42. In P. D'Angelo (Ed.), *Doing news framing analysis: Empirical and theoretical perspectives* (pp. 17–42). New York, NY: Routledge.

Reese, S. D. (1990). The news paradigm and the ideology of objectivity: A socialist at the Wall Street Journal. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 7(4), 390-409.

Riffe, D., Lacy 1948, S., & Fico, F. (2005). *Analyzing media messages: using quantitative content analysis in research*. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

Rodgers, S., & Thorson, E. (2003). A Socialization Perspective on Male and Female Reporting. *Journal of Communication*, *53*(4), 658–675. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2003.tb02916.x

Rodrigues, A. (2013, July 7). Alckmim volta a falar em "vandalismo." *O Estado de São Paulo*, retrieved from Factiva.

Rogstad, I. D. (2014). Political News Journalists in Social Media: Transforming political reporters into political pundits?. *Journalism Practice*,*8*(6), 688-703.

Romero, S. & Neuman, W. (2013, June 20) Sweeping Protests in Brazil Pull In an Array of Grievances. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/world/americas/brazil-protests.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Saldana, M., & Mourao, R. R. (2015). Reporting in Latin America: Issues and perspectives on investigative journalism in the region. In *Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication National Conference*.

Saldaña, M., Higgins Joyce, V. D. M., Schmitz Weiss, A., & Alves, R. C. (2016). Sharing the Stage: Analysis of social media adoption by Latin American journalists. *Journalism Practice*, forthcoming.

Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication, 49*(1), 103.

Schmitz Weiss, A. (2015). The digital and social media journalist: A comparative analysis of journalists in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. *International Communication Gazette ,77* (1): 74-101. doi:10.1177/1748048514556985

Schultz, S. (2005, December 28). Calls made to strengthen state energy policies. *The Country Today*, pp. 1A, 2A.

Shahin, S., Zheng, P., Sturm, H. A., & Fadnis, D. (2016). Protesting the Paradigm A Comparative Study of News Coverage of Protests in Brazil, China, and India. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, forthcoming.

Shoemaker, P. J. (1991). *Gatekeeping*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Shoemaker, P. J., & Reese, S. D. (1996). *Mediating the message*. White Plains, NY: Longman.

Shoemaker, P., & Reese, S. D. (2014). *Mediating the Message in the 21st Century : A Media Sociology Perspective.* New York: Taylor & Francis Group.

Sinclair, J., & Straubhaar, J. D. (2013). *Latin American television industries*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Singer, J. B. (2005). The Political J-Blogger: 'Normalizing' a New Media Form to Fit Old Norms and Practices. *Journalism*, 6(2), 173–98.

Snider, P. B. (1967). "Mr. Gates" Revisited: A 1966 Version of the 1949 Case Study. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *44*(3), 419–427. http://doi.org/10.1177/107769906704400301

Snow, D. a., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review*, *51*(4), 464. http://doi.org/10.2307/2095581

Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A., & Kriesi, H. (2004). *The Blackwell companion to social movements*. Malden, MA : Blackwell Pub .

Snow, D., Benford, R., McCammon, H., Hewitt, L., & Fitzgerald, S. (2014). The Emergence, Development, and Future of the Framing Perspective: 25+ Years Since" Frame Alignment". *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *19*(1), 23-46.

Sparrow, B. H. (2006). A research agenda for an institutional media. *Political Communication*, *23*(2), 145-157.

Stauffer, C. (2013, June 21). Social media spreads and splinters Brazil protests. *Reuters*. Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-protests-socialmedia-idUSBRE95K18O20130621

Straubhaar, J. (1989). Television and Video in the Transition from Military to Civilian Rule in Brazil. *Latin American Research Review*, *24*(1), 140–154. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2503285

Straubhaar, J. D. (2007). *World television: from global to local*. Los Angeles: Sage.

Swart, W. J. (1995). The League of Nations and the Irish Question: Master Frames, Cycles of Protest, and "Master Frame Alignment." *The Sociological Quarterly*, *36*(3), 465–481. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.1995.tb00448.x

Tabachnik, B. & Fidell, L. (2013). Using Multivariate Statistics. New York: Harper & Row.

Tarrow, S. (2014). Critical Dialogue. The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics. By Bennett W. Lance and Segerberg Alexandra. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 251p. $85.00 cloth, $29.99 paper. *Perspectives on Politics*, *12*(02), 468–470. http://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000991

Tarrow, S. G. (1994). *Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (2008). *Contentious performances*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tracy, S. J. (2013). *Qualitative Research Methods: Collecting Evidence, Crafting Analysis, Communicating Impact*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Tuchman, G. (1978). *Making news: a study in the construction of reality*. New York: Free Press.

Tufekci, Z. (2014). Social movements and governments in the digital age: Evaluating a complex landscape. *Journal of International Affairs*, *68*(1), 1.

Tunstall, J. (1970). *Media sociology: a reader* (Vol. Amer.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Tunstall, J. (1971). *Journalists at work: specialist correspondents: their news organizations, news sources, and competitor-colleagues*. London: Constable.

UOL (2015, August 16). Com líderes da oposição, 'Fora, Dilma' reúne 795 mil pelo Brasil, diz PM314. *UOL Notícias.* Retrieved from: http://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2015/08/16/com-lideres-da-oposicao-fora-dilma-reune-794-mil-em-25-estados-e-no-df.htm

Valenzuela, S., Arriagada, A., & Scherman, A. (2012). The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior: The Case of Chile. *Journal of Communication*, *62*(2), 299–314. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01635.x

Valocchi, S. (1996). The Emergence of the Integrationist Ideology in the Civil Rights Movement. *Social Problems*, *43*(1), 116–130. http://doi.org/10.1525/sp.1996.43.1.03x0339a

Valocchi, S. (2005). Not Yet Queer Enough: The Lessons of Queer Theory for the Sociology of Gender and Sexuality. *Gender and Society*, *19*(6), 750–770. http://doi.org/10.1177/0891243205280294

Van Laer, J., & Van Aelst, P. (2010). INTERNET AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTION REPERTOIRES. *Information, Communication & Society*, *13*(8), 1146–1171. http://doi.org/10.1080/13691181003628307

Verba, S., Schlozman 1946, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in American politics . Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press .

Vis, Farida. 2013. "Twitter As a Reporting Tool for Breaking News." Digital Journalism 1 (1): 27–47. doi: 10.1080/21670811.2012.741316.

Voakes, P. S. (1997). Social influences on journalists ' decision making in ethical situations. *Journal of Mass Media Ethics : Exploring Questions of Media Morality*, *12*(1), 18–35. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327728jmme1201

Voltmer, K. (2012). How Far Can Media Systems Travel? In D. C. Hallin & P. Mancini (Eds.), *Comparing media systems beyond the western world* (pp. 224–245).

Waisbord,

Waisbord, S. R. (2000). *Watchdog journalism in South America: news, accountability, and democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Watts, J. (2015, March 21). Scandals, protests, weak growth: is Latin America's left in retreat? *The Guardian.* Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/22/latin-america-left-tough-times-brazil-argentina-venezuela

Weaver, D. a., & Scacco, J. M. (2012). Revisiting the Protest Paradigm: The Tea Party as Filtered through Prime-Time Cable News. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*. http://doi.org/10.1177/1940161212462872

Weaver, D. H. (2015). Studying Journalists and Journalism Across Four Decades: A Sociology of Occupations Approach. *Mass Communication and Society*, *18*(1), 4–16. http://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2014.969843

Weaver, D. H. & Wilhoit, G. C. (1986). *The American journalist: a portrait of U.S. news people and their work*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Weaver , D. H. , & Wilhoit , G. C. (1991). *The American journalist: A portrait of U.S. news people and their work*. Bloomington : Indiana University Press .

Weaver, D. H. & Wilhoit, G. C. (1996). *The American journalist in the 1990s: U.S. news people at the end of an era*. Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Weaver, D. H. & Willnat, G. C. (1998). *The Global journalist: news people around the*

world. Cresskill, N.J: Hampton Press.

Weaver, D. H. & Willnat, G. C. (2012). *The global journalist in the 21st century*. New York: Routledge.

White, D. M. (1950). The "Gatekeeper": a case study in the selection of news. *Journalism Quarterly*, *27*, 383–90.

Wolfsfeld, G., Segev, E., & Sheafer, T. (2013). Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *18*(2), 115–137. http://doi.org/10.1177/1940161212471716

Zelizer, B. (2004). Taking journalism seriously: news and the academy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Zeller, F., & Hermida, A. (2015). When Tradition meets Immediacy and Interaction. The Integration of Social Media in Journalists' Everyday Practices. *Sur le journalisme About journalism Sobre jornalismo*, 4(1), 106-119.

Zero Hora (2015, March 22). "Impeachment seria um trauma muito grande." Zero Hora, retrieved from Factiva.

Zero Hora. (2013, June 23). Ativista sugere "carona" na onda de protestos. *Zero Hora*, retrieved from Factiva.

Vita

Rachel Reis Mourão obtained a B.A. degree in Journalism from Universidade Federal do Amazonas in Brazil and a M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of Florida. Her recent research focuses on how technology impacts journalists covering political events. Mourão has taught multiple courses on digital journalism, and her professional experience includes several years working as a digital reporter and social media manager for news organizations in Brazil. She is the recipient of multiple awards including the McCombs Publishing Award, the Markham Student Paper Award, and the Latino/Latin American Communication Research Award in 2015. Mourão will be joining the School of Journalism at Michigan State University as an assistant professor in the fall of 2016.

Permanent address (or email): rachelmourao@gmail.com
This dissertation was typed by the author.